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TheaimofthisthesiswillbetogiveanelucidationofNietzsche’sidealofthepost-moral
autonomous individual: to give a picture of what Nietzsche takes such an individual to
look like, and to show how this picture relates to some of Nietzsche’s most fundamental
philosophical concerns. Overall, my argument will be that autonomy, or rather the
degree of autonomy that a person possesses, is a function of the power of that person
in relation to the other people and forces, and of their ability to extend their will over
long periods of time. Moreover, the achievement of the highest degrees of autonomy,
and by extension the achievement of the greatest levels of power, requires imposing
(whether intentionally or not) an ethic upon one’s actions and one’s self. There are
several features that this ethic must have if it is adequately to perform its function: it
must be self-chosen rather than simply picked up from one’s surroundings, it must act
to give unity to the most diverse collection of collection of drives and affects possible
for the person who holds it, and it must be well tailored to ﬁt their speciﬁc natural
constitution.
In order to establish this I will focus on four main issues: the signiﬁcance of the
sovereign individual of GM II: 2, the role of ethics/values in Nietzsche’s ideal of au-
tonomy, the relation between Nietzsche’s deﬂationary account of consciousness and
his views of freedom, and the notion of unity at play in Nietzsche’s writings. I will
also offer some thoughts on the coherence of Nietzsche’s ideal of autonomy with his
thoughts on life-afﬁrmation.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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vCHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, my aim will be to give an elucidation of Nietzsche’s ideal of
the autonomous individual: to give a picture of what Nietzsche takes such an
individual to look like, and to show how he ties in to some of Nietzsche’s most
fundamental philosophical concerns. In doing so, I will draw upon his works
from Daybreak onwards, i.e. from those of his writings which he tells us in
Ecce Homo constitute his “campaign against morality”1 (EH, “Why I Write Such
Good Books”, D: 1). In general, I will try to focus on the published works
where possible, but I will not avoid using his unpublished notes on principle
where they seem especially clear or helpful.
In the remainder of this introduction I will outline the structure of my the-
sis. Before doing so, however, it will be worth making some brief preliminary
remarks. Firstly, I will give a little more detail about what I take my target to
be. As is well known, Nietzsche’s works contain a large critical element. Many
of the traditional concepts employed in philosophy, such as substance, being,
self, truth, objectivity and so on, are subjected to ﬁerce scrutiny and found to
be either incoherent or lacking any application in the real world. And freedom,2
another staple of the philosophical tradition, is certainly among those notions
that Nietzsche attacks. My main interest in this thesis, however, will not be
with Nietzsche’s critical remarks on the subject.3 Rather, my interest will be in
1All emphasis throughout this thesis is Nietzsche’s unless otherwise stated.
2I will follow Nietzsche in using the terms ‘free’ and ‘autonomous’ and their cognates inter-
changibly throughout this thesis.
3Although obviously I will touch on these issues at several points throughout the course of
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the role autonomy plays in the positive aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy, i.e. in
those parts of his corpus where he is not merely attacking traditional ideas, but
is actually engaged in some of the conceptual rebuilding work that is required if
we take his critical tirades seriously.
This positive aspect of Nietzsche’s thought may often be a lot more tenta-
tive or experimental in comparison with his infamously ferocious attacks on
accepted philosophical notions. In spite of this, I still hope to show that there is
enough coherence and substance in Nietzsche’s remarks on this topic to make
them worthy of consideration. There is, however, one misunderstanding which
should be warded off right at the very beginning. As was just mentioned mo-
ments ago, Nietzsche’s positive recommendations for the future of mankind
have a somewhat experimental and provisional character. As such, they do not
necessarily or even obviously present a uniﬁed and coherent whole. Instead,
they more closely resemble a set of related suggestions—suggestions that all is-
sue from one man with his own relatively stable preferences and views, to be
sure, but suggestions that differ signiﬁcantly from each other in many respects.
In looking at Nietzsche’s ideal of autonomy, therefore, I do not claim to be
exhausting the positive side of Nietzsche’s thought, but rather to be examining
one recurrent thread. This is a topic that will be touched upon again in Chapter
VI.
I will begin my investigation in Chapter II by looking at a ﬁgure who often
features prominently in discussions about Nietzsche’s views on autonomy: the
sovereign individual. Here, I will examine three different interpretations one
might give of the role this ﬁgure plays in Nietzsche’s thought and argue for the
one I ﬁnd most convincing. More speciﬁcally I will claim that, contrary to the
standard reading, the sovereign individual does not straightforwardly represent
any Nietzschean autonomy ideal for the future, but is rather a ﬁgure from the
past. I will then go on to give some thoughts about what signiﬁcance this ﬁgure
does have for Nietzsche’s ideal of autonomy if we accept the interpretation I
have argued for. My argument here will be that we should see this ﬁgure as
being somewhat analogous to the noble of the First Essay. As an example of
healthy humanity from the past, he draws Nietzsche’s admiration and possesses
my argument.
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some of the qualities that Nietzsche would like to see return to mankind in the
future. As a ﬁgure from a different period of history, however, the sovereign
individual can no longer be directly recreated as the conditions which made his
existence possible (such as human beings naturally possessing a relatively simple
and coherent collection of drives) are no longer present. As such, we should
not see the sovereign individual as straightforwardly representing Nietzsche’s
autonomy ideal, but rather as being an instructive ﬁgure from history—a ﬁgure
that we can learn certain important lessons about human freedom from, but
not one which we should be trying to directly replicate in modern conditions.
In the following chapter I will look at the relationship between autonomy
and ethics in Nietzsche’s philosophy. As a preliminary to this, I will begin
by saying a little bit about the stipulative use of the term ‘ethics’ that I will
use throughout the chapter, and more speciﬁcally about how it relates to the
ethics/morality distinction employed by Bernard Williams. After these prelim-
inaries, I will then argue for two separate but related points. The ﬁrst is that,
like many thinkers before him in the Western philosophical tradition, Niet-
zsche sees being ethical, in a suitably speciﬁed sense, as being required for living
autonomously. The second point I will argue for, which is more speciﬁc to Ni-
etzsche, is that the highest degrees of autonomy can only be achieved by living
one’s life according to an ethic which is both self-created and personalized. Or,
put another way, that in order to attain to the greatest levels of autonomy pos-
sible for human beings, a person cannot just unthinkingly accept the dominant
morality of their age and culture. Rather, they must create their own values,
and ideally must do so in such a way that the new values they adopt cohere
particularly well with the rank order of drives and affects that constitute their
self, and hence work to enhance the ﬂourishing of the speciﬁc type of natural
creature that they are.
After this, I will then spend a chapter looking at how Nietzsche’s views on
autonomy ﬁt with what I shall call his ‘delationary’ account of consciousness.
This chapter will be split into two halves. In the ﬁrst half, I will look at Niet-
zsche’s critical remarks concerning the efﬁcacy of our conscious thoughts and
desires, and consider whether they pose major difﬁculties for any Nietzschean
ideal of autonomy. Here, I will argue against more radical interpretations of
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these remarks which see them as expressing Nietzsche’s commitment to the
goal of totally eliminating conscious processes from our explanations of human
behaviour. Attributing this sort of aim to Nietzsche, I will claim, is both in-
compatible with his doctrine of perspectivism, as well as seriously at odds with
his actual practice in the published works. In place of this, I will argue, we
should see Nietzsche as still maintaining some role for consciousness in our ex-
planations of people’s actions, but a drastically reduced one compared to the
highly mentalistic and voluntarist picture of the generation of actions that had
previously held sway in the philosophical tradition up to the point at which
Nietzsche was writing. The second half of the chapter will then deal with Ni-
etzsche’s remarks concerning the value of consciousness as a faculty. In this
latter half of the chapter, I will give an exposition of Nietzsche’s concerns about
consciousness’ contribution to the health (or rather, to the sickness) of Euro-
pean man. Ultimately, however, I will argue that these concerns do not exclude
consciousness as a faculty from playing an important role in Nietzsche’s posi-
tive vision for the future of mankind. This is because, on Nietzsche’s view, the
value of any given thing is not ﬁxed for all time, but is rather a function of the
use it has been put to by the latest will to power to appropriate it and give it a
new meaning. Hence, the fact that mankind’s heightened level of consciousness
has often been harmful in the past does not rule out the possibility that it could
be turned to a new, more positive use by individuals who become free in the
future.
In Chapter V I will turn to an analysis of the notion of unity at work in
Nietzsche’s conception of autonomy. In this chapter, my main aim will be to
elucidate the sort of unity of character that Nietzsche both uses as a standard of
evaluation in itself, and sees as intimately linked to the attainment of autonomy.
To begin with, however, I will look at a more basic sort of unity that is presup-
posed by this more complex form: that of the physical body. Here, I will argue
that the unity of the body is not more basic than that of the soul because it is a
different type of unity. Rather, like that of the character, any unity possessed by
the body is organizational—the only major difference is that the organizational
unity of the body is both older and more stable. After this, I will then go on to
look at the more complex form of unity which Nietzsche sees as being deeply
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connected with autonomy: the unity of a person’s soul or character. Here, I
will look at why Nietzsche sees this sort of unity as being necessary for the au-
tonomous individual, along with looking at a variety of the different metaphors
that Nietzsche himself uses in characterizing this sort of unity, and trying to see
what can be gleaned from each of them. Following this, I will look at another
notion which is closely associated with unity in Nietzsche’s thinking: diversity.
Here, I will look at Nietzsche’s claim that the highest individuals are those who
manage to unify the most diverse and conﬂicting sets of drives and affects possi-
ble. In relation to this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought, my argument will be that
this is not any sort of merely arbitrary or aesthetic preference on his part, but
rather is motivated by his belief that unity-in-diversity is a route to the greatest
degrees of power, and by extension autonomy, possible for human individuals.
Finally, I will then end this chapter by looking at the potential objection that
Nietzsche’s notion of unity is nothing more than a formal requirement, and by
considering some possible responses that might be made to this charge.
I will then conclude in the ﬁnal chapter with some thoughts on how Niet-
zsche’s ideal of autonomy relates to his frequent remarks about the afﬁrmation
of life, and also to related notions such as the eternal recurrence and amor fati.
Here, I will consider a possible tension that might be seen to arise between these
two aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, and consider several ways in which it might
be resolved. I will not attempt to give a deﬁnitive answer to this question in this
concluding chapter. Rather, my intention will be to point to further questions
that the research undertaken in the rest of my thesis could point to.
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THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL
Compared to many other mainstream philosophical writers, Nietzsche makes
abundant use of symbolic ﬁgures or characters in order to achieve his ends. In
his ﬁrst book The Birth of Tragedy, for instance, his reasoning revolves around
his own particular conceptions of the Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus, as well
as his psychological sketches of historical ﬁgures such as Socrates and Euripides.
Undoubtedly the greatest number of examples could be drawn from his most
literary work Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Zarathustra himself, the Übermensch, the
last human beings, the spirit of gravity, etc.), but there is also no shortage of
such characters in the more polemical writings that follow.1
Nowhere is this more true than in On the Genealogy of Morality,2 where
ﬁgures such as the noble (or master), the slave, and the priest play an integral
role in history of morality that Nietzsche describes. In this chapter, I will ex-
amine the signiﬁcance of another much discussed ﬁgure from the Genealogy:
the sovereign individual of the Second Essay. This character has particular rel-
evance to my overall project of examining Nietzsche’s ideal of the autonomous
individual. Not only is he described as the “master of the free will”, but he also,
if the standard interpretation of this passage is to be believed, represents a type
1Socrates resurfaces in the section of Twilight of the Idols entitled “The Problem of Socrates”,
and the free spirit appears fairly frequently from Human, All Too Human onwards. Christ and
Dionysus also ﬁgure often in the later works, in a relationship both similar and different to
that between Apollo and Dionysus in The Birth of Tragedy. Other candidates might include the
philosophers of the future, as well as his characterizations of historical ﬁgures such as Goethe,
Napoleon, and Shakespeare (amongst others).
2I shall refer to this work simply as the Genealogy from this point onwards.
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of achieved autonomy that Nietzsche believes it valuable for us all (or at least a
certain portion of higher individuals) to strive after. Hence, if the standard read-
ing is correct, the sovereign individual offers a ready-made formula for the type
of autonomous individual that Nietzsche envisions existing in the post-moral
stage of mankind that he is attempting to bring about through his writings.
Despite only (explicitly3) being treated of in one passage (GM II: 2) the
sovereign individual has made many appearances in commentaries on Niet-
zsche’s philosophy. Moreover, and as with many aspects of Nietzsche’s thought,
this passage has been understood in a variety of ways. Hence, the ﬁrst part of
my task will be exegetical—determining exactly what role Nietzsche intends
the sovereign individual to play in the story of the Second Essay. In order
to do this, I will consider three different readings of the passage in question.
Firstly, I will examine the most common view, that the sovereign individual
straightforwardly represents some sort of Nietzschean ideal of autonomy, and
that sovereignty (as described in GM II: 2) is something Nietzsche would have
his higher individuals (if not everyone) attain to. After this, I will look at a view
that stands in direct opposition to this. According to this alternative interpre-
tation, the sovereign individual actually represents a counter-ideal:4 something
Nietzsche deliberately sets up so as to criticize and displace. Finally, I will then
consider the view that I will endorse, namely that the sovereign individual is
not a Nietzschean ideal at all (either positive or negative), but is a description
of a type of human being that was once, under certain historical conditions,
possible, but has since disappeared because of the prevalence of ascetic moral
values.5
3I say ‘explicitly’ here because one might think that he is referred to again as the “man of
the future” who “will redeem us” is GM II: 24, and perhaps elsewhere. Some people even go
so far as to equate the sovereign individual directly with the Übermensch. See, for example,
May’s statement that “the absolutely sovereign individual is, I suggest, none other than the
Übermensch” (1999, p.117). As this chapter will show, this is not a statement I would agree
with.
4In one sense this is a slightly misleading term to use given Nietzsche’s use of the phrase
“counter-idealists” (GM III: 24) to describe people who are opposed to a particular ideal. I do,
however, give an extended explanation of the sense in which I am using the term on page 17.
5These are not the only interpretations of GM II: 2 that one could possibly put forward. One
might, for example, take the sovereign individual to be an expression of Nietzsche’s hope that
the phenomenon of bad conscience might (like all great things) end in its own self-overcoming
(cf. GM III: 27). Hence, the sovereign individual is not an ideal to be striven for, but rather
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Due to the dominance in the secondary literature of the ﬁrst of these read-
ings, I will describe it here only in general terms rather than associating it
with any particular commentator. In describing the remaining two views, on
the other hand, I will rely upon the accounts offered by Acampora (in “On
Sovereignty and Overhumanity: Why It Matters How We Read Nietzsche’s
Genealogy II: 2”) and Janaway (in Beyond Selﬂessness) for support.
After arguing for this understanding of the signiﬁcance of the sovereign indi-
vidual, I will then conclude by reﬂecting upon what consequences this reading
has for the relation between GM II: 2 and Nietzsche’s ideal of autonomy. My
argument here will be that the sovereign individual plays a similar role in the
Second Essay to that played by the noble in the First Essay. As an example of
a healthy type of human being from the past, he naturally draws Nietzsche’s
praise when compared with the sick animal man has become. However, as with
the noble, the conditions which made this ﬁgure possible no longer exist, and
Nietzsche is not calling for his reappearance in any simple sense. Instead, he is
looking to bring about a type of human being that shares some of the positive
features present in the sovereign individual, but that also incorporates the many
changes that human beings and human society have undergone since his disap-
pearance. As such, the sovereign individual does not represent a ready-made
formula for an autonomous Nietzschean individual of the future, but can only
act as a sort of instructive ﬁgure from the past—one who provides some clues
about what is to be achieved, but tells us signiﬁcantly less about exactly how to
go about achieving it. I will also discuss both the resonances and differences this
reading has with the other two interpretations discussed within this chapter.
The Sovereign Individual as a Nietzschean Ideal
In terms of Nietzsche scholarship, the notion that the sovereign individual rep-
resents some sort of ideal is the closest thing there is to a received view of the
passage. Acampora, in her insightful essay on the topic, describes agreement on
this issue as “nearly unanimous” (2006, p.147) amongst commentators, listing
a vague (and confusing) wish about the future of mankind. For an excellent treatment of this
reading and its difﬁculties see Ridley (1998, p.142–6).
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only Hatab (1995) as a dissenting voice.6 In this section, I will examine the rea-
sons why this received view has found so much support, as well as considering
some of the objections that have recently been raised against it.
The Sovereign Individual as a Nietzschean Ideal: For
Perhaps the most obvious reason why the sovereign individual has been taken
to be a Nietzschean ideal is the manner in which he is described. Nietzsche
summons some of his most ﬂattering language in this passage, and really seems
to be trying to gain our allegiance for this ﬁgure. The following excerpt provides
a good example:
in short, we ﬁnd a man with his own, independent, enduring will whose preroga-
tive it is to promise—and in him a proud consciousness quivering in every muscle
of what he has ﬁnally achieved and incorporated, an actual awareness of power
and freedom, a feeling that man in general has reached completion. This man
who is now free, who actually has the prerogative to promise, this master of the
free will, this sovereign—how could he remain ignorant of his superiority over ev-
erybody who does not have the prerogative to promise or answer to himself, how
much trust, fear and respect he arouses—he “merits” all three—and how could he,
with his self-mastery, not realize that he has necessarily been given mastery over
circumstances, over nature and over all creatures with a less enduring and reliable
will?
(GM II: 2)
As this passage shows, Nietzsche heaps praise on the sovereign individual at
such a rate that it can be difﬁcult to keep up. With such a glowing reference, it
is easy to see what the notion of an ideal has been associated with this character.
The exuberant tone of the rhetoric is not the only reason for seeing the
sovereign individual as a Nietzschean ideal. One might also cite the fact that
he seems to exemplify many qualities that are praised highly elsewhere in Niet-
zsche’s works: self-mastery, a certain hardness towards others, an enduring will,
6Although she does mention Loeb’s essay, which postdates her own, in a footnote (2006,
p.158–9).
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positive attitude towards fate,7 etc. This is particularly true when we remember
that Nietzsche describes the sovereign individual as being a “man who is now
free” and who possesses “the extraordinary privilege of responsibility” (GM II:
2). These remarks (in conjunction with other passages) can be seen to suggest
the presence of a particular view about the nature of freedom and responsibility
in Nietzsche’s works, namely that these are not necessarily possessed by all (or
even most) human beings, but are complex achievements that must be worked at
and developed, and are a matter of degree. Hence, not all fully matured human
beings are free and accountable for their deeds, but rather they must (or at least
can) become so through imposing unity upon their character across time and
overcoming certain internal and external resistances to this goal of autonomous
selfhood.8 The sovereign individual is then taken to be the ultimate exemplar of
this kind of attained freedom—a ﬁgure who has, through the possession of an
enduring will, forged a free and responsible being from the basic materials of his
natural self. If all this is correct, then it seems highly plausible that Nietzsche
presents the sovereign individual as an ideal for our admiration and emulation.
Further support for this reading can also be found in the relationship Niet-
zsche seems to maintain as holding between the sovereign individual and moral-
ity. Right at the beginning of his sustained exaltation, Nietzsche describes him
as “autonomous and supramoral (for ‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually
exclusive)” (GM II: 2).9 This remark has been taken to show that the sovereign
individual is somehow beyond the morality of good and evil, and is hence a
relatively concrete example of the post-moral phase of mankind which Niet-
zsche frequently reminds us is, or at least should be, on the way. Moreover,
the parenthetical statement is meant to emphasize the fact that the sovereign
individual’s autonomy is dependent upon the fact that he has liberated himself
7Whether the sovereign individual’s attitude towards fate constitutes amor fati is a thorny
issue. Generally, I think, it is taken to be so. However, this is not the only position available,
and some have questioned the compatibility between the love of fate and mastery of fate. I look
at Acampora’s argument to this effect on pages 14–15.
8The most famous exponent of such a view, whose treatment of these issues is excellent, is
Nehamas (1985). There are plenty of other examples though, such as Gemes (2009), May (2009),
Richardson (1996) and Risse (2007).
9This quote is from the Kaufmann and Hollingdale translation of the Genealogy. All others
in this thesis are from Diethe’s more recent translation unless otherwise stated.
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from morality, and hence to highlight the fact that one cannot be autonomous
whilst one’s actions are determined by the dictates of an external ethical code.
If the sovereign individual does represent mankind as liberated from morality,
however, then this is another reason for seeing him as the perfect candidate for
representing a Nietzschean ideal.
In addition to all this, seeing the sovereign individual as a Nietzschean ideal
also can also be linked to some of the remarks Nietzsche makes in his auto-
biographical work Ecce Homo. When describing the Genealogy, Nietzsche fa-
mously states:
With regard to expression, intention, and the art of surprise, the three essays
that make up this Genealogy are perhaps the most uncanny things written so far.
Dionysus, as is known, is also the god of darkness.—In each case, a beginning
that should be deceptive: cool, scientiﬁc, even ironic, intentionally foreground,
intentionally evasive.
(EH: “Why I Write Such Good Books”, GM)
In terms of the Second Essay, it seems as though the sovereign individual
must play some part in the “deceptive” nature of its beginning. If not for his
brief appearance in GM II: 2 the chronology of the essay would seem far more
straightforward, and, in spite of the highly laudatory language used to describe
him, he does not explicitly reappear anywhere in the Genealogy.10 Yet, if this is
so, the question then becomes: in what sense is this beginning deceptive?
If we accept the notion that the sovereign individual is a Nietzschean ideal,
there is a fairly simple answer to this question. This beginning is deceptive in the
sense that Nietzsche presents us with an ideal, and then goes on in the rest of the
essay to show us just how far we are from actually achieving it. In other words,
Nietzsche raises our hopes at the start of the essay by describing the sovereign
individual, an example of what higher humanity could be. He then carries on,
as Owen describes it, by “pulling the rug from beneath our feet” (2007, p.102)
and giving his diagnosis of the actual state of contemporary man—as the sick
animal, using the means of bad conscience to inﬂict suffering upon himself.
10Or indeed anywhere else in the published works.
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The Sovereign Individual as a Nietzschean Ideal: Against
These then are the main reasons for seeing the sovereign individual as the rep-
resentative of a Nietzschean ideal: he is described in glowing terms, he exempli-
ﬁes many qualities that Nietzsche praises highly elsewhere, he seems to be an
instance of an autonomous supramoral man of the future, and seeing him as an
ideal allows us a way of understanding the “deceptive” nature of the beginning
of the Second Essay. However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
some questions have been raised over the soundness of this reading. In this sec-
tion, I will look at the considerations offered against seeing the sovereign as an
ideal in Acampora’s recent essay “On Sovereignty and Overhumanity”.11
I will begin with the most basic reason, as stated by Acampora: “Simply
put, there is not enough textual evidence to support the general and oft-repeated
claim that the sovereign individual of GM II: 2 is Nietzsche’s ideal type” (2006,
p.153). As was mentioned previously, the sovereign individual is only ever ex-
plicitly mentioned in one section of the Genealogy. If he were an ideal type,
we might reasonably expect other descriptions and elucidations to be given else-
where. Yet, whilst the term ‘sovereign’ is occasionally used in other contexts,
there is no further mention of the sovereign individual as such anywhere in the
published works. Hence, to take him as Nietzsche’s vision for the future of
humanity on the basis of one passage seems a little hasty.
Further questions are also raised by Acampora about the context in which
the sovereign individual passage arises, and the talk of memory and forgetting
that surrounds it. In the opening section of the Second Essay, during his dis-
cussion of the “prerogative to promise”, Nietzsche directs our attention to the
nature and value of “forgetfulness” (GM II: 1). There are two main points he
wants to get across. Firstly, that forgetfulness is “an active ability to suppress,
positive in the strongest sense of the word” (GM II: 1) as opposed to a pas-
sive inability to remember. Secondly, that this positive capacity of forgetfulness
11I take Acampora as representative here as she is highly inﬂuenced by Hatab (1995), and her
objections include and expand upon those offered by White (1994). Loeb (2006) offers some
alternative considerations against seeing the sovereign as an ideal, but explaining these would
involve going deeply into some Zarathustrian ideas (the eternal recurrence, the nature of time
as a cause of ressentiment) that seem quite distant from the concerns of the Second Essay.
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plays an important role in our psychic health—“there could be no happiness,
cheerfulness, hope, pride, immediacy, without forgetfulness” (GM II: 1). After
establishing these points about forgetfulness, Nietzsche then returns to the issue
of promising:
this necessarily forgetful animal [man], in whom forgetting is a strength, repre-
senting a form of robust health, has bred for himself a counter-device, memory,
with the help of which forgetfulness can be suspended in certain cases,—namely
in those cases where a promise is to be made: consequently, it is by no means
merely a passive inability to be rid of an impression once it has made its im-
pact...instead it is an active desire not to let go, a desire to keep on desiring what
has been, on some occasion, desired, really it is the will’s memory: so that a world
of strange new things, circumstances, and even acts of will may be placed quite
safely in between the original “I will”, “I shall do” and the actual discharge of the
will, its act, without breaking this long chain of the will.
(GM II: 1)
Asthispassageshows, theabilitytopromisereliesuponmemory, a“counter-
device” that man has developed in order to combat his natural forgetfulness.
Moreover, this memory is not to be conceived negatively as a failure of forget-
fulness, but is itself also a positive capacity—an active desire to hold on to certain
relevant aspects of the past. The sovereign individual then, who is deﬁned by
“the prerogative to promise” and who upholds his word “in the face of mishap
or even ‘in the face of fate’” (GM II: 2), seems to represent the pinnacle of this
development of memory—a desire to never, if possible, fail to see out a desire
that has once been desired. Yet, if he is a Nietzschean ideal, and he does have
such a highly developed memory, then it is difﬁcult to understand why Niet-
zsche goes out of his way to remind us of the virtues of active forgetfulness. To
put it another way, if Nietzsche thinks that forgetfulness is so important for the
healthy functioning of human beings, as GM II: 1 (and other passages12) seem to
suggest, then why does he idealize a ﬁgure characterized by his highly developed
memory, such as the sovereign individual?13
12The ﬁrst section of On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life (The second of the
Untimely Meditations) provides a particularly good example.
13The mnemonic ability of the sovereign is also at the root of Loeb’s objections to placing
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Difﬁculties also arise when we consider the compatibility of the sovereign
individual with another of Nietzsche’s major ideas, amor fati. The notion of
amor fati ﬁrst appears in Book Four of The Gay Science,14 and remains promi-
nent (and perhaps even gains prominence) through the rest of Nietzsche’s life.
Put brieﬂy (or rather, merely translated), amor fati means the love of fate. Niet-
zsche usually ﬁlls out this enigmatic slogan with the idea of not merely bearing
or accepting the necessary aspects of one’s life, but actually being so positively
disposed towards them so as to love them, for the role they play in making one
who one is. When the sovereign individual is described, however, there are sev-
eral indications that his comportment to his destiny does not constitute amor
fati. We are told, for instance, that he is “strong enough to remain upright in
the face of mishap or even ‘in the face of fate’”. We are also told that he has
a “consciousness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny”
(GM II: 2). Given these remarks, it seems that the sovereign individual displays
a desire to control or master fate, rather than an acceptance and love of that
which is necessary. Here is how Acampora puts the point:
Committing oneself to conquering fate, which the sovereign individual of GM
II: 2 does as part of taking responsibility for the promises he makes, would seem
to stand in the way of, would speciﬁcally bind one to an idea that would prevent
one from, loving one’s fate.
(Acampora, 2006, p.152)
Hence, as Acampora sees it, the sovereign individual’s desire to fulﬁl his
promises excludes him from the possibility of loving his fate. If this is cor-
rect, however, then his status as an ideal is certainly thrown into doubt. For
if Nietzsche can only consistently be promoting one of these two ideals (i.e.
sovereignty or amor fati) then the weight of textual evidence would deﬁnitely
seem to decide this debate in favour of amor fati.
this ﬁgure at the core of Nietzsche’s positive vision. According to Loeb (2006), the memory
developed by mankind (and dramatized in the ﬁgure of the sovereign individual) is what ﬁxes
man’s past as a “that which was” (2006, p.165) and prevents him from seeing the truth of the
eternal recurrence.
14In the opening section (276), to be speciﬁc.
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In addition to these ﬁrst three points, Acampora also makes a further objec-
tion to the received view, which raises questions over the relationship between
the description we are given of the sovereign individual in GM II: 2 and many
of the critical remarks Nietzsche makes elsewhere. According to Acampora,
seeing the sovereign individual as Nietzsche’s ideal type “requires committing
him [Nietzsche] to afﬁrming other ideas, particularly about the nature of hu-
man subjectivity, which he clearly ﬁnds problematic” (2006, p.152). As is well
known, Nietzsche attacks many of the ideas that have held sway in the philo-
sophical tradition. Hence, some of the phrases used in the description of the
sovereign individual may seem surprising to those more used to Nietzsche’s crit-
ical tirades. He is described, for instance, as a “master of the free will” and “The
‘free’ man” (GM II: 2), in spite of Nietzsche’s many denials of the existence of
free will.15 He is also described as possessing “the extraordinary privilege of re-
sponsibility”, even though Nietzsche elsewhere claims that it is only error which
makes us believe that people are accountable for their actions.16
Foremost amongst these inconsistencies, at least in Acampora’s eyes, is that
between the sovereign individual’s distinctive activity (promising) and Niet-
zsche’s usual account of the human subject. As Nietzsche himself points out,
making a promise (or a sincere one, at least) involves a “degree of control over
the future” (GM II: 1). More speciﬁcally, the person making the promise must
be capable of ensuring, exceptional circumstances notwithstanding, that their
future self will act upon their present desire and hence fulﬁl their promise. This
presupposes a level of duration and unity to the self that is sharply at odds with
the vast majority of Nietzsche’s writings on the issue. Here is how Acampora
states the puzzle:
how could it be that the Nietzsche who so emphasizes becoming, and who is
suspicious of the concept of the subject (as the “doer behind the deed”), could
15For some examples of Nietzsche’s claims speciﬁcally about free will, see A 14, 15 and 38,
BGE 21, EH: “Why I am so Wise”, 6 and TI: “The Four Great Errors”, 7.
16This sort of view is particularly prevalent around the time of Human, All Too Human,
when Nietzsche was developing his intellectual friendship with Paul Rée. See sections 39, 91,
and 105–7 for good examples. It can also be found, although with much less frequency, in the
later works. See, for example, the whole of “The Four Great Errors” section of Twilight of the
Idols.
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think that it is desirable—let alone possible—that a person could ensure his or her
word in the future?
(Acampora, 2006, p.153)
Put crudely: how can Nietzsche be recommending the ideal of the sovereign
individual when he believes that there are no stable individuals but only collec-
tions of disparate, and typically conﬂicting, drives and affects?
The Sovereign Individual as a Nietzschean
Counter-Ideal
Up to this point I have described the reasons both for and against the typical
understanding of the sovereign individual passage. I will now move on to look-
ing at one of the opposing theories which claims that the sovereign individual
is not Nietzsche’s ideal type, but actually represents a counter-ideal.
To begin with, it is worth getting clear about exactly what is meant by
this in this context. To say that Nietzsche presents the sovereign individual
as a counter-ideal is not to say that he simply intends for his readers to react
negatively to this ﬁgure. Rather, it means that he describes the sovereign indi-
vidual as if he were describing an ideal type, but with the overall intention of
undermining and critiquing the very values inherent in the ideal this ﬁgure rep-
resents. Put another way, this reading claims that Nietzsche intends his readers
to be drawn to the ﬁgure of the sovereign individual when he is ﬁrst described,
but that by the end of the Second Essay he hopes to have shown that the ideal
that is being represented here is both incoherent and potentially harmful to its
followers.
What ideal, then, does the sovereign individual represent if not Nietzsche’s
own? To answer this question, it may be useful to look again at the notion of a
counter-ideal. In order for the presentation of a counter-ideal to be worthwhile,
the values one is trying to undermine must already have (or at least be likely
to acquire) adherents. After all, why criticize an ideal that nobody currently
does, or is ever likely to, believe in? Nietzsche’s counter-ideal is no different,
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according to this interpretation, and targets an ideal already held many of his
contemporaries. Hatab dubs this “the modernist ideal of subjective autonomy”
(1995, p.37), and it roughly amounts to the desire to possess a sort of absolute
responsibility for one’s actions—a responsibility so absolute that one recognizes
no mitigating factors in the explanation and causes of one’s behaviour (such as
circumstance or the inﬂuence of one’s past), but believes oneself to bear the sole
accountability. In other words, it is the ardent belief that one’s actions arise in
an entirely undetermined fashion from one’s own neutral free will.
If this understanding is correct, it also makes room for an interesting link to
be made between GM II: 2 and Nietzsche’s oft-discussed attack on the notion
of free will in Beyond Good and Evil. Here (BGE 21), after rejecting both “free
will” and “un-free will” as misconceived concepts, Nietzsche goes on to identify
two different types of person who, for “profoundly personal” reasons, reject the
idea of un-free will. The sovereign individual, if he were a counter-ideal, would
now become aligned with the ﬁrst of these two types that Nietzsche mentions,
namely those who “would never dream of relinquishing their ‘responsibility’,
a belief in themselves, a personal right to their own merit” (also, note the simi-
larity of language used). Hence, far from being an ideal that Nietzsche himself
endorses, the sovereign individual is more akin to the ideal of the man who
suffers from “the longing to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for [his]
actions [himself] and to relieve God, world, ancestors, chance and society of the
burden”.
We now have a fuller picture of the opposing theory: the sovereign individ-
ual is not a faithful representation of Nietzsche’s own values, but an attempt to
create a character who exempliﬁes the modern ideal of absolute responsibility,
an ideal which Nietzsche wishes to criticize and replace. In the remainder of
this section I will put forward some of the considerations for and against this
position.
The Sovereign Individual as a Nietzschean Counter-Ideal: For
As might well be expected, there is not a lot of extra textual evidence that can
be used to support the claim that the sovereign individual is a counter-ideal. It
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has already been mentioned that the only direct evidence comes from GM II:
2, so the case for this view is not going to rely on unearthing new passages in
which Nietzsche is explicitly anti-sovereignty. Instead, the claim is essentially
that this interpretation possesses the greater explanatory power. If we accept
the received view, we must ﬁnd answers to the objections listed above.17 The
reading that understands the sovereign individual as a counter-ideal, by contrast,
is supposedly capable of explaining (almost18) all of the features of the passage
emphasized by the received view, as well as being able to account for all of the
objections that have been raised against it. Stated so brieﬂy this claim sounds a
little bold, so I will now go on to unpack it.
Firstly, and perhaps also most obviously, the notion that the sovereign indi-
vidual is a counter-ideal is able to accommodate both the glowing language in
which he is described, as well as the fact that he seems to be depicted as some
sort of man of the future, liberated from morality. As was mentioned in the
previous section, presenting something as a counter-ideal involves, initially at
least, putting it forward as if it were an ideal one genuinely believed. Therefore
we should not be surprised to see Nietzsche attaching so many superlatives to
the sovereign individual, or associating him with so many positive ideas. After
all, his overall intention is to raise (or perhaps awaken) our allegiance to this
ﬁgure to the highest level possible, in order for his genealogical undermining to
have the greatest effect.
This counter-ideal structure is also capable of explaining why Nietzsche says
the beginning of the Second Essay “should be deceptive”. In fact, it is perhaps
even better equipped to do so. According to the standard interpretation, to
recap, the beginning of this essay is deceptive because Nietzsche presents us his
ideal, but then goes on to show how far most (if not all) modern Europeans are
from actually achieving it. In short, he deliberately raises our hopes, only to
then go on and dash them. If we accept the claim that the sovereign individual
17This is not to say that this cannot be done. Some suggestions along these lines are consid-
ered later in this chapter.
18I say ‘almost’ here because there is one major point of difference between the two interpre-
tations (aside from the attitude towards the sovereign individual they attribute to Nietzsche):
they differ over whether the sovereign individual clashes with or ties into the major themes of
Nietzsche’s works.
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is a counter-ideal, on the other hand, there is a much stronger sense in which the
beginning to this essay is deceptive. Rather than merely being a device intended
to raise our hopes, the sovereign individual now becomes part of an elaborately
misleading introduction, designed to trick Nietzsche’s readers into the (false)
belief that he shares and supports the modern ideal of absolute responsibility.
Hence, instead of presenting his values genuinely but withholding how far we
are from realizing them (as the standard interpretation would have it), Nietzsche
is actually being a lot more deceitful. He never actually endorses the ideal of free
will and autonomy seemingly put forward in GM II: 2, but only appears to do
so in order to heighten the feeling for this ideal in his readers.
So far in this section I have shown how understanding the sovereign indi-
vidual as a counter-ideal can account for some19 of the features of the passage
highlighted in favour of the traditional interpretation. However, if this theory
really does possess more explanatory power than its competitor, then we should
expect it to be able to survive (and ideally explain and incorporate) at least some
of the objections that have been brought against the received view. I will now
explain how it attempts to do so.
Firstly, this interpretation can quite easily explain the fact that the sovereign
individual only ever makes one appearance in Nietzsche’s works. As a counter-
ideal, his usefulness is limited to his deceptive role in the Second Essay, and there
would be no need for Nietzsche to ever mention him again unless he wanted to
try and play exactly the same trick on his readers twice.
Secondly, this reading is also capable of accounting for the seeming inconsis-
tencies between the passage in question and other major aspects of Nietzsche’s
thought noted earlier (i.e. his recommendation of amor fati and his critical at-
titudes towards notions such as free will and the stable human subject). If the
sovereign individual is the representative of an ideal Nietzsche only ever intends
to undermine, then there is no reason to suppose that he would ﬁt well with Ni-
etzsche’s pronouncements on other issues. In fact, to the contrary, we would
fully expect the distinguishing features of the sovereign individual to embody
the sort of conceptual errors that Nietzsche frequently diagnoses in the philo-
sophical thinking of modern man. After all, it is the prevalence and harmfulness
19See previous footnote.
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of these errors, according to this interpretation, that motivates his attack on this
ideal.
Finally, this way of understanding the sovereign individual passage can also
help make sense of Nietzsche’s motivations for placing it alongside his discus-
sion of memory and forgetfulness. As was mentioned on pages 13–14, one difﬁ-
culty facing the standard interpretation is that it must account for the seeming
discrepancy between the sovereign individual’s highly developed memory and
the praise which Nietzsche lavishes on the positive capacity of forgetfulness. If
we accept the counter-ideal reading, on the other hand, then there is no discrep-
ancy here at all. The sovereign individual is not a ﬁgure Nietzsche wants us to
imitate, and the unhealthy degree to which his memory needs to be developed
is merely another reason why Nietzsche disapproves of the ideal he represents.
Moreover, this interpretation also allows for a new way of looking at the
overall message of the Second Essay which gives a far more prominent role to
Nietzsche’s discussion of memory and forgetting than is usually supposed. Here
is Acampora’s most crisp statement of the idea:
The task of GM II is to offer an account of how the Kraft20 of remembering
accomplished its victory, and to chart the deleterious effects of the atrophy of
forgetting in the course of human development.
(Acampora, 2006, p.149)
If we accept the view that the sovereign individual is a counter-ideal, there-
fore, Nietzsche’s remarks about memory and forgetfulness become far more
than throwaway comments made at the beginning of the Second Essay. In fact,
these statements now act as a sort of scene setting for the whole piece, where
Nietzsche issues a warning to us about the importance of active forgetfulness for
a healthy human existence. The rest of the essay, on this reading, then serves as
an investigation into the negative consequences that human beings have had to
suffer for over-developing their memory in the pursuit of this ideal of subjective
autonomy: consequences such as guilt, bad conscience, and the whole machin-
ery of “self-cruciﬁxion and self-abuse” in which “Europe excelled during the last
millennia” (GM II: 23).
20Power or force.
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The Sovereign Individual as a Nietzschean Counter-Ideal:
Against
In the previous section, I examined some of the reasons that might be put for-
ward in favour of seeing the sovereign individual as a counter-ideal. More specif-
ically, I attempted to show why one might believe that this interpretation pos-
sesses greater explanatory power than the received view, and hence provides a
more satisfying reading of the passage in question. In this section, I will now
consider some objections that could be made over the plausibility of this alter-
native stance.
The ﬁrst such objection centres around the obvious elitism that is present
in this ideal. Throughout the passage in question, Nietzsche makes frequent
reference to the superiority the sovereign individual does (and should) feel over
all those who do not have the prerogative to promise. Hence, we are told, his
dealings with others will be markedly different depending on whether or not
these others are also sovereign individuals. If they are, he will “necessarily”
treat them with “respect” (GM II: 2). Those who are not, by contrast, will be
in for some quite different treatment:
he will necessarily be ready to kick the febrile whippets who promise without
that prerogative, and will save the rod for the liar who breaks his word in the
very moment it passes his lips.
(GM II: 2)
These remarks seem to imply that sovereign individuals constitute only a
certain section of society, and that they will frequently have to deal with (and
guard themselves against) people who simply do not have the same kind of self-
control as they do. This point is then reinforced by Nietzsche’s description
of the sovereign individual’s responsibility as an “extraordinary privilege”, pre-
sumably possessed only by a select few. If all this is correct, then it should make
us suspicious of the claim that what is being presented here is the “modernist
ideal of subjective autonomy”. For it is surely one of the basic premises of this
ideal that nearly all human beings are responsible for their actions, in virtue of
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being rational subjects with free will.21 The ideal represented by the sovereign
individual, by contrast, differs greatly from this Kantian-style outlook by seeing
freedom as only being possessed by a certain higher portion of mankind. More-
over, it also seems to involve a vastly different conception of how human beings
should be treated. According to most understandings of the “modernist ideal of
subjective autonomy”, all human beings are worthy of respect and equal treat-
ment.22 In the description Nietzsche offers us, on the other hand, we are told
that sovereign individuals will only respect other sovereign individuals, and will
seemingly not be gentle in their treatment of those who they take to be below
themselves.
A second reason for questioning this alternative reading is that it seems
to rely on somewhat overstating the scope of the critical side of Nietzsche’s
project. As was noted previously, one of the major motivations for seeing the
sovereign individual as a counter-ideal is the seeming inconsistency between the
descriptions Nietzsche gives us in GM II: 2 and the critical remarks that can
be found in the rest of his corpus. The fact that he attributes both freedom
and responsibility to the sovereign individual, for example, seems to be at odds
with the critical stance he often takes towards these notions elsewhere in his
works. Hence, according to the counter-ideal reading, Nietzsche cannot be
writing completely truthfully in his account of the sovereign individual. To
take this view, however, one must assume that Nietzsche only ever takes a scep-
tical stance with regards to such traditional philosophical concepts such as free-
dom, selfhood, and responsibility. Yet, if we look more closely at the textual
evidence, we ﬁnd that his views are actually more complex. Whilst it is true
that he frequently brings objections against these notions, he also has a more
revisionary side to his thought. In this less critical mood, he is happy to allow
for the possibility of new and, in his eyes at least, improved versions of the con-
cepts he ordinarily attacks. Therefore, we cannot conclude solely from the fact
that he is employing certain concepts (such as freedom, autonomy, etc.) that he
cannot be writing in earnest. This point can be best shown through examples.
21Excepting perhaps children and people whose cognitive faculties are limited in certain ways.
22Kant’s famous statement of the idea comes in Section II of the Groundwork of the Meta-
physics of Morals: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (1997, p.38).
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As the ﬁrst example, I will look at what Acampora takes to be the most
glaring inconsistency between the sovereign individual passage and the rest of
Nietzsche’s works, namely the position advanced within it on the nature of
human subjectivity. As Acampora understands things, to recap, the sovereign
individual’scapacitytopromisepresupposesadegreeofpersonalstabilitywhich
cannot be reconciled with Nietzsche’s radically sceptical views on the nature of
the self. To take this position, however, involves ignoring most (if not all) of
the subtleties of Nietzsche’s view on this difﬁcult topic. The following passage
from Beyond Good and Evil provides a good example:
First of all, we must also put an end to that other and more disastrous atomism,
the one Christianity has taught best and longest, the atomism of the soul. Let
this expression signify the belief that the soul is something indestructible, eter-
nal, indivisible, that it is a monad, an atomon: this belief must be thrown out of
science! Between you and me, there is absolutely no need to give up “the soul”
itself, and relinquish one of the oldest and most venerable hypothesis—and con-
cepts like “mortal soul” and the “soul as subject-multiplicity” and the “soul as a
society constructed out of drives and affects” want henceforth to have civil rights
in the realm of science.
(BGE 12)
As this passage shows, Nietzsche does not totally deny the existence of any
sort of human “soul” (or self). Instead, his objection is towards certain concep-
tions of the self—those that understand the human subject as some sort of sin-
gle, simple, indestructible and eternal entity that each person possesses. The fact
that he rejects this particular historical conception of the self, however, should
not be equated with an outright denial of the existence of any sort of sustained
selfhood for human beings whatsoever. Rather, as the quote above shows, it
simply means that any concept of selfhood that is at work in Nietzsche’s writ-
ings will have to meet certain conditions: it will have to recognize (at least) the
multiplicity, complexity, and mortality of any human subject. This, however, is
exactly the sort of conception of selfhood that does underpin all of Nietzsche’s
discussions of the psychological origins of certain beliefs, as well as his frequent
talk of self-creation. Hence, the mere fact that Nietzsche attributes some degree
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of stable subjectivity to the sovereign individual does not automatically mean
that he is not compatible with Nietzsche’s other pronouncements.
A similar treatment can also be given to the issue of freedom. Just as with
his claims about the nature of the self, Nietzsche’s frequent critiques of the
notion of free will could be seen as conﬂicting with the fact that he describes
the sovereign individual as a “man who is now free” and a “master of the free
will”. This, however, would be to once again ignore the many positive uses to
which Nietzsche puts the notion of freedom. Take, for example, the following
famous passage on Goethe from Twilight of the Idols:
Goetheconceivedofastrong, highlyeducated, self-respectinghumanbeing, skilled
in all things physical and able to keep himself in check, who could dare to allow
himself the entire expanse and wealth of naturalness, who is strong enough for
this freedom...A spirit like this who has become free stands in the middle of the
world with a cheerful and trusting fatalism in the belief that only the individual
is reprehensible, that everything is redeemed and afﬁrmed in the whole—he does
not negate any more...But a belief like this is the highest of all possible beliefs: I
have christened it with the name Dionysus.—
(TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 49)
Here, Nietzsche once again describes for us a man who “has become free”
and “who is strong enough for this freedom”. And, whilst there may be doubts
about Nietzsche’s seriousness in employing the notion of freedom with regard
to the sovereign individual, the same thing cannot really be said in this connec-
tion. Here, Nietzsche associates the notion of freedom with two ﬁgures (Goethe
and Dionysus) that get nothing but a positive treatment throughout his writ-
ings. Moreover, he also links freedom here with the notion of afﬁrmation—one
of the central positive themes of all his writings from The Gay Science onwards.
Hence, the mere fact that Nietzsche talks about freedom cannot be taken as a
guarantee that we should be looking for some sort of hidden or disguised mean-
ing.
Finally, seeing the sovereign individual as a counter-ideal also sits rather un-
easily with the chronology of the Second Essay. Throughout GM II: 2 there are
frequent references to the fact that the sovereign individual comes after, and in-
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deed is produced by, what Nietzsche calls “the morality of custom”. The moral-
ity of custom, however, occupies a quite speciﬁc place in history for Nietzsche.
This is shown by his description of it as “the actual labour of man on himself
during the longest epoch of the human race, his whole prehistoric labour” (GM
II: 2). Hence, it would seem strange if Nietzsche believed that the sovereign
individual could represent the “modernist ideal of subjective autonomy” whilst
also believing him to have been made possible by a style of morality that existed
exclusively during mankind’s prehistory.
This last objection also applies equally well to the standard interpretation
of the passage, which sees the sovereign individual as some sort of future ﬁgure,
whose freedom and autonomy is dependent upon his liberation from morality.
In the case of both of these readings, it seems that misleading translations may
play some part in the problem. I am thinking here of one particular part of the
sovereign individual passage, which normally gets translated along these lines:
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last
brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what
they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the
sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again from the morality of
custom, autonomous and supramoral (for autonomous and moral are mutually
exclusive)23
(GM II: 2)
Despite there being two separate indications that it is speciﬁcally the moral-
ity of custom that is presently under discussion, people seem to have taken more
notice of the last of the few words reproduced here, which strongly imply that
the sovereign individual is somehow beyond morality as such—hence making
him a perfect candidate for the status of a Nietzschean future ideal. Yet, if we
look at the original German text, it is clear that this was not what Nietzsche
was intending to imply. Before quoting this text, however, it will be useful to
23I am here using Kaufmann and Hollingdale’s translation (Nietzsche, 1996), because their
translation of ‘sittlich’ by the word ‘moral’ suits my purposes particularly well. Diethe’s trans-
lation however, which uses ‘ethical’ instead, is in many ways just as misleading, mainly due to
the ethics/morality distinction that has been applied to Nietzsche’s thought most notably by
Clark (2001). I will discuss this distinction in more detail in the next chapter.
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give some preliminary explanation. When talking about morality, Nietzsche
most commonly uses the word ‘Moral’—as in the German title of the book
Zur Genealogie der Moral. The phrase ‘morality of custom’, on the other hand,
translates the German phrase ‘Sittlichkeit der Sitte’. Bearing this in mind, I will
now give the original German text from which the words “autonomous and
supramoral (for ‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually exclusive)” are trans-
lated:
das autonome übersittliche Individuum (denn »autonom« und »sittlich« schliesst
sich aus)
(Nietzsche, 1988, p.48)
As this shows, even in these remarks Nietzsche is clearly only intending to
convey to us that the sovereign individual is supra-the-morality-of-custom (i.e.
übersittliche), and that his autonomy is merely dependent upon his liberation
from a morality which existed exclusively during mankind’s prehistory. In fact,
Nietzsche does not even use the German word ‘Moral’ once throughout the
whole of GM II: 2. Hence both of the views that have been discussed so far,
which share the assumption that the sovereign individual is primarily an ideal
relevant for either modern or future times, seem to involve ignoring the very
speciﬁc place in history that Nietzsche attributes to this ﬁgure.
The Sovereign Individual as a Figure from the Past
So far in this chapter I have considered reasons both for and against two differ-
ent interpretations of the role the sovereign individual plays within Nietzsche’s
thought. I will now look at a third possible reading which, I shall argue, avoids
the problems that these other reading face, as well as cohering better with many
of Nietzsche’s other remarks in the Second Essay.
The main claim of this third reading, then, is that the sovereign individual
is not an ideal that Nietzsche (or indeed anyone else) is proposing for the future
of mankind. Instead, he is actually a ﬁgure that existed at a certain point in
mankind’s history, but has since become, for various reasons, impossible. As
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such, his role can only be understood in relation to what Janaway has called
the “fall and redemption pattern” (2007, p.117) of the Second Essay.24 Here is a
precise summary:
at some time in the past, as a product of the harshly repressive “morality of cus-
tom”, there became possible sovereign individuals with a free will. Since that time
the post-Christian morality of selﬂessness has been victorious, positing the desir-
ability of guilt and self-suppression and the conception of the non-self-suppressing
individual as blameworthy for not making the supposedly available choice to be
harmless. In some future we might cast off this conception of morality, and the
will could be free again.
(Janaway, 2007, p.117)
This represents the bare bones of the reading in question. In this section and
the next, I will go into more detail about exactly how this “fall and redemption
pattern” works, as well as showing how it avoids the difﬁculties faced by the
two interpretations that have already been discussed.
The ﬁrst important stage of this “fall and redemption pattern”, then, is ac-
tually that which precedes the fall—the creation of sovereign individuals by the
“harshly repressive” morality of custom. As was mentioned in the previous
section, Nietzsche makes frequent references to the fact that the “free will” pos-
sessed by the sovereign individual is made possible by the morality of custom.
The question now becomes: how? To answer this, we must look at Nietzsche’s
analysis of what this morality actually entails. The idea of the morality of cus-
tom is ﬁrst introduced in Daybreak.25 Here, Nietzsche describes this morality as
being characterized by a blind and superstitious obedience to tradition. Unlike
other forms of ethical orientation, the morality of custom is not, in the eyes
of its adherents at least, susceptible to justiﬁcation and rationalization. Rather,
those individuals living under its dictates obey tradition simply “because it com-
mands” (D 9) and see no practical utility for themselves in doing so, except
perhaps in avoiding the wrath of the many vengeful and elusive spirits which
24It should be noted that Janaway does not argue directly for this reading, but rather considers
it as one of the many possible interpretations that could be given of the passage.
25D 9—one of the passages Nietzsche refers us to in GM II: 2.
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they take to populate their primitive world. Moreover, and as Nietzsche is par-
ticularly fond of emphasizing in the Genealogy, the rules that the morality of
custom lays down are enforced through particularly harsh punishments, in or-
der to impress the need to obey most forcefully on the collection of “slaves of
the mood and desire of the moment” (GM II: 3) that constitute its subjects.
As Nietzsche himself points out, there is much “hardness, tyranny, stupid-
ity and idiocy” (GM II: 2) contained in such a morality. Yet, in spite of this, it
also serves a useful purpose: it provides a training in obedience as such. It is this
training which makes sovereign individuals possible. After learning obedience
in relation to arbitrary and tyrannical laws, human beings then become capable
of obeying laws that they set for themselves. This ability to fully obey laws that
the person in question somehow identiﬁes with, has internalized, and sees as be-
ing somehow expressive of their own nature is what Nietzsche understands by
the possession of conscience in its earliest stages, and it is the possession of this
sort of conscience as a “dominant instinct” (GM II: 2) which then characterizes
the sovereign individual.
It is for this reason that Nietzsche thinks that human beings only become
fully free, autonomous, and responsible once they have transcended the moral-
ity of custom. Whilst they are still under the sway of this ethical system, their
actions are dictated entirely by what tradition demands. After the development
of conscience, by contrast, people become capable of directing their actions ac-
cording to their own ends and values, and hence are truly in control of their
own actions for the ﬁrst time. Moreover, the possession of this “dominant in-
stinct” also acts to unify the disparate drives of the individuals in which it is
found. This is because, due to its ‘dominant’ nature, all other drives must ﬁnd
a function in relation to its ends, or else risk being suppressed until they essen-
tially lose their force and power.
It is also worth noting that, at this stage of its development, according to
Nietzsche, conscience is best described as an instinct. This is shown by the
closing sentences of the passage:
The proud knowledge of this extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the con-
sciousness of this rare power over himself and his destiny, has penetrated him to
his lowest depths and become an instinct, his dominant instinct:—what will he
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call his dominant instinct, assuming that he needs a word for it? No doubt about
the answer: this sovereign human being calls it his conscience...
(GM II: 2)
Here, we meet for the ﬁrst time with one of Nietzsche’s potentially confus-
ing uses of the notion of instinct. This is an issue that will be returned to in
greater detail in Chapter IV,26 so I will not go into great detail here. Sufﬁce it to
say for the time being though, that I think Nietzsche is using this term in order
to bring out certain features of the way conscience functions in the individual
who possesses it. The qualities he is primarily trying to signal are not, however,
those that we would ordinarily associate with the idea of instinct—being inborn
as opposed to learnt, for example, or being some sort of automatic reaction.27
Rather, his point is to emphasize that conscience in this phase of its develop-
ment does not present its demands as rational considerations for the assent of
the conscious intellect, but rather commands authoritatively as if from deep
within.
This, however, is not where the story of the Second Essay ends. Once con-
science has developed it does not simply continue to be an unconscious regu-
lating faculty within the human individual. Instead, according to the account
Nietzsche gives, conscience becomes intertwined with notions such as guilt and
self-denial, and ultimately transforms into what he dubs “bad conscience” (GM
II: 4)—a desire to understand one’s self as guilty and worthy of punishment. As
might be expected from a writer as complex as Nietzsche, the reasons behind
this transformation are many and intricate. The reason to which he devotes the
most space within the context of the Second Essay, however, is the fact that the
necessities of social living force human beings to impose constraints upon many
of their naturally aggressive desires (through such measures as codes of laws and
associated punishments). These aggressive desires do not simply disappear, how-
ever, and it becomes necessary for people to ﬁnd alternative ways of expressing
their natural need to inﬂict cruelty and suffering. Barred from external expres-
sion, these impulses turn back on the very people who hold them, and seize
26More speciﬁcally, on pages 131–136.
27Although he may possibly be intending to imply these things as well.
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upon bad conscience as a way of making themselves suffer as a compensation
for the more natural external outlet that is no longer available to them.
In one sense, it may look as if something does not add up about this account.
This is because it seems to posit the same phenomenon—i.e. socialization—as
the cause of both conscience and bad conscience. If bad conscience is caused by
the suppression of natural instincts necessary for communal living, why does
the morality of custom, which seems to involve a similar sort of suppression,
give rise to the more positive form of conscience that Nietzsche describes in GM
II: 2 and not to its unpleasant counterpart? This is, however, only a seeming
inconsistency, and there are two signiﬁcant differences between the morality of
custom and later ethical systems which account for the differences in the results
they produce.
The ﬁrst difference is in the types of values that inform the two systems.
As was mentioned earlier, the rules laid down by the morality of custom are
arbitrary and handed down through tradition. As such, they do not speciﬁcally
target man’s aggressive impulses in the same way that later, more humane ethi-
cal systems do. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that certain rules put forward
by the morality of custom would actually require engaging one’s aggressive in-
stincts in order to obey them: rules often attributed to primitive societies such
as sacriﬁces or ritualistic ways of taking revenge on those who have wronged
you might, for example, fall in to such a category. Hence, whilst the morality
of custom does involve the suppression of desires, it still allows for the vent-
ing of some aggressive impulses, and does not force man to turn these against
himself to nearly the same degree.
Secondly, there is also a difference in scope between the two ethical systems,
in the sense of the number of people whom you must regard as members of
your social group, and hence extend ethical treatment to. Whilst the timeline
of the Genealogy is not uncontroversial, it seems safe to assume that the moral-
ity of custom held sway whilst human society was still, in Nietzsche’s words,
“shapeless and shifting” (GM II: 17), and people still lived in relatively small
tribal groups, each with its own different sets of traditions and customs. As
such, these human beings were still “happily adapted to the wilderness, war, the
wandering life and adventure” (GM II: 16), and treated other tribal groups in the
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essentially aggressive fashion that this style of living demands. Hence, as with
the nobles of the First Essay, there is still plenty of opportunity for those living
under the morality of custom to “compensate for tension which is caused by be-
ing closed in and fenced in by the peace of the community” by going “outside”
into the “wilderness” (GM I: 11). At a certain point, however, according to the
story Nietzsche tells, there is a radical and sudden change in the life of these
people: a “pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race” (GM
II: 17) imposes a state upon them.28 After this has occurred, the boundaries
of the ethical community are extended vastly. Suddenly, virtually nobody one
comes into contact with on anything like a regular basis is a legitimate target
for aggressive impulses, and man “ﬁnally [ﬁnds] himself imprisoned within the
conﬁnes of society and peace” (GM II: 16)—unable to express any of his natural
aggressive desires externally. It is this “most fundamental of all changes” (GM
II: 16) from nomadic groups to organized states that partly marks the difference
between the morality of custom and later ethical systems, and helps to explain
why bad conscience arises from one and not the other.
All of this described above is obviously a highly truncated version of the
story Nietzsche tells, and there are many other factors that feed in to the trans-
formation of conscience into bad conscience. The important point here, how-
ever, is that once this transformation has occurred conscience can no longer
perform the function that it once did. Instead of being a ruling instinct which
allows people to impose a unity on their actions across time in accordance with
their own values, it becomes an instrument for self-cruelty and self-hatred. As
such, it no longer enables freedom and responsibility in those who possess it,
but rather contributes to the loss of these very qualities. This is because it no
longer acts as a force to unify the individuals it is found in, but instead height-
ens the internal conﬂict of “an animal soul turning against itself” (GM II: 16),
and hence furthers the dissolution of the self into many selves. Once this has
occurred, however, sovereign individuals (and the type of freedom they possess)
are no longer possible.
This transformation of conscience into bad conscience constitutes the “fall”
28Whilst it might be intuitive to assume that this change occurred gradually, Nietzsche is
insistent that it was in fact a highly sudden transition (cf. GM II: 17).
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aspect of this “fall and redemption” pattern—the loss of the freedom and respon-
sibility that was once possible. Nietzsche’s message does not end here, however,
and he also hopes that “redemption” might be available at some future time.
This is most clearly shown in the latter sections of the Second Essay (GM II:
24–5), where Nietzsche talks of a “man of the future” who will overcome the
ideal of self-hatred which bad conscience has given rise to:
This man of the future will redeem us, not just from the ideal held up till now, but
also from those things which had to arise from it, from the great nausea, the will
to nothingness, from nihilism, that stroke of midday and of great decision that
makes the will free again, which gives earth its purpose and man his hope again,
this Antichrist and anti-nihilist, this conqueror of God and nothingness—he must
come one day...
(GM II: 24)
As this passage clearly shows, Nietzsche holds high hopes that mankind, or
at least some men, will be liberated from bad conscience at some point in the
future. What is particularly interesting to note in terms of the “fall and redemp-
tion” reading under discussion, however, is Nietzsche’s talk of the making “the
will free again”.29 This implies two beliefs on Nietzsche’s part. Firstly, that the
will was free at some point in the past. Secondly, that the will is no longer free.
Given that Nietzsche holds these beliefs, it seems obvious that the Second Es-
say must follow something along the lines of the “fall and redemption pattern”
being described here. Moreover, given the observations that have already been
made about the historical location of the sovereign individual (i.e. his existence
directly after or during the latter stages of the prehistoric morality of custom),
along with the fact that he is described as a “master of the free will”, it also
seems fairly safe to conclude that the sovereign individual is not an ideal which
Nietzsche is proposing, but is rather a ﬁgure from some time in the past—from
the previous point in history when the will was free for the ﬁrst time.
29Emphasis added.
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The Sovereign Individual as a Figure from the Past: For
I have now outlined the fundamentals of the “fall and redemption” reading of
the Second Essay, as well as the role which the sovereign individual plays within
it: the Second Essay tells the story of how mankind achieved freedom through
the morality of custom, lost it through his involvement with bad conscience,
and must now cast of the shackles of self-hatred which divide him against him-
self in order to become free again. The role of the sovereign individual passage
in all of this, to reiterate, is to provide a dramatized picture of the type of free
human being who was once possible before conscience was corrupted and trans-
formed into bad conscience. In the remainder of this section, I will go on to
show how this reading can both account for (most of30) the evidence in favour
of the two readings I have already discussed, as well as overcoming the problems
that they faced.
Firstly, and as with both of the two previous interpretations, this reading
can easily explain why Nietzsche describes the sovereign individual in such ﬂat-
tering terms. Given Nietzsche’s desire to see “great health” (GM II: 24) restored
to humanity, it is not at all surprising that he displays admiration and wonder
at this example of healthy humanity that he believes himself to have located in
the distant past. Hence, we should not be surprised to see his rhetoric reaching
up to such dizzying heights of adulation.
Secondly, this reading can also account for the fact that the sovereign indi-
vidual is only ever discussed fully in one passage. Much as with the counter-ideal
reading, this interpretation assigns a very speciﬁc role to this ﬁgure within the
story of the Second Essay. Therefore, there would be no need for Nietzsche to
discuss him anywhere else unless he was going to undertake another in-depth
30I say ‘most of’ here because it cannot account for the fact (used mainly in support of the
standardreading)thatthe sovereignindividualisseeminglyportrayedasa ﬁgurefromthefuture,
liberated from morality. If my argument is correct, however, this actually counts in favour of
this reading, because the assumption that the sovereign individual is ﬁgure from the future relies
on a mistranslation of the passage in question. Similarly, it also cannot explain the fact (used in
support of the counter-ideal reading) that this passage might be taken to clash with Nietzsche’s
critical stance towards notions such as freedom and selfhood. Once again, however, this does
not count against this reading because, I argue, taking this stance relies upon overstating the
critical side of Nietzsche’s project. For a fuller treatment of both of these issues see the previous
section of this chapter.
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analysis of the transformation of the conscience into bad conscience.
This “fall and redemption” reading can also offer an explanation of Niet-
zsche’s motivations for claiming in Ecce Homo that the beginning of the Sec-
ond Essay “should be deceptive”. Undoubtedly, part of the reason lies in that
given by the standard interpretation: Nietzsche wants us to identify with the
sovereign individual when he is ﬁrst described, but intends to make us realize
that we are far more similar to the man of bad conscience described later in
the essay. However, there is also slightly more to it than this. By placing the
sovereign individual in the distant past, Nietzsche is also using this beginning
to challenge another common assumption which comes under ﬁre frequently in
the Genealogy—namely that human history represents any sort of teleological
process of improvement (cf. GM I: 11–2 and GM II: 12 in particular). Hence,
not only is Nietzsche using this beginning to make us aware of just how far we
are from achieving freedom and autonomy, he is also using it to show that, con-
trary to most people’s beliefs, we are actually much further from achieving it
than people who existed long ago, and to whom we generally consider ourselves
vastly superior.
Another advantage of this interpretation is that it avoids the difﬁcult ques-
tion of whether the sovereign individual’s attitude towards fate can be made
consistent with Nietzsche’s doctrine of amor fati. As was discussed previously,
the sovereign individual displays a desire to control fate which seems at odds
with Nietzsche’s frequent recommendations that we should love that which is
necessary. If he is a ﬁgure from the past, as opposed to any sort of future ideal,
then his compatibility with this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought is no longer an
issue. As Nietzsche is not recommending that we emulate this ﬁgure in any
strict sense, there is no need to ensure that he can be made compatible with all
of Nietzsche’s other positive remarks.31 Hence, even if it could be shown con-
clusively that his attitude towards his destiny contradicts the stipulations laid
down by amor fati, this would still not exclude him from playing the role he is
intended to within the framework of the Second Essay.
31Although given the experimental nature of Nietzsche’s positive philosophy this might be
too great a demand to make upon any interpretation anyway. Issues relating to this concern
will be discussed in Chapter VI.
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The elitism that is present in the attitude of the sovereign individual also
presents no difﬁculties for this reading. As was mentioned on pages 22–23,
the unequal treatment this ﬁgure displayed towards others (depending upon
whether or not they too were sovereign individuals) made it highly doubtful
whether he could be a representative of the “modernist ideal of subjective au-
tonomy”. If we see the sovereign individual as a ﬁgure from the past, however,
there is no problem here at all. Equality is an ideal that we are still striving
to achieve today, and that has only come to prominence in the latter stages of
history. Hence, given the sovereign individual’s existence at the end of prehis-
tory, there is no need to expect his actions to cohere with this extremely recent
model of how human relations should be conducted.
This “fall and redemption” interpretation is also in a perhaps unique po-
sition to be able to explain the disagreement the two other views of the pas-
sage have over whether the sovereign individual coheres with or contradicts the
views that Nietzsche puts forward in the rest of his writings. According to the
standard view, to recap, the sovereign individual exempliﬁes a type of attained
freedom and responsibility that Nietzsche often discusses in other parts of his
work. The counter-ideal view, by contrast, claims that Nietzsche rejects notions
such as free will and autonomy outright and hence cannot be seriously attribut-
ing such qualities to the sovereign individual. If we see the sovereign individual
in the context of the “fall and redemption” reading, however, we can go some
way towards explaining both of these viewpoints. Given that the purpose of
this passage is to dramatize a type of freedom and responsibility that existed
in the past, it is inevitable that it will tie in (to some extent) with Nietzsche’s
vision of how these things might be achieved in the future. Yet, given that Niet-
zsche thinks that these qualities can no longer be found in his contemporaries,
we can also understand part of his motivations for his hyperbolic claims that
these notions are totally illusory: speciﬁcally, as an attempt to challenge mod-
ern man’s assumption that he possesses freedom and responsibility merely in
virtue of being human.
So far in this section, I have examined how seeing the sovereign individual as
a ﬁgure from the past can incorporate the evidence used in assessing the merits
of the previous two interpretations I have discussed. Yet there is one considera-
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tion that cannot be accounted for directly. This is an argument used in favour of
the counter-ideal view, which runs something along these lines: in the opening
section of the Second Essay Nietzsche talks about the positive value of active
forgetfulness. In the following section, when discussing the sovereign individ-
ual, he attributes to him a highly developed memory. Therefore, this argument
concludes, Nietzsche cannot seriously be endorsing the sovereign individual, as
this would involve him in a contradiction—that of positively valuing both mem-
ory and forgetfulness. The reason why this argument cannot be accounted for
directly, however, is that it involves an essentially mistaken conception of Niet-
zsche’s purpose in discussing active forgetfulness. In order for this argument to
work, Nietzsche would have to be attributing some sort of absolute value to for-
getfulness, such that anything which worked against it would necessarily have
to be disvalued. Attributing this sort of absolute value to anything, however,
would really seem to be an extremely un-Nietzschean move. It seems far more
likely, by contrast, that what Nietzsche displays over the course of GM II: 1–2
is a somewhat more ambivalent attitude towards both memory and active for-
getfulness. He values active forgetfulness for the role it can play in the healthy
functioning of animal life, but he also values memory insofar as it has enabled
new and valuable capacities (such as the ability to keep promises and extend
one’s will through time) to develop in man. In this sense, his attitude is very
similar to that which he displays in the First Essay towards the increased intel-
ligence brought about in human beings through the slave revolt in morality. In
one sense, he clearly sees this increased intelligence as a negative phenomenon,
as it takes mankind further away from the healthy, instinctual mode of life it
once had. Yet, at the same time, he also recognizes that the possession of this in-
creased intelligence is what has made man “an interesting animal” (GM I: 6) and
has “brought a wealth of novel, disconcerting beauty and afﬁrmation to light”
(GM II: 18). Hence, to conclude that Nietzsche cannot value memory because
he also values forgetfulness, would be a similar style of error to claiming that
he cannot value the increased intelligence of mankind because he also admires
the instinctual way mankind functioned prior to gaining this intelligence. Yet,
this is clearly not the case. Therefore, despite what this argument implies, Niet-
zsche’s purpose here is not to set up these two faculties as opponents, and then
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declare his allegiance to forgetfulness.
I have now touched upon all the considerations which have been advanced
in favour of the previous two interpretations, and explained their relationship
to the “fall and redemption” reading. Before moving on to my conclusion,
however, I will advance some further thoughts that might be thought to speak
in favour of this view.
Firstly, this interpretation ﬁts neatly with a plausible account of exactly why
Nietzsche chooses to dub this ﬁgure the sovereign individual. Throughout his
writings, Nietzsche frequently echoes the Platonic view that the structure of
the self can be understood by comparison with the structure of a society.32 In
the passage from Beyond Good and Evil quoted earlier, for example, he lists the
hypothesis that the “soul” is a “society constructed out of drives and affects”
as one that should possess “civil rights in the realm of science” from now on.
Later in the same book, he also claims that “our body is...only a society con-
structed out of many souls” (BGE 19), and in the Genealogy he tells us that “our
organism runs along oligarchic lines” (GM II: 1). When he describes the ﬁgure
under discussion as the sovereign individual, therefore, it is hard not to be re-
minded of Plato’s comparisons of different types of individuals with different
types of societies in the Republic. Moreover, this parallel is also backed up if
we consider the salient features of a sovereign state alongside the characteriza-
tion of the sovereign individual given by this “fall and redemption” reading. A
sovereign state is characterized by all of the political power being concentrated
into a single ruler, with all of the other aspects of the state being under their
control. This is exactly the type of dominance that, according to this interpre-
tation, Nietzsche attributes to the conscience in his depiction of the sovereign
individual. Hence, the reason why the sovereign individual is the sovereign indi-
vidual is because his soul is structured in the manner of a sovereign state—with
a single ruling element determining the actions of the whole.
In addition to this, the “fall and redemption” reading also makes sense of
the many similarities that can be found between the sovereign individual and
the nobles of the First Essay. If we accept the timeline that is being proposed
by this interpretation, the place in history this ﬁgure occupies would fall some-
32This point has also been noted by Nehamas (1985, p.182–3).
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where between pre-history and the dominance of the ideal of self-hatred—in
other words, he would be around during exactly the period of time when, ac-
cording to Nietzsche, the nobles would have still existed and dominated large
portions of Europe. Given this, it seems likely that if any sovereign individuals
did actually exist, then they would have been found amongst the ranks of the
nobles. If this is so, however, it would explain many of the remarks Nietzsche
makes about his mindset and behaviour. Firstly, for example, there is the at-
titude he adopts towards those he takes to be below himself: one of disdain,
mistrust, and superiority. This is precisely the attitude we are told that the no-
ble displays towards the slave, and that Nietzsche characterizes as the “pathos of
distance” (GM I: 2). Secondly, it would also explain the extreme similarities be-
tween their mode of valuation. In the middle of his description of the sovereign
individual, Nietzsche tells us that:
The “free” man, the possessor of an enduring and unbreakable will, thus has his
own standard of value: in the possession of such a will: viewing others from his
own standpoint, he respects or despises; and just as he will necessarily respect his
peers, the strong and the reliable (those with the prerogative to promise)...so he
will necessarily be ready to kick the febrile whippets who promise without that
prerogative, and will save the rod for the liar who breaks his word in the very
moment it passes his lips.
(GM II: 2)
In other words, the sovereign individual uses the positive value he feels him-
self to have as a way of evaluating others. Those who are like him he takes
to be good, those who are unlike him he takes to be bad. This, however, is a
carbon copy of the “spontaneous” and “active” (GM I: 10) method of valuation
that is attributed to the nobles in the First Essay, in contradistinction to the
reactive method associated with slave morality. Finally, there is also the striking
similarity of vocabulary that Nietzsche employs when describing both ﬁgures.
This is particularly well instanced by his statement that the sovereign individual
arouses “trust, fear, and respect”, in which it is difﬁcult not to be reminded of
his memorable claim that:
We may be quite justiﬁed in retaining our fear at the blond beast at the centre of
every noble race and remain on our guard: but who would not, a hundred times
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over, prefer to fear if he can admire at the same time, rather than not fear, but
thereby permanently retain the disgusting spectacle of the failed, the stunted, the
wasted away and the poisoned?
(GM I: 11)
Final Thoughts on the Sovereign Individual
InthepreviousthreesectionsofthischapterIhavecomparedthreedifferentpos-
sible understandings of the role of the sovereign individual within Nietzsche’s
thought, and argued for the one I take to be most persuasive—namely, that
which takes his signiﬁcance to be intricately linked to the “fall and redemption”
structure of the Second Essay. To conclude, I will look at how, if we accept this
interpretation, this ﬁgure relates to Nietzsche’s ideal of autonomy. To do this,
I will compare the signiﬁcance this reading assigns to the sovereign individual
with that attributed to him by the other two interpretations I have discussed in
this chapter. In both cases, I will examine the important areas of agreement and
disagreement, and put forward my thoughts on what these differences entail for
our understanding of this ﬁgure.
Themostnaturalplacetobeginiswithacomparisonwiththestandardview.
According to proponents of this view, the sovereign individual holds a very
important place in regard to Nietzsche’s views on autonomy. Not only is he a
Nietzschean ideal, but he is so precisely because he represents a particular type
of attained freedom that Nietzsche sees it as valuable for us emulate. Hence,
when considering Nietzsche’s autonomy ideal, GM II: 2 is potentially the most
important passage available, and any higher individuals of the future (or indeed
the present) who achieve the type of post-moral autonomy that Nietzsche is
aiming to bring about will actually be sovereign individuals in the most literal
sense.
In terms of the contrast between this understanding of the sovereign indi-
vidual’s signiﬁcance and that attributed to him by the “fall and redemption”
reading, one aspect is relatively simple to explain, whilst the other takes a little
more work. The side that is fairly easy to explain is the similarities, so I will
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begin here. In a certain sense, the similarities are obvious: both attribute a pos-
itive attitude towards the sovereign individual to Nietzsche, and both see him
as ﬁgure for emulation. Hence, loosely speaking, both of these views agree that
he is some kind of ideal. After all, the purpose of Nietzsche giving the Second
Essay this “fall and redemption” pattern is to try and play some part in the re-
demption, by raising an awareness of the exact nature of the problem at hand.
In other words, Nietzsche does not describe this ﬁgure from the past merely in
order to lament his disappearance, but rather as a reminder that freedom was
possible in the past, and could be possible again. Therefore, just as with the
standard view, this reading sees the sovereign individual as telling us something
important about the nature of freedom, and who therefore must, to a certain
extent at least, be emulated.
These similarities, however, belie an important underlying difference. As
was mentioned above, there is a certain sense in which it is fair to say that both
of these viewpoints see the sovereign individual as some sort of ideal. Yet, the
sort of ideal that he is taken to be actually varies quite considerably between the
two cases. As far as the standard view goes, the sovereign individual represents
something along the lines of the ﬁnished article: he is literally Nietzsche’s ideal
type of human being, and it is human beings of this type that Nietzsche is aim-
ing to help try and bring about in the future through his writings. According
to the “fall and redemption” reading, by contrast, the sovereign individual is
an ideal in a slightly weaker sense. Rather than being a complete and accurate
representation of Nietzsche’s imagined higher individuals of the future, he func-
tions more along the lines of a foretaste or model for such individuals, without
actually being one himself. Initially, the difference between these two positions
may not seem all that clear, but it can be illuminated by a comparison with the
nobles of the First Essay, who play a similar role in Nietzsche’s project in the
Genealogy.
The First Essay then, very brieﬂy, relates the story of a struggle between two
different ethical systems—noble morality (or ‘good and bad’) and slave moral-
ity (or ‘good and evil’). These two systems originate in distinct social groups
who are, unsurprisingly, referred to as the nobles and the slaves.33 Now, two
33This is not quite accurate, as slave morality actually originates with the priests, who are a
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of the main points that Nietzsche wants to get across in this essay are as fol-
lows: ﬁrstly, that noble morality represents a superior (and healthier) ethical
system than slave morality (cf. GM I: 10–1 in particular), and secondly that
slave morality has largely won out over the previously dominant noble moral-
ity, and now monopolizes the moral thinking of present day Europe (cf. GM
I: 7-9). In addition to trying to persuade us of these two points, Nietzsche also
uses this essay to voice his desire that a new form of noble morality should be
instated, and to convince his readers (or some of them at least) that they should
desire the same (GM I: 16–7). When looked at in this way, a familiar looking
fall and redemption pattern becomes evident here as well: mankind once lived
under a healthy and noble ethical system, lost this through the prevalence of a
slavish system of valuation, and now must strive to once again become noble.
Now, if we compare the pattern of the ﬁrst two essays, it is obvious who corre-
sponds to the ﬁgure of the sovereign individual within the context of the First
Essay—namely, the original noble. Both the sovereign individual and the noble
represent mankind in an earlier, healthier stage, and act as a ﬁgure who Niet-
zsche attaches positive value to, especially by comparison with modern man.
Yet, as has been argued many times before, it is obvious that Nietzsche is not,
and indeed cannot be, arguing for the re-emergence of the original noble in any
simple sense. This is because, leaving aside the question of whether Nietzsche
would see his re-emergence as desirable, the conditions that would make his re-
emergence possible are simple not present. As the arguments for this claim have
been made before, I will not go in to them too deeply here.34 But, put brieﬂy,
the sort of existence led by the noble was only possible due to the relatively low
level of internalization present in mankind at this early stage. Modern man,
however, is internalized to a very high degree, and there is simply no way that
this can be undone. Hence, granting that Nietzsche wants to bring about a
new nobility, it must also be recognized that this new nobility will have to be
different in many ways from that which existed previously, and that he cannot
merely call for exactly the same set of noble values that previously existed to be
type of noble (cf. GM I: 6–7). However, as this type of morality is sustained and empowered
through its being adopted by the slave class, this formulation will sufﬁce here.
34For a fuller treatment of this issue, see Ridley (1998, p.128–34).
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brought to the fore again. Hence, whilst it is true that Nietzsche both admires
and idealizes the original nobles, it is also the case that the creation of a new no-
ble morality cannot simply involve a direct replication of the noble values that
existed previously. Rather, a new noble morality must share certain core fea-
tures with its predecessor,35 but must also take into account the many changes
that human beings and human society have undergone since the emergence of
slave morality.
Thisrelationshipthatobtainsbetweentheoriginalnoblesandanyfutureno-
ble morality that may arise is, according to the “fall and redemption” reading,
parallel with that which holds between the sovereign individual and any indi-
viduals possessing autonomy that may arise in the future. Moreover, the reasons
why this relationship is the same are also parallel: the conditions which made
sovereign individuals possible are simply no longer present. As was discussed
on pages 29–30, the deﬁning feature of the sovereign individual is his posses-
sion of conscience as a dominant instinct. Yet, as was also discussed earlier, the
reason why sovereign individuals no longer exist is because of the transforma-
tion of conscience into bad conscience. Hence, if Nietzsche wanted to recreate
sovereign individuals in any literal sense, the only way to do so would be by
undoing this transformation—in other words, by removing bad conscience and
reinstating conscience as the instinctual director of man’s actions. As should
be obvious, however, this would be an impossible task. Firstly, if the sovereign
did exist during a time when mankind still lived according to the demands of a
relatively coherent instinct structure, this would involve a task similar to that
of recreating the original nobles: the increased level of consciousness brought
about in modern man by internalization would have to be reversed. In addition
to this, however, there is simply no obvious way to remove a phenomenon like
bad conscience which has, according to Nietzsche, become so deeply embed-
ded in the psyche of modern man. This is why, in one of his own attempts to
35Most obviously, it must be ‘active’ instead of ‘reactive’, in the sense of starting out from a
feeling of one’s own satisfaction with oneself, rather than from a desire to chastise and admonish
those features of others that one sees as undesirable or threatening (cf. GM I: 10–1). It also seems
likely that it will have to recognize the intricate link between a person’s character and the sort
of actions that the person in question is capable of performing—a link denied in slave morality’s
contention that we have an absolutely free will (cf. GM I: 13). These are only two examples,
and more structural similarities could possibly be drawn out from Nietzsche’s works.
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suggest how bad conscience might be overcome, Nietzsche recognizes that bad
conscience itself might need to have a role to play. Here is Nietzsche’s most
explicit statement regarding this issue:
Wemodernshaveinheritedmillenniaofconscience-vivisectionandanimal-torture
inﬂicted on ourselves: we have had most practice in it, are perhaps artists in the
ﬁeld, inanycaseitisourrafﬁnement andtheindulgenceofourtaste. Fortoolong,
man has viewed his natural inclinations with an “evil eye”, so that they ﬁnally be-
came intertwined with “bad conscience” in him. A reverse experiment should
be possible in principle—but who has sufﬁcient strength?—by this, I mean an in-
tertwining of bad conscience with perverse inclinations, all those other-worldly
aspirations, alien to the senses, the instincts, to nature, to animals, in short all the
ideals which up to now have been hostile to life and have defamed the world.
(GM II: 24)
As this passage demonstrates, Nietzsche is not so naïve as to believe that
bad conscience can be removed or reversed in any simple sense. Instead, he
recognizes that bad conscience is a phenomenon we must now live with, and
any attempt to move beyond it may well have to employ the very resources of
bad conscience itself in doing so.36 Due to this fact, the sovereign individual, as
a ﬁgure who arose under conditions we can no longer replicate exactly, can only
serve us so far as an ideal. Whilst we can recognize that many of his qualities,
such as the unity his character possesses over time and the strength of his will,
are essential for any type of autonomy we can hope to possess, it would be
pointless and impossible to try and recreate him exactly. Therefore, whilst he
should be recognized as an ideal of sorts, he is certainly not Nietzsche’s ideal
type in the stronger sense suggested by the standard view.
These, then, comprise the important similarities and differences between the
signiﬁcance attributed to the sovereign individual by the “fall and redemption”
reading and by the standard view: they agree that the sovereign individual is
some sort of ideal for Nietzsche, but disagree over how strongly we should
understand this claim. I will now look at the contrast between the “fall and
redemption” reading and the view that the sovereign individual is a counter-
ideal.
36This is a point which has also been made by Ridley (1998). See Chapter 6 in particular.
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To begin with, it is worth reiterating the signiﬁcance that the counter-ideal
view attributes to GM II: 2 within the larger context of Nietzsche’s views on
freedom as an ideal. As was previously discussed, this interpretation sees the
sovereign individual as being part of an elaborate trick Nietzsche is playing on
his readers. Rather than being a faithful portrayal of Nietzsche’s own views,
he is actually a representative of the “modernist ideal of subjective autonomy”
which Nietzsche is out to criticize. As such, the signiﬁcance of the sovereign
individual is to be understood negatively rather than positively. In other words,
the sovereign individual is intended to represent an understanding of human
freedom that Nietzsche believes to be essentially incoherent and harmful to
its proponents. Therefore, GM II: 2 works as something along the lines of a
summary of the conception of autonomy that Nietzsche is out to destroy, and
offers very little constructive evidence about the type of post-moral freedom, if
any, that Nietzsche envisions for the future.
Just as was the case with the comparison with the standard view, one aspect
of the contrast between these two views is easier to explain than the other. In
this case, it is the differences between the two views that are simpler to express,
so I will begin with these. Perhaps most basically, there is a vast difference in the
attitude towards the sovereign individual that they each attribute to Nietzsche.
Whilst the “fall and redemption” reading does not go as far as the standard view
in the positive valuation it takes Nietzsche to have of the sovereign individual, it
still believes that he essentially approves of this ﬁgure. According to the counter-
ideal reading, on the other hand, Nietzsche totally rejects the very possibility
of the sort of autonomy embodied in the sovereign individual, and is basically
hostile to people who aspire to be like this type. Moreover, the “fall and re-
demption” view also thinks that some lessons can be taken from the sovereign
individual about what autonomy might look like in the post-moral age, even if
it must be remembered that these lessons cannot necessarily be applied in any
straightforward or direct fashion. If we accept the counter-ideal view, by con-
trast, the only lessons we can draw from the sovereign individual are in how not
to conceive of freedom.
In spite of these major disagreements, however, there is one important sense
in which these two views coincide. This is because they both agree that the
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sovereign individual is not Nietzsche’s ideal type, and hence both maintain that
what Nietzsche is aiming to do is to bring about individuals who are, as we
might put it, supra-sovereign. In other words, both of these two readings share
the belief that the sovereign individual should not be understood as a represen-
tative of the type of person that Nietzsche wants to bring about in the future,
and that the higher individuals in which he does place his hopes will have to, in
some sense, move beyond the ideal that is embodied by this ﬁgure.
Obviously, they both hold this belief for drastically different reasons. In the
case of the counter-ideal view, higher individuals will have to move beyond the
ﬁgure of the sovereign individual because he represents the “modernist ideal of
subjective autonomy”—a mistaken belief that a person can become the absolute
and sole author of their actions in some metaphysical sense. Yet, despite not
sharing this conception of what the sovereign individual is supposed to exem-
plify, it is no less true for the “fall and redemption” reading that anyone wishing
to achieve any type of post-moral autonomy will have to go further than simply
imitating the sovereign individual. This is largely due to the reasons touched
upon earlier in this section: the conditions which made sovereign individuals
possible no longer exist. Therefore, any individuals of the future who do attain
anything like the same degree of freedom as was possessed by the sovereign in-
dividual will have to use the materials which the current condition of mankind
presents to them in doing so. To conclude this chapter, I will now put forward a
few thoughts on the differences between the situation of mankind now and dur-
ing the time when sovereign individuals were possible, and discuss how these
differences will affect the nature of any higher individuals ﬁtting Nietzsche’s
conception that may come about.
The ﬁrst major difference, and probably the most obvious, is the degree to
which mankind’s life takes place at the level of reﬂective consciousness rather
than, in some sense, instinctively. As has been mentioned a couple of times
now, the sovereign individual existed at a stage of human development when
man was not a self-conscious being to the same degree as he is now. Rather, his
actions were determined by his conscience, which functioned as a “dominant
instinct”. Modern man, by contrast, has around two thousand more years of
internalization behind him, and hence leads his life far more at the level of de-
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liberative consciousness. Given this fact, any unity which human beings impose
on their character in the future, and hence any freedom that they achieve, may
well need to rely upon the faculty of conscious reﬂection to a greater extent in
doing so. This is demonstrated in Nietzsche’s famous account of giving style to
one’s character (GS 290), along with many other passages in his work which give
directions on how to consciously apply artistic (or indeed horticultural) meth-
ods in the creation of a character.37 Higher individuals of the future, therefore,
will not necessarily be able to rely on instinctive forces to unify their character
in the same way that sovereign individuals could.
This is not to say that reﬂective consciousness is the only force that could
possibly be used to unify the characters of higher individuals of the future.
As Nietzsche states when discussing the formation of his own character in Ecce
Homo, “[b]ecoming what you are presupposes that you do not have the slightest
idea what you are” (EH: “Why I am so Clever”, 9). The meaning of this enig-
matic statement is explained more fully in the course of the passage, where Niet-
zsche explains that not deliberately attempting to create a character for yourself
can actually facilitate the process in question:
The whole surface of consciousness—consciousness is a surface—has to be kept
free from all of the great imperatives. Be careful even of great words, great atti-
tudes. They pose the threat that instinct will “understand itself” too early.— —In
the mean time, the organizing, governing “idea” keeps growing deep inside,—it
starts commanding, it slowly leads back from out of the side roads and wrong
turns, it gets the individual qualities and virtues ready, since at some point these
will prove indispensable as means to the whole,—one by one, it develops all the
servile faculties before giving any clue as to the domineering task, the “goal”, the
“purpose”, the “meaning”.
(EH: “Why I am so Clever”, 9)
The thought here is clearly that the “governing ‘idea’” that makes a person
become what they are can be at work within an individual without that per-
son actually having any reﬂective awarenes of the content of the idea. Hence,
the creation of that person’s character does proceed in a fashion that we might
37GS 299 and D 560 provide good examples of both types of metaphor
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call instinctive, below the “surface” that constitutes their conscious awareness.
At ﬁrst glance, this might seem to sit at odds with Nietzsche many recommen-
dations that we should consciously attempt to give a unity to our character.
Nietzsche’s hyperbole aside, however, there is no reason to think that both of
these methods of attaining unity could not sit side by side within one historical
age (although perhaps not in one person). Therefore, the overall lesson to be
gleaned here is that for higher individuals of the future, unlike the sovereign in-
dividuals of the past, both deliberately giving style to one’s character using the
tools of self-consciousness, as well as allowing one’s character to form without
any intentional input, will provide possible routes to the sort of uniﬁed self that
will enable freedom to ﬂourish again.38
There is also another signiﬁcant difference between the current condition
of mankind and that which obtained during the era when sovereign individuals
were still possible, according to the account Nietzsche gives—namely, the di-
versity and complexity of the drives which make up human beings. Here, we
meet with some of the less pleasant aspects of Nietzsche’s thought, because the
reason for this largely seems to reside in the extensive mixing of races that has
contributed to the nature of modern man. Here is a statement of this idea from
Beyond Good and Evil:
In an age of disintegration where the races are mixed together, a person will have
the legacy of multiple lineages in his body, which means conﬂicting (and often
not merely conﬂicting) drives and value standards that ﬁght with each other and
rarely leave each other alone. A man like this, of late cultures and refracted lights,
will typically be a weaker person: his most basic desire is for an end to the war
that he is.
(BGE 200)
The idea that Nietzsche expresses here is basically that individuals from the
modern era, due to their more mixed biological heritage, will contain a far
greater number of “drives and value standards” than people would have done
in the past. Moreover, this collection of drives etc. will be more varied and
conﬂicting than those of human beings who only have one cultural descent.
38I will return to the theme of Nietzsche’s views on consciousness and discuss them more
fully in Chapter IV.
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I do not wish to discuss the merits of this particular view here. Given, how-
ever, that Nietzsche does believe this to be the case, it does have some important
implications for the nature of any higher individuals who may achieve a type
of post-moral autonomy in the future. This is because, due to his existence in
the distant past, the sovereign individual would have been constituted by a far
smaller collection of drives than people are today. In addition to this, the drives
that he did possess would, in virtue of his relatively steady heritage, have been
far more naturally uniﬁed than those we would expect to ﬁnd in modern man.
Therefore, an important sense in which any higher individuals of the future will
differ from the sovereign individuals of the past will be the fact that they will
have a far more diverse and conﬂicting set of drives with which to work, which
will be more difﬁcult to unify into a coherent whole.39
As Nietzsche himself recognizes, the greater diversity and complexity to
be found in modern man can be either a blessing or a curse. For those who
Nietzsche would describe as “weaker”, it can make the task of giving any sort
of unity to their character impossible. As Nietzsche points out later on in the
passage quoted above, however, it can also be of great beneﬁt to other types of
person:
if conﬂict and war affect such a nature as one more stimulus and goad to life—,
and if genuine proﬁciency and ﬁnesse in waging war with himself (which is to
say: the ability to control and outwit himself) are inherited and cultivated along
with his most powerful and irreconcilable drives, then what emerge are those
amazing, incomprehensible, and unthinkable ones, those human riddles destined
for victory and for seduction
(BGE 200)
Hence, it is fair to say that the complex nature of modern man is something
of a double-edged sword. For those without the abilities necessary to master
their conﬂicting drives, it means that their lives will be characterized by a sort
of internal chaos and disunity, and their “most basic desire” will be for an end
to the war that constitutes their self. For those who do possess the requisite
abilities, on the other hand, the incredible variety of contrasting drives that
39This thought owes much to Richardson (1996). See section 2.5 in particular.
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make them up will provide the sort of strong resistances that Nietzsche sees
it as necessary for great individuals to overcome on their path to becoming
who they are. Moreover, it will open up the possibility of individuals who
possess a far richer unity, based on a more complex and diverse set of drives
and affects.40 Hence, whilst it is true that Nietzsche considers the sovereign
individual a striking ﬁgure, and one worthy of our admiration and respect, it
shouldalsoberememberedthatthemanychangesmankindhasundergonesince
the time of his existence have created new possibilities for mankind as a whole,
and particularly for those “amazing, incomprehensible, and unthinkable ones”
that Nietzsche conceives of as the higher humanity of the future.
40Issues relating to Nietzsche’s notion of unity, and his conception of unity-in-diversity, will
be treated more fully in Chapter V.
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ETHICS AND AUTONOMY
This chapter aims to establish two separate but related points about the rela-
tionship between autonomy and ethics in Nietzsche’s thought. The ﬁrst is that
Nietzsche held a view which is found, in more or less similar forms, in the
works of a variety of thinkers throughout the history of philosophy, namely
that autonomy1 requires ethical living.2 The second, and more substantial, of
the two points, by contrast, is one which is far more particular to Nietzsche:
that in order to achieve the highest degrees of autonomy possible for human
beings, it is essential that the ethic a person lives by is somehow personalized
or customized in such a way as to enhance the ﬂourishing of the individual in
question.
As a ﬁrst step on the way to establishing these two points, I will discuss
the stipulative use of the term ‘ethics’ that I will be employing throughout this
chapter, and its relation to the ethics/morality distinction ﬁrst made by Bernard
Williams in EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy and later applied more speciﬁcally
to Nietzsche’s thought by Maudemarie Clark. Here, I will emphasize that I will
be using the term to signify something broader than it is usually used to signify,
to mean something roughly along the lines of ‘any life-directing procedure that
excludes simply following one’s immediate desires and inclinations’. I will also
1Given that Nietzsche believes that autonomy is a matter of degree, and not something one
either possesses or does not possess, this could be phrased more precisely as ‘any signiﬁcant level
of autonomy’.
2Most notably by two thinkers who Nietzsche is normally keen to stress his opposition to:
Plato and Kant.
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advance some considerations to suggest that this use of the term is appropriate
in the context of Nietzsche’s thought.
After clarifying this crucial concept, I will then move on to the investigation
proper. Here, I will begin by establishing the ﬁrst of the two claims above,
that Nietzsche takes ethical living to be necessary for any worthwhile degree
of autonomy. My argument here will proceed negatively, i.e. by showing that
Nietzsche believes that the lowest degrees of autonomy are possessed by those
who live by no ethic at all, or, which comes to the same thing by my deﬁnition,
by those who let their lives be determined solely by their immediate desires.
I will then move on to the second of the two claims mentioned above: that
the ethic a person lives by needs to be personalized in such a way as to pro-
mote their own individual ﬂourishing in order to achieve the highest degrees of
autonomy possible for human beings. The ﬁrst step towards establishing this
claim will be fairly simple: given that autonomy means self-determination, liv-
ing by an ethics which is, in some sense, one’s own will obviously yield a higher
degree of autonomy than allowing one’s actions to be determined by an ethic
that is merely accepted from some external source. This, however, only takes
us so far, and still does not explain the necessity that the ethic a person lives by
be both their own and tailored to promote their own ﬂourishing.
In order to explain why the second half of this conjunction is required, I will
look a bit more closely at a particularly relevant subset of Nietzsche’s writings:
those that concern the creation of value. In this section of the chapter, I will
have two main aims. The ﬁrst will be exegetical, i.e. getting clear about exactly
what Nietzsche understands the creation of value to involve. Here, strange as
it may initially sound, I will use a comparison with the Kantian moral agent to
shed light on the Nietzschean creator of values. One main point I will stress
is that, in spite of Nietzsche’s choice of language, we should not understand
the sort of ‘creation’ involved in the creation of value by analogy with our
ordinary understanding of artistic creation—i.e. as being some of free act of
expressionbasedonanindividual’sdesiresandinclinations. Instead, itshouldbe
understood as heavily constrained by facts about which values most effectively
promote the ﬂourishing of the agent in question.
Finally, I will conclude by considering why, on Nietzsche’s account, the
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highest degrees of autonomy available come about through living according to
an ethic which is personalized, in the sense of being speciﬁcally tailored to en-
hance the ﬂourishing of the individual in question. The broad outline of my
argument here will be that Nietzsche takes autonomy and power to be inti-
mately related, such that an increase in the degree of an agent’s autonomy is
essentially tantamount to a heightening of their power as an agent. Therefore,
given that a personalized ethic is one which is particularly suited to enhancing
the ﬂourishing of the agent who possesses it—which is, on Nietzsche’s account,
equivalent to it increasing their power—it follows that such a personalized ethic
will also be a particularly effective way of increasing that agent’s autonomy.
Williams and Ethics
Throughout this chapter I will be using the word ‘ethic’ (and its cognates) in
a very speciﬁc fashion, which owes much to the work of Bernard Williams.
Hence, before beginning the investigaion proper, I will give a brief account of
the ethics/morality distinction as employed by Williams, and discuss how my
use of the term relates to Williams’. I will also give some reasons for thinking
that the term, as I intend to use it, is appropriate when applied to Nietzsche’s
thought.
Williams ﬁrst makes a distinction between ethics and morality in his book
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. As Williams himself recognizes, these two
terms are ordinarily used synonymously, hence this distinction is not intended
to track anything in our ordinary usage of these words. Rather, it is made as
part of Williams’ critique of the “morality system” (2006, p.182) and amounts,
roughly, to this: an ethic is “any scheme for regulating the relations between
people that works through informal sanctions and internalized dispositions”
(1995a, p.241),3 whereas “morality should be understood as a particular devel-
3Clark also cites this deﬁnition, which comes from “Moral luck: a postscript”. The deﬁni-
tion given by May, which is clearly a response to that of Williams, is also worth mentioning:
“I take ‘ethics’ to be concerned with two general questions, to which the traditional ‘morality’
examined by Nietzsche supplies a very particular set of answers: namely, what is the ‘good’ life
for agents? And what are the best means—virtues, values, and practices—for attaining it? How
I regulate my behaviour towards others is, on this deﬁnition, only one aspect of the good and
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opment of the ethical, one that has special signiﬁcance in modern Western cul-
ture” (2006, p.6). Ethics, therefore, is the more general of the two terms. There
are many different possible ethical outlooks, and morality is but one of these.
Or, to put this point another way, morality is one of the determinate forms that
the determinable notion of the ethical can take. In terms of characterizing ex-
actly what morality is, there is no uncontroversial deﬁnition available. Williams
does suggest a few characteristic features that deﬁne it as the particular ethical
outlook it is though: “it peculiarly emphasizes certain ethical notions rather
than others, developing in particular a special notion of obligation, and it has
some peculiar presuppositions” (2006, p.6). Amongst the notions emphasized,
according to Williams, are guilt and blame, and the “peculiar suppositions” be-
ing referenced here include things like “a voluntariness that will be total and will
cut through character and psychological or social determination” (2006, p.194)
and “a resistance to luck” (1995a, p.241).
The difﬁculties that lie in deﬁning morality need not detain me here, as it
is the other half of this distinction that I intend to make use of in this piece.
However, whilst my use of the term ‘ethic’ is certainly inspired by Williams’
distinction, I will not be using the term in exactly the same way as he does.
This is partly a result of approaching the issue from different angles. Williams,
in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy at least, is looking to give an outline of
what counts as an ethical consideration when making decisions, and hence does
this by giving prominent examples of what both ethical and non-ethical consid-
erations look like. In this chapter, by contrast, I will be more interested in the
related notion of an ethic: something along the lines of a more or less system-
atic collection of goals to be achieved, rules to be followed, values to promote,
virtues to cultivate, etc. which play a signiﬁcant role in determining how a
person feels they should act on a given occasion.
This is a fairly minor difference all told, and there is another that is more ma-
jor. To see what this is, it will be useful to look at the context in which Williams
introduces the ethics/morality distinction. The chapter in which Williams ﬁrst
discusses it is called “Socrates’ Question”. The question being looked at here is
the central ethical question ‘how should one live?’, asked by Socrates in Plato’s
its attainment.” (1999, p.3).
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Republic. When the issue is framed in this way, it is tempting to see an ethic as
anything which provides an answer, at the appropriate level, to this question,
and this is not far from the deﬁnition that I want to give. Williams resists this
conclusion though, as it would mean even a “bald egoism” (2006, p.12) would
fall within its boundaries and hence be classiﬁed as an ethical way of life. In
applying this term to Nietzsche’s thought, however, I do not think we should
follow Williams here. Egoism, conceived here as a possible way of life rather
than any sort of descriptive claim about human beings, does provide an answer
to the question ‘how should one live?’ That answer is, at its highest level of
generality, do whatever is best for oneself regardless of the consequences this
has for others.4 Hence, it is an ethic in the highly extended stipulative sense of
the word that I am using here. Whether or not it is a good ethic is a separate
question, but it remains a possible ethical outlook nonetheless.
The term ‘ethic’ as I will use it will therefore have a broader application
than it would if I were faithfully trying to extract the term from Williams, in
the simple sense that far more possible styles of life will be classed as being
lived according to an ethic. There is a further issue to be raised though, as
this term is clearly too broad as it stands. This is shown by considering the
question: what type of life would not be classiﬁed as lived according to an ethic,
on this deﬁnition? No obvious answer springs to mind, as it is possible to
portray any life as being governed by some such goals, principles, etc. even if
the person in question does not formulte these explicitly or give particularly in-
depth consideration to such matters. The point cannot be that living according
to an ethic has to involve consciously codifying the rules by which one lives
one’s life. There might be some people who would endorse such a view, but
I think it is almost certain that Nietzsche wouldn’t be amongst them. Rather,
there must be something else that distinguishes what I am calling ethical living
from non-ethical living.
The missing component in the Nietzschean idea I am trying to capture, I
suggest, is supplied by the two related ideas of discipline and form-giving. An
ethic, therefore, should not be understood as simply any set of goals, values,
4Obviously this doesn’t exclude the possibility that what is best for one’s self often involves
showing consideration for others.
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etc. which provides an individual with a way of answering Socrates’ question.
Rather, it should be understood as a set of goals, values, etc. which both plays a
signiﬁcant role in determining the person’s actions, and involves self-discipline
and form-giving, or to point this ﬁnal clause another way, excludes simply fol-
lowing one’s immediate desires and inclinations in a straightforward fashion.5
This deﬁnition is still very broad, but that actually suits my purposes here.
For what I want is to use this term to capture the wide variety of different
phenonema that Nietzsche recommends to his would-be followers at different
points: giving oneself laws, creating one’s own set of values, living one’s life
according to an artistic plan, cultivating personal virtues, striving towards an
idealized version of one’s self, and so on.6 These all represent different types of
ethical consideration which stand in no obvious or uncontroversial relation to
one another. A set of laws is not the same thing as a set of values, although the
values that a person holds and the laws that they endorse as applying to them-
selves will obviously have to harmonize if the person in question is to be able
to live a life which is an adequate expression of both. Similarly, striving towards
an idealized picture of one’s self will inevitably involve cultivating some virtues,
but it is certainly not true that this is all it will involve, and the relevant set of
virtues will not simply emerge straightforwardly from considering the type of
person one is trying to become. The usefulness of the term ethic, as I will em-
ploy it, lies in the fact that it can emcompass all of the different types of ethical
consideration listed above (and more), without giving special prominence to any
of them in particular, and without making any special assumptions about the
relationships between them.
It is this feature of the notion of an ethic that makes it particularly appro-
priate when applied to Nietzsche’s thought. This is partly because, as was men-
tioned above, Nietzsche is willing to recommend a highly varied set of ethical
considerations as being beneﬁcial to his target audience, without seeming to sug-
5As an early indication of the plausibility of attributing this view to Nietzsche, consider the
following statement from Twilight of the Idols: “‘What I do not mean by freedom...’—In times
like these, giving in to your instincts is just one more disaster. The instincts contradict, disturb,
destroy each other...Today the individual would ﬁrst need to be made possible by being cut
down and pruned: possible here means complete” (TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 41).
6See A 11, BGE 214 and 272, GS 290, 299 and 335 and UM III: 1 for a few examples.
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gest that any of these is superior to the others. However, there is also more to
it than this. This term, as I will use it at least, also accomodates the fact that
Nietzsche himself doesn’t clearly distinguish between different types of ethical
consideration. In a passage that we will have reason to come back to later, for
example, Nietzsche moves unreﬂectively from talk of living one’s life according
to “an artistic plan” to the idea of “being bound by but also perfected under
[one’s] own law” (GS 290). Similarly, in another passage I will draw on later,
Nietzsche talks interchangably of the necessity that a “virtue...be our own in-
vention”, the need for each one of us to devise “his own categorical imperatives”,
and the harm done to a people “when it confuses its own duty with the concept
of duty in general” (A 11). My stipulative use of the term ‘ethic’ is therefore not
arbitrary, but reﬂects features of Nietzsche’s own philosophical practice: his re-
fusal to give preference to one type of ethical consideraion above the others (as
a virtue theorist or Kantian advocate of duty might, for example), as well as the
fact that he doesn’t himself carefully distinguish between all the different types
of consideration that we might label ethical.
Ethical Living and Autonomy
Now that the use I will make of the notion of an ethic has been made clear, it is
time to establish the ﬁrst of the two claims I intend to argue for in this chapter:
that Nietzsche believes autonomy requires living according to an ethic. As was
mentioned in the introduction, many thinkers throughout the history of phi-
losophy have endorsed similar sounding claims. The particular variant of this
claim that Nietzsche himself endorses is, however, very different from the more
standard forms that it can take, so it will be useful to begin by registering these
differences. Most thinkers who endorse a version of this claim mean something
akin to the following: that living according to the dictates of one particular eth-
ical outlook (usually those of traditional Western morality) is the one true way
of living autonomously. This view is almost as un-Nietzschean as one can get,
and it is clear that Nietzsche would not give his assent to anything of the sort.
The claim I think he would endorse, on the other hand, is far more general. His
claim, as I take it, would be more along these lines: that living according to any
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ethic gives a greater degree of autonomy than living according to no ethic at all.
In order to show Nietzsche’s commitment to something along these lines,
it will be helpful to exchange this formulation of the claim for one that is,
given my specialized use of the notion of an ethic, equivalent: namely, that
simply following one’s immediate desires and inclinations yields only the lowest
degrees of autonomy. Nietzsche, in a passage from Beyond Good and Evil, calls
this style of living “laisser-aller”, and is unequivocal in asserting his belief that it
is not a style of life which results in the freedom of the person who adopts it:
Every morality, as opposed to laisser-aller, is a piece of tyranny against both “na-
ture” and “reason”. But this in itself is no objection; for that, we would have
to issue yet another decree based on some other morality forbidding every sort
of tyranny and unreason. What is essential about every morality is that it is
a long compulsion.7 In order to understand Stoicism or Port-Royal or Puri-
tanism, just remember the compulsion under which every language so far has
developed strength and freedom: the compulsion of meter, the tyranny of rhyme
and rhythm. Look how much trouble the poets and the orators of every coun-
try have to go through! (including some of today’s prose writers, who have an
inexorable conscience in their ear)—and all “for the sake of some stupidity”, as
utilitarian fools say (and think they are clever for saying it)—or “in obsequious
submission to arbitrary laws”, as anarchists say (and then imagine themselves
“free”, even free-spirited). But the strange fact is that everything there is, or was,
of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, or masterly assurance on earth, whether
in thinking itself, or in ruling, or in speaking and persuading, in artistic just as
in ethical practices, has only developed by virtue of the “tyranny of such arbi-
trary laws”. And, in all seriousness, it is not at all improbable that this is what is
“nature” and “natural”—and not that laisser-aller!
(BGE 188)
and, further on in the same passage:
I will say it again: what seems to be essential “in heaven and on earth” is that
there be obedience in one direction for a long time. In the long term, this always
7This statement provides some support for my earlier claim that discipline is, for Nietzsche
at least, a necessary component of anything that is to count as an ethic. The fact that Nietzsche
is talking about what I am calling ethics here, rather than talking about morality in the more
speciﬁc sense, is shown by his use of the phrase “every morality”. Obviously there is only one
morality in the restricted sense employed in Williams’ distinction.
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brings and has brought about something that makes life on earth worth living—
for instance: virtue, art, music, dance, reason, intellect—something that trans-
ﬁgures, something reﬁned, fantastic, and divine. The long un-freedom of spirit,
the mistrustful constraint in the communicability of thought, the discipline that
thinkers imposed on themselves, thinking within certain guidelines imposed by
the church or court or Aristotelian presuppositions, the long, spiritual will to in-
terpret every event according to a Christian scheme and to rediscover and justify
the Christian God in every chance event,—all this violence, arbitrariness, harsh-
ness, terror, and anti-reason has shown itself to be the means through which
strength, reckless curiosity, and subtle agility have been bred into the European
spirit.
(BGE 188)
There are many interesting points made in this passage, but there is one
that is particularly relevant to my argument here: that it is a mistake to equate
freedom with lack of constraint. Here as elsewhere, Nietzsche does not hold
back in his criticism of those who make this mistake. In the famous passage on
free will from BeyondGoodandEvil, he says that “It is almost always a symptom
of what is lacking in a thinker when he senses some compulsion, need, having-
to-follow, pressure, un-freedom in every ‘causal connection’ and ‘psychological
necessity’. It is very telling to feel this way—the person tells on himself” (BGE
21). Something similar is being claimed by Nietzsche here. Seeing freedom as
being tantamount to living under no constraints is simply a sympton of not
being the sort of person capable of meeting the demands that such constraints
set and ﬂourishing under them. This is not, however, a harmless or minor
error. Freedom has not merely been mischaracterized by those who endorse
the viewpoint of laisser-aller. Rather, it has been characterized in a way that is
exactly opposed to the truth of the matter: constraint has been painted as being
incompatible with freedom, when in fact it is required for it.
This passage, and others like it, give strong evidence that Nietzsche opposes
the idea that autonomy consists merely in the lack of constraint. Indeed, he
even holds the directly opposing view: that a complete lack of constraints leads
to the lowest degrees of autonomy possible, and that the higher levels can only
be achieved with the help of the sort of constraint involved in “every morality”.
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Yet the question of why this is so still remains. To the best of my knowl-
edge, Nietzsche never gives an explicit argument for this position.8 However, I
think it is fairly easy to reconstruct one from some recognizably Nietzschean
premises.
The ﬁrst such premise, which has indeed become a commonplace in writing
about Nietzsche, is that human beings are not guaranteed a uniﬁed self simply
in virtue of being human.9 In their naturally occurring state, people are simply
a collection of a large number of differing drives and affects. The exact drives
and affects that make up the individual differ in their strength, and perhaps even
in their nature and number, from person to person, as does the coherence and
order amongst them. Plus, as far as Nietzsche is concerned at least, disorder and
incoherence are by far the more common state of affairs. This picture means
that, left to their own devices at least, human beings are less like single uniﬁed
individuals and more like a collection of warring homunculi, with each drive in
direct competition with all of the others to control the behaviour of the person
in question.
The next premise is that human beings are capable of moving from this state
of affairsto one inwhich theydo possess areasonable degree ofuniﬁed selfhood,
or, as this is often put, that genuine selfhood is possible for human beings, but it
is an achievement rather than a given. This achievement involves, for Nietzsche,
setting to work on the raw material of one’s drives and affects, and forging them
into some sort of unity.10 As there are many differing aspects to one’s self,
8He does, however, offer some related considerations. Most commonly, he makes psycho-
logical observations intended to show that people who oppose this view do so out of weakness
and/or out of a desire to shirk responsibility for their own actions (cf. GS 290, BGE 199 and
TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 41). He also, in the passage quoted most recently (BGE
188), gives a phenomenological account of artistic creation which is intended to show that acts
of free creation do not feel like acts performed under no constraint whatsoever, but rather that
the artist “knows how strictly and subtly he obeys thousands of laws at this very moment, laws
that defy conceptual formulation precisely because of their hardness and determinateness”. Ex-
actly what this is supposed to prove, and how successfully it does so, are not issues I will discuss
here
9Nehamas, for example, expresses this common view perfectly: “The unity of the self, which
therefore also constitutes its identity, is not something given but something achieved, not a
beginning but a goal” (1985, p.182). For a couple of other examples, see Gemes (2009, p.38) and
Richardson (1996, p.49).
10This issue will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter V.
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this unity obviously cannot be literal singularity. Rather, it is what might be
characterized as a harmonious unity—one in which the aims of all (or most)
of one’s different drives and affects are integrated, and work together towards
shared ends rather than battling against each other for dominance. There is
no single twelve-step program available for the achievement of such unity, but,
generally speaking, it seems to involve fusing several drives into a single pattern
of activity in which they can all participate, cultivating certain drives which ﬁt
well with others, and removing drives which do not. There are many different
parts of Nietzsche’s works which suggest such a picture, but the most famous is
surely the following passage from The Gay Science:
To “give style” to one’s character—a great and rare art! It is practised by those who
survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then ﬁt
them into an artistic plan until each appearsas art and reason and even weaknesses
delight the eye. Here a great mass of second nature has been added; there a piece
of ﬁrst nature removed—both times through long practice and daily work at it.
Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it is reinterpreted into
sublimity. Much that is vague and resisting shape has been saved and employed
for distant views—it is supposed to beckon towards the remote and immense. In
the end, when the work is complete, it becomes clear how it was the force of a
single taste that ruled and shaped everything great and small—whether the taste
was good or bad means less than one may think; it’s enough that it was one taste!
(GS 290)
Once this picture of human selfhood as an achievement is in place we can be-
gin to understand why autonomy requires ethical living for Nietzsche: roughly
speaking, because uniﬁed selfhood is a minimum condition of effective self-
determination, and living according to an ethic is required for unifying the self.
Those who live the life of laisser-aller, the opposite of ethical living by my def-
inition, simply follow their immediate desires and inclinations, shunning any
possible “arbitrary” constraints on their actions. Given the natural state of hu-
man beings that Nietzsche proposes, however, the result of such a laisser-aller
lifestyle is not a single self. Rather, the person who simply follows their im-
mediate desires and inclinations without imposing any form of them comes
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out looking rather more like several different selves inhabiting the same body—
whichever drive is strongest at a given time is the sole determiner of action, and
different and conﬂicting drives will determine the person’s actions at different
times. There is no single plan (or ethic) which all these actions can be explained
by reference to, and the result will not be a single, coherent and uniﬁed in-
dividual, but rather something closer to a battleground upon which opposing
tendencies battle with each other for dominance, with nothing determining the
outcome of this battle except for the relative strengths of the particular drives
involved.
It is this relationship between ethical living and selfhood that underpins the
relationship between ethical living and autonomy. For, put very simply, there
cannot be autonomy (self-determination) if there is no uniﬁed self to be au-
tonomous. The actions of a person living the life of laisser-aller appear to be
autonomous, as there is no external force determining them. This appearance
masks the actual truth of the matter though. For whilst external constraints are
lacking, so is the sort of ‘internal’ unity that is required for legitimately seeing
these actions as issuing from a single character at all. Moreover, this internal
unity is lacking precisely because of the abscence of constraints upon the ac-
tions of the person in question, whether these constraints are taken unquestion-
ingly from an outside source (such as God’s will or from a supposedly universal
morality) or created explicitly by and for the individual who will submit to
them. Hence an ethic, conceived as something that places limits upon which
actions are permissible and which dispositions are to be cultivated, is essential
to the sort of autonomy Nietzsche envisages as possible for human beings.
Personalized Ethics
I will now move on to discussing the second of the two claims that I wish to
defend in this chapter, that the highest degrees of autonomy possible for human
beings involve living according to an ethic which is somehow personalized or
customized.
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there might seem to
be an incredibly simple argument for this claim. As autonomy means self-
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determination, it seems obviously true that living according to an ethic which
is one’s own, in the sense of being personally created, will lead to a higher degree
of autonomy than simply living according to an ethic which has been received
unquestioningly from an outside source. This argument, however, only estab-
lishes that the ethic a person lives by must be personal in a weak sense, i.e. in
the sense of being created by the individual in question. Nietzsche’s claim, as I
take it, is stronger than this. To achieve the highest levels of autonomy possible,
the ethic a person lives by must not simply be personal in this weaker sense.
Instead, it needs to be personalized in the stronger sense of being speciﬁcally
tailored to enhance the ﬂourishing of the individual in question.11
In order to establish this claim, I will take a particular relevant subset of Ni-
etzsche’s writings as a sort of case study, namely those that concern the creation
of value. Here, my aim will be twofold. Firstly, in the remainder of this section,
I will argue that the creation of value, in the form that Nietzsche recommends
it at least, does not involve the free creation of any values whatsoever in a value-
less void, but is rather much closer to the phenomenon I have just described, i.e.
it consists in creating a set of values that are beneﬁcial precisely and speciﬁcally
for the person who creates them. I will then conclude by discussing why, for
Nietzsche, a set of personalized values of this kind are necessary for the highest
degress of autonomy possible for human beings.
The Creation of Value
To begin with, it is worth making some preliminary remarks. Sometimes,
and particularly in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the language Nietzsche employs can
tempt us into thinking about the creation of value in a somewhat confusing
fashion—as a (or perhaps even the) supremely creative deed, in which a new
thing, a value, is brought into the world to compete with, and ideally replace,
values that already exist. This intuitive picture of value creation relies upon a
particular way of using the word value, according to which ‘value’ is an generic
type of which there are many different speciﬁc instances: courgage is a value,
honesty is a value, and so on.
11More will be said about this personal/personalized distinction on pages 98–100.
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If this were the sort of thing Nietzsche had in mind, the idea of the creation
of value would have some very strange consequences. Presumably, on a fairly
natural reading, it would involve the invention of entirely (or at least signiﬁ-
cantly) new qualities or attributes, which could then be classiﬁed as new values
to stand alongside the old ones. This, however, is clearly not what Nietzsche
has in mind, as is attested to by the fact that he devotes little or no time towards
trying to invent such things.
For this reason, I think it is fairly clear that Nietzsche should not be under-
stood as using the word ‘value’ in the manner described above. Instead, what he
is really interested in is people’s valuations—what they take to be worthwhile or
beneﬁcial. Hence, when something is called a value by Nietzsche, this is really
shorthand for saying that it is taken to be valuable: to say that compassion is
a value for person x, for instance, is equivalent to saying that person x believes
compassion to be a laudable quality.12
This focus upon human valuations (as opposed to values in some abstract
sense) has signiﬁcant implications for what is meant by the notion of the cre-
ation of value. Value creation does not involve the invention or creation of some
novel quality intended to fall within a mysterious category of things known as
values. Rather, it involves the creation of what Nietzsche calls “a tablet of the
good” (Z I: “On a Thousand and One Goals”) or a “rank order of values” (GM
I: Note): something akin to an understanding of which types of things are to
be valued positively and which negatively. Therefore, it should be remembered
throughout this section that the creation of value is not the creation of a com-
pletely new entity, but is more like a redetermining of the value of things that
already exist.
In addition to this, Nietzsche’s interest in valuations also has another conse-
quence worth mentioning. This is due to the fact that valuations (as opposed to
values as we think of them when we use the word ‘value’ in the abstract sense)
are complex and composite—they not only encompass the object (or quality,
12As a point of clarity, what I am describing here is two possible ways of using the word
‘value’, regardless of what one takes value to be. I am not attempting to distinguish between
two different understandings of value as such, and a person could use the word value in either
(or both) of the ways described here without revealing anything about their stance on the nature
of value.
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or action etc.) that is valued, but also the reasons that support the pro-attitude
shown towards the object, and the affective accompaniments that go alongside
all instances of valuation. Because of this complexity, the creation of a new
“tablet of the good” is not limited exclusively to simply attributing new levels
of value to things. It can also involve valuing things for new reasons, or in
new ways. For example, a person who has created a new “tablet of the good”
for themselves might continue, in line with their previous values, to regard
self-control as an admirable quality, but now for aesthetic rather than moral
reasons. Or, similarly, such a person might carry on regarding the works of
great thinkers as valuable, but now expresses this through feeling a high-spirited
desire to engage with and continue their enterprise, rather than through feel-
ings of reverence and awe which make them stop before these works and simply
admire. Hence, another thing that should be borne in mind throughout this
section is that the creation of a new “rank order of values” is not exhausted by
deciding what, from now on, is to be deemed as valuable: it also involves making
changes in both the why and how of our valuations.
The creation of value and the future philosophers
With these preliminary remarks out of the way, it is now time to begin the
investigation proper. However, an immediate problem is posed by the fact that
Nietzsche seems to employ two distinct and seemingly contradictory notions
of value creation throughout his works. According to the ﬁrst of these, the
creation of value is an extremely personal affair: the individual who creates
values in this sense does so largely for their own sake, as a means of promoting
their own ﬂourishing. As such, they may well deem these values as being useless
(or perhaps even potentially harmful) to others who do not share their nature,
and will often not see preaching these values to vast multitudes of people as
being desirable or ﬁtting. The second conception of value creation, by contrast,
seems to point us in a rather different direction. According to this conception,
which is especially present throughout Beyond Good and Evil,13 the creation of
13See the section entitled “We Scholars” in particular.
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value is the job of the future philosophers14—individuals who:
are commanders and legislators: they say “That is how it should be!” they are the
ones who ﬁrst determine the “where to?” and “what for?” of people
(BGE 211)
When reading the passages which lend support to this latter conception, the
creation of value appears to have little to do with individuals adopting values
which enhance their own ﬂourishing. Instead, the task of the creator of values
is to form a new system of values for an entire civilization15 and, seemingly, to
create a new universal system of values to replace the existing moral system of
which Nietzsche is so critical.
My ﬁrst aim will therefore be to show that the ﬁrst, more personal concep-
tion of the creation of value is the more fundamental of the two, and hence
the one more deserving of our attention, at least when thinking about Niet-
zsche’s autonomy ideal. This task is complicated by the fact that the conception
of the future philosophers itself admits of two different readings: one accord-
ing to which the new philosopers literally legislate new values to people, and
another according to which they function more along the lines of examplars—
people who live according to new values in such a way that others follow in
their footsteps and embrace similar valuations. I will take these two possible in-
terpretations in turn. With the ﬁrst, I will show that whilst there is good textual
evidence for the prescence of this view in Nietzsche’s works, it does not actually
have much bearing on the issue of Nietzsche’s ideal of autonomy. I will then
argue that the second, more fruitful understanding of the future philosophers is
virtually indistinguishable from the ﬁrst, more personal style of value creation.
14Thephrase‘thephilosophersofthefuture’mightpreferabletoformulationIhaveused(‘the
future philosophers’) as it brings out more clearly the double meaning intended by Nietzsche,
i.e. that these are philosophers of the future both in the sense that they will occur in the future,
and in the sense that they are concerned primarily with shaping the future of mankind. In spite
of this, I will stick with my formulation as it is less cumbersome. A similar point is also made
by Nehamas (1988).
15Or perhaps for the whole of mankind.
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The future philosopher as commander and legislator
In some of the places where Nietzsche discusses value creation, we seem to meet
with a view reminiscent of Plato’s Republic—a new type of philosopher should
be entrusted with the structuring and shaping of society, a task including, but
also going beyond, the creation of new values. Within these passages, how-
ever, the exact method of the structuring and shaping undertaken by the new
philosopher is presented in various ways. At certain points, we are given a very
hands-on picture of the work of the new philosopher:
The philosopher as we understand him, we free spirits—, as the man with the
most comprehensive responsibility, whose conscience bears the weight of the
overall development of humanity, this philosopher will make use of religion for
his breeding and education work, just as he will make use of the prevailing polit-
ical and economic situation.
(BGE 61)
In passages such as these, Nietzsche seems to imagine the new philosopher
as being in a position of some power, with the authority to have a say in issues
of breeding and religion, and as using this position to create a new system of
values for mankind. In this section, I will argue that this is not the conception
of value creation that should focus upon when trying to understand Nietzsche’s
autonomy ideal.
At this point, it is worth being speciﬁc about exactly what I intend to claim
and what I do not intend to claim. I will not be arguing that this is a misreading
of Nietzsche. As the quote above shows, there are certainly passages in the pub-
lished works that support this reading. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s unpublished
notebooks provide even stronger evidence that he gave serious thought to the
existence and goals of such philosopher-legislators of future society.16
Moreover, I will not be arguing that we should disregard this interpretation
only because it appears less frequently in the text. As a matter of fact, I think
16“Discipline and Breeding”, the Book Four of The Will to Power, contains some good exam-
ples, particularly in the subsection entitled “The Highest Man as Legislator of the Future”. WP
733, where Nietzsche considers some of his own proposals for the future of marriage, is also
worth consulting on this point, as is WP 132.
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this is true,17 and should count as a consideration when judging which con-
ception of value creation to focus upon. However, there are also futher reasons,
beyond this textual bias, for questioning the idea of the creator of values as some
sort of powerful philosopher-legislator.
For one thing, it is initially unclear what content to give to the notion of leg-
islating values. Can such a thing be done? What would it involve? Prima facie,
at least, values do not seem to be the sort of thing one can legislate—a powerful
philosopher-legislator could cerainly prohibit or encourage many different ac-
tions, practices, institutions and so on, but this would still not really amount to
a legislation of values. As Nietzsche himself often tells us, people’s valuations
become deeply ingrained only through centuries of cultural endevour, and it is
unclear how exactly one could go about legislating to people what their deeply
held moral attitudes should be.
We could still grant that this is a possibility. Perhaps if a philosopher-
legislator had enough inﬂuence over education, religion, politics and so on he
could start gradually altering peoples moral attitudes and begin legislating a new
system of values to replace Christian morality. The work might take a substan-
tial amount of time, but it could at least be begun. Even if we can make sense
of the notion of value legislation, however, there are still further problems with
this understanding of the creation of value.
These problems are made clear by considering the question: who is the
new philosopher supposed to be legislating values for? Presumably, it cannot
be simply for everybody, as Nietzsche frequently bemoans the stupidity and
harmfulness of having one morality for all.18 Confronted with this difﬁculty,
it is natural to turn to Nietzsche frequent classiﬁcations of people into ‘higher’
or ‘lower’.19 Which of these two types of people should the new philosopher
be legislating values for? It seems that it deﬁnitely cannot be for the higher
individuals, as “the requirement that there be a single morality for everyone is
harmful precisely to the higher men” (BGE 228). These higher individuals, it
17And almost certainly so if we only consider the published works.
18GS 335 and A 11, two passages which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, both
provide good examples. For further examples, see BGE 43, 198 and 228.
19Other pairs of terms, such as ‘noble’ and ‘base’, ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, or ‘great individuals’
and ‘the herd’ could also be used.
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seems, each need a seperate set of values that will enable them to achieve their
highest goals, and can have their gifts crushed if forced to follow a morality
designed for all. Granted, Nietzsche believes that our contemporary morality
is particularly harmful to higher men, due to its promotion of ideals of equality
and compassion. But, given the fragility he ascribes to human greatness, and
the vastly differing conditions he believes apply to each agent’s ﬂourishing, it
still seems that any single morality, no matter how much it tailored itself to the
promoting of great individuals, could only be harmful on the whole.
So, if the new philosopher is not meant to be legislating values for the higher
men, then that really only leaves one option: they are supposed to legislate val-
ues for the lower men, or the herd as Nietzsche usually describes them. This
seems equally implausible. For one thing, Nietzsche approves of the morality
that already exists in the herd. Herd morality is perfectly appropriate for most
people. His problem is not with herd morality as such, but rather with the fact
that this morality stretches itself out beyond the herd, with detrimental effects
to higher men. As far as the herd itself goes though, this morality does a good
job. At the most basic level, it prohibits harmful behaviour and prevents mem-
bers of the herd from doing serious damage to themselves as well as to non-herd
members. Beyond this, it also provides a ready tool for allowing members of
the herd to beautify their lives—providing ideals of duty, virtue, selﬂessness, and
moderation with which to glorify what Nietzsche would describe as their unre-
markable existences. This, in turn, lessens their ressentiment towards their life,
and also thereby reduces the number of destructive actions that might follow
from this feeling of frustration with their place in the world (cf. BGE 61).
So it seems that neither the higher men nor the lower are appropriate targets
for the new philosophers when they are legislating values: the higher men each
need their own values tailored to their individual natures, and the lower men
already have a morality ﬁt for purpose. This analysis is perhaps a little simple,
and there might be other options available. Perhaps the new philosophers are
supposed to legislate values for the herd, but on a different premise from that
currently used. Whereas present herd morality aims at the preservation and en-
hancement of members of the herd, the new philosophers task might involve
legislating a morality for the herd not intended to beneﬁt them, but rather in-
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tended to minimize any negative effects they might have on higher men and
potentially even utilize them in enhancing the latters’ ﬂourishing. This sort of
viewpoint seems to be supported by passages such as the following from the
Third Essay of the Genealogy:
The sickly are the greatest danger to man: not the wicked, not the “beasts of
prey”...there could be no greater or more disastrous misunderstanding than for
the happy, the successful, those powerful in body and soul to begin to doubt
their right to happiness in this way. Away with this “world turned upside down”!
Away with this disgraceful mollycoddling of feeling! That the sick should not
make the healthy sick—and this would be that kind of mollycoddling—ought to
be the chief concern on earth:—but for that, it is essential that the healthy should
remain separated from the sick, should even be spared the sight of the sick so that
they do not confuse themselves with the sick.
(GM III: 14)
Once we remember the equation of the majority with the ‘sick’ that is being
employed here,20 a familiar Nietzschean theme becomes audible: the danger
posed to the higher men by the values of the herd. Given this danger, it might
be fair to speculate that the role of the new philosopher is to legislate values for
the majority in such a way as to make them less dangerous (and perhaps even
useful)21 to the “strokes of luck” (GM III: 14) that are the higher men. Exactly
how this would work is not immediately obvious, but one possible idea might
be that the task of the new philosophers is to enforce a Nietzschean dictum
from The Will to Power, namely to ensure that “The ideas of the herd should
rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it” (WP 287). If this were the case,
then the problem of neither the higher or lower men seeming to be appropriate
targets for new values would be avoided.
This proposal clearly brings fresh questions: how hard and fast is the distinc-
tion between higher and lower men? Are there borderline cases? How should
these be treated? Can lower men become higher men and vice versa? Is the
difference only one of degree and not of type? How are the new philosophers
20The passage begins: “The more normal this sickliness is in man—and we cannot dispute
this normality”.
21Nietzsche’s remarks on the necessity of slavery to higher culture might belong here.
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supposed to reliably distinguish between the higher and lower men? Even if
they can distinguish, how are they meant to ensure that the new values they
legislate to the majority do not also ﬁlter through to the higher men?
I do not intend to tackle any of these questions here. This line of enquiry
has, I think, been brought far enough to illustrate my point. Whilst I still do
not want to deny that support for the idea of such philosopher-legislators can be
found in Nietzsche’s works, it is clear that the further we press on in this area,
the more it involves us in questions concerning the value and practicability of
philosopher rulers, and the less relevant it becomes to the issue of Nietzsche’s
ideal of autonomy. Hence, whether or not this idea of philosopher-legislators
can be made ultimately viable, I do not think it provides a particularly fruitful
line of investigation in the context of an investigation into the role the creation
of value plays in Nietzsche’s post-moral autonomy ideal.
The future philosoper and the philosophical laborer
Not all of the passages concerning the future philosophers imply that they need
to wield such an inordinate amount of political power to perform the task of
value creation. The majority admit of a far more moderate reading, in which
the job of the new philosopher is not to literally legislate new values, but rather
simply to be their originator—the ﬁrst person to posit, and more importantly
to live by, a new set of values. This line of Nietzsche’s thought is captured
particularly well by the wording of the following description given of the future
philosophers:
Ultimately, they have to do more than just to know—they have to be something
new, mean something new, and present new values!
(BGE 253)
When trying to get to grips with this more moderate picture, it is helpful
ﬁrst to look at another type of philosopher that Nietzsche describes in direct
opposition to the future philosophers: the “philosophical laborers”:
I am going to insist that people ﬁnally stop mistaking philosophical laborers and
scientiﬁc men in general for philosophers,—that here, of all places, people be
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strict about giving “each his due” and not too much to the one, and much too
little to the other...The project for philosophical laborers on the noble model
of Kant and Hegel is to establish some large class of given values (which is to
say: values that were once posited and created but have come to dominate and
have been called “truths” for a long time) and press it into formulas, whether
in the realm of logic or politics (morality) or art. It is up to these researchers
to make everything that has happened or been valued so far look clear, obvious,
comprehensible, and managable, to abbreviate everything long, even “time” itself,
and to overwhelm the entire past...True philosophers reach for the future with a
creative hand and everything that is and was becomes a means, a tool, a hammer
for them.
(BGE 211)
The idea that Kant and Hegel’s purpose is to make things “clear, obvious,
comprehensible, and managable” might be classed as grounds for suspecting a
Nietzschean joke here, but the rest of the passage makes it clear that Nietzsche
is being serious. Moreover, the idea is pretty straightforward: true philosophers
are those that ﬁrst posit new valuations, and philosophical laborers are those
who follow in their footsteps, dedicating their lives to providing endless justi-
ﬁcations and elaborations of the system of values that has been created. I take
it there is no need to ask whether the future philosophers will be true philoso-
phers, or merely philosophical laborers.
This more minimal conception of the future philosophers clearly avoids
many of the problems of the more radical reading. As the new philosophers
no longer need to be conceived as possessing any sort of political authority, all
the questions regarding the principles upon which society are to be structured,
as well as those questions related to the possibility of literally legislating values,
simply disappear. Similarly, the difﬁculties with who the values are supposed to
target also fall away when the future philosophers are no longer seen as directly
enforcing their values on anybody other than themselves.
As these difﬁculties fall away, however, the gap between the type of value
creation undertaken by the future philosophers and the more personal style
of value creation also reduces signiﬁcantly. Now both cases essentially involve
an individual creating and living by a new set of values, without having the
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means (or often even the desire) to force these values onto other people. In
other words, when the passages concerning the future philosophers are not in-
terpreted as arguing for the necessity of philosopher-rulers who will shape the
future of mankind in accordance with their own will, they no longer seem to
be suggesting anything radically different from the passages which recommend
a more personal style of value creation speciﬁcally to the individual.
At this point, it may be suggested that my use of the phrase ‘radically differ-
ent’ has actually done a lot of my work for me here, for though there may not
be radical differences between the sanitized version of the future philosopher
and the individual creating a personal set of values, there are still some note-
worthy differences nonetheless. The sanitized future philosopher, for example,
whilst ex hypothesi not having the power to enforce his values on others, may
well still aim to create values that will be taken on by people other than them-
selves, whereas the individual creating their own values seems, according to the
preliminary understanding I have sketched thus far, to only be concerned with
creating values speciﬁcally tailored to their own needs. Similarly, the individual
creating their own set of values seems, once again according to the preliminary
understanding developed so far, to have a deﬁnite goal in the creation of their
values—i.e. their own ﬂourishing. The future philosopher, on the other hand,
need not have this or indeed any other such speciﬁc goal as their aim. All that is
important is that they are the originator of new values, and there is no speciﬁc
purpose which they must conceive as determining the values that they choose.
These differences are not actually as major as they ﬁrst appear to be though,
andif theyreveal anythingit isthe deﬁcienciesin thepreliminary understanding
of personal value creation that have been employed so far. The reason for this
is that the creation of value, at least as far as Nietzsche is concerned, does not
necessarily have to be engaged in deliberately and consciously. In other words, a
person doesn’t have to set out with the explicit aim of creating a personal set of
values which will enhance their own ﬂourishing in order to arrive at one. More-
over the result, i.e. a higher degree of autonomy, is the same regardless of how
the personalized set of values has been arrived at. Hence the differences that
I noted a moment ago between the (moderately conceived) future philosopher
and the creator of personal values all disappear. This is because these differences
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all relate to the intention with which the individual was creating their values,
and as my last point has shown, there are no speciﬁc intentions which actually
need to be attributed to every creator of values per se.22 Therefore, if these differ-
ences are signiﬁcant at all, it is only as differences between the future philosoper
and the individual who is self-consciously and deliberately creating a personal set
of values, and not as differences between the future philosopher and the creator
of personal values as such.
The creator of values as new, unique and incomparable
Thus far, I hope to have shown that the points where Nietzsche associates the
creation of value with the new philosophers are not the most illuminating when
considering the relationship between value creation and autonomy. When these
passages are read in their most extreme light, they have little relevance to this
topic, and lead us only into questions regarding the structuring of an ideal Niet-
zschean society. When they are read more moderately, however, these sections
seem to almost collapse into the more personal style of value creation that Ni-
etzsche discusses elsewhere in his works. In this section, my aim will be to
investigate exactly what this more personal conception of value creation entails.
The idea that certain individuals should create new values is commonly as-
sociated with Nietzsche’s thought. This is frequently ﬂeshed out along the fol-
lowing lines: Nietzsche believes that higher individuals should avoid accepting
any system of values which claims to apply to everyone, and instead create their
own values, values which are taken to be somehow more expressive of their
own nature or more amenable to their ﬂourishing as an individual. Though
points related to this way of looking at value creation are scattered throughout
Nietzsche’s works, there are two passages in particular which explicitly treat
value creation against the backdrop of claims about the harmfulness of taking
any moral prescription to be universal, GS 335 and A 11. Here, as the shorter
of the two examples, is the passage from The Antichrist:
One more word against Kant as a moralist. A virtue needs to be our own inven-
tion, our own most personal need and self-defence: in any other sense, a virtue is
22This is will also crop up in the next chapter.
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just dangerous. Whatever is not a condition for life harms it...“Virtue”, “duty”,
“goodness in itself”, goodness that has been stamped with the character of the
impersonal and universally valid—these are the fantasies and manifestations of
decline, of the ﬁnal exhaustion of life, of the Königsberg Chinesianity. The most
basic laws of preservation and growth require the opposite: that everyone should
invent his own virtues, his own categorical imperatives.
(A 11)
Aside from being the two passages which give the most detailed exposition
of the relation between value creation and the harmfulness of (supposedly) uni-
versally applicable moral judgements, however, these passages also have some-
thing else in common: they both begin with discussions of Kant’s ethics. Now
while I do not want to claim that this was a calculated move on Nietzsche’s
part, I do think that it is telling that both of Nietzsche’s most clearly stated
calls for the creation of new values emerge from thinking about Kant’s moral
philosophy. For this reason, I want to undertake a brief comparison of Kant’s
and Nietzsche’s views.
Accounts of the ethical views of either of the two thinkers involved here
can, and indeed have, easily ﬁll entire books, so I will have to limit my enquiry
in a number of ways. Most obviously, the level of detail I go into will be that
which is necessary for the comparison which I am trying to make, and not
that which would be expected from an in-depth commentary on Kant’s moral
philosophy. Also, given that both Kant and Nietzsche addressed a wide variety
of topics falling within the domain of moral philosophy, I will also need to set
a limit on which content I discuss. The obvious way to set this limit is to look
for the parts of Kant’s thought which address the same issues that Nietzsche is
concerned with in the passages where he discusses value creation. Now Kant
himself does not focus primarily on the concept of value, and certainly not on
the creation of value, so any straightforward comparison is out of the question.
The area that is in question here though, I believe, and which I therefore want to
look at, is what we can think of as the source of authority of any ethical demands
which we should recognize as binding upon ourselves.
Given how frequently Nietzsche attacks Kant, it might be thought that the
only insight such a comparison could confer would be a negative one: by fully
75NIETZSCHE’S AUTONOMY IDEAL
understanding where Kant thinks the authority of morality derives from, we
are given the picture of the polar opposite of the Nietzsche’s view, which can
then be understood as a kind of negative image in relation to the original Kan-
tian model. This, however, will not be my purpose in drawing the comparion.
Rather, my claim will be that, in spite of the obvious differences, there are actu-
ally many crucial similarities between Kant’s and Nietzsche’s ethical views on
this point, and that understanding both these similarities and these differences
can help us get a ﬁrmer grip on what Nietzsche understands by the creation of
value.
To begin with, it is worth noting that there is a certain sense in which both
thinkers share the same starting point: they both reject the idea that the author-
ity of ethical demands comes from a source outside of man. The constraints
that certain ethical demands impose on our behaviour are not a function of
the power of some sort of external commander who issues them to us, nor are
they derived from some sort of moral structure inherent in the fabric of reality
which we intuit in some mysterious way. Instead, they both try and show how
it is something in (or better about) ourselves which gives authority to certain
ethical considerations.
Kant’s method for achieving this goal, in broad outline, is to argue that
“morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings” (1997, p.53). In other
words, it is because of the fact that we possess rationality that we ﬁnd ourselves
bound by the moral law. This is not something necessarily particular to human
beings, in Kant’s eyes, rather any rational being, human or otherwise, would be
bound by the same moral law.
The particular idea of the moral law that Kant puts forward, the categorical
imperative, is one of the most famous pieces of moral philosophy of all time,
and there is no need to rehearse either what it states or the nature of Kant’s
particular arguments for it in detail here. Instead, what I want to look at is the
picture of the human subject that complements Kant’s notion of the moral law.
As already stated, Kant believes that we are all rational beings. This, further-
more, implies that we have what Kant calls a “will”:
Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representa-
tion of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is
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required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than
practical reason.
(Kant, 1997, p.24)
On Kant’s picture then, to have a will is to have the capacity to act in accor-
dance with rational principles, or in accordance with “imperatives” (1997, p.25)
as Kant also calls them. This is not the whole story, however, and, in human
beings at least, rational principles are not always the determining ground of the
will. The following passage from the Groundwork, which follows hot on the
heels of Kant’s deﬁnition of will as practical reason, demonstrates this point
well:
If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of such a being that are cog-
nized as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, the will is a
capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes
as practically necessary, that is, as good. However, if reason solely by itself does
not adequately determine the will; if the will is exposed also to subjective condi-
tions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with the objective ones; in
a word, if the will is not in itself completely in conformity with reason (as is ac-
tually the case with human beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively
necessary are subjectively contingent
(Kant, 1997, p.24)
In possessing a will, then, human beings have the capacity to act on the basis
of what reason commands as “practically necessary”. This does not, however,
mean that rational considerations are always, as a matter of fact, the determining
ground of the will. Rather, the will is also capable of being determined by
“certain incentives” which can directly contradict that which is demanded by
reason alone—namely, by inclinations.
This distinction between a person acting from inclination on the one hand,
and “only by laws which he gives to himself through reason” (1956, p.101) on
the other, is crucial to Kant’s moral philosophy. As is well known, the conse-
quences of an action are not what determines its value in the Kantian system.
Rather, it all depends upon the motive that caused the action: when a person
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acts on the basis of what reason commands “independently of inclination” their
action is both autonomous and in conformity with the moral law. To the ex-
tent that their action arises from inclination, by contrast, it is heteronomous
and lacking in true moral worth.
It is Kant’s use of the terms autonomous and heteronomous that is particu-
larly interesting here. Why are actions that are performed in accordance with
the dictates of reason autonomous, but actions done from inclination not? Af-
ter all, both inclination and reason are aspects of the human being capable of
inﬂuencing the will, on Kant’s theory. In both cases, therefore, we seem to have
instances of an aspect of the self determining the will, and therefore we should
have autonomy rather than heternomy.
This aspect of Kant’s thought becomes even more puzzling if we consider
some of the intricacies of Kant’s theory. On ﬁrst inspection, it might seem as
if there is a simple solution to this issue: when we act according to reason, our
actions arise from us in a way that is in some sense spontaneous or uncaused.
When we obey our inclinations, on the other hand, our actions are causally
determined by our strongest bodily desire. This solution, however, completely
contradicts Kant’s account. For Kant, the issue is far more complex than this.
When considered in relation to their “empirical character” every action a person
performs, whether autonomous or heteronomous, is causally determined—“in
regard to this empirical character there is no freedom” (1998, p.541). Consid-
ered as an appearance, then, all of a person’s actions, whatever motive they
stem from, are part of the causal order and hence are determined entirely by
antecedent factors. When considered in relation to their “intelligible character”,
on the other hand, a person’s will must be “declared free of all inﬂuences of
sensibility and determination by appearances” (1998, p.537). Hence, considered
as the author of their deeds, all of a person’s actions, whether autonomous or
heteronomous, arise through the “spontaneity” (1998, p.533) of the person’s
will—and whether the maxim of their action is based on the demands of reason
alone, or on those of their inclinations, their will forms this maxim “without
needing to be preceded by any other cause” (1998, p.533) and hence should not
be seen as determined by antecedent events. Given this, it becomes even more
puzzling that Kant does not see both actions based on rational considerations
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and actions performed through inclination as expressing autonomy, in so far as
the person is considered in relation to their intelligible character.23
The reason why this is not so, on Kant’s theory, is because of what we might
call his ‘thin’ conception of the human being qua practical reasoner. According
to this conception, the human being, as the performer of their actions at least,
is a rational will and nothing more.24 And this amounts, basically, to the claim
that what we might think of as the ‘true self’ or ‘essence’ of any human be-
ing is their pure, rational will—with all other elements of themselves, and most
notably the (presumably bodily) sources of their inclinations, being excluded.
This is why, for Kant, to act according to “reason alone” is to act autonomously,
i.e. out of one’s own true nature, and to act according to other types of motive
(which Kant would classify as inclinations) is to be heteronomous, i.e. to spon-
taneously base the maxims of one’s actions on something external to one’s self
conceived as a rational will.
The reason why Kant takes the rational will to be something along the lines
of the essence of the individual is not always clear, and he sometimes seems
to argue the point in the opposite direction from the one I am taking now:
in other words, he argues from from the fact that we recognize the absolute
authority of morality to the claim that spontaneous rationality must be our
true nature in order for us to have this recognition. In spite of this, however,
some clues may be given by an illuminating discussion from the Critique of
Practical Reason. There, in the “Analytic of Pure Practical Reason”, he tackles
the question of how to reconcile the “causality of freedom” he attributes to the
agent as practical reasoner with the “causality of necessity” (1956, p.97) that
functions everywhere in the natural world. And the answer he gives, in short,
is that there is no contradiction here at all. This is because, according to Kant,
the human agent qua practical reasoner is not a part of the phenomenal realm
that is the natural world, but is rather “the intelligible substrate in us” (1956,
23An admirably clear account of Kant’s distinction between the empirical and the intelligible
character of a rational being can be found in Allison’s Kant’s Theory of Freedom. See Ch. 2 in
particular.
24This is to be contrasted, on Kant’s theory, with the conception of the human being qua
object of natural science, which states that all of their actions arise from “natural necessity”
(1956, p.101).
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p.103). Here is how Kant puts the point:
natural necessity, which cannot coexist with the freedom of the subject, attaches
merely to the determinations of a thing which stands under the conditions of
time, and consequently applies only to the acting subject as appearance...But the
same subject, which, on the other hand, is conscious also of its existence as a
thing-in-itself, also views his existence so far as it does not stand under temporal
conditions, and to himself as determinable only by laws which he gives to himself
through reason. In this existence, nothing is antecedent to the determination
of his will; every action and, in general, every changing determination of his
existence according to inner sense, even the entire history of his existence as a
sensuous being, is seen in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as only a
consequence, not as a determining ground of his causality as a noumenon.
(Kant, 1956, p.101)
This, then, is Kant’s solution to “the apparent contradiction between the
mechanism of nature and freedom” (1956, p.101): natural necessity only per-
tains to the subject as appearance, whereas freedom “depends upon the spon-
taneity of the subject as a thing-in-itself” (1956, p.103). Hence, for Kant, the
rational will present in us all is not merely one feature of ourselves amongst
others—rather it is our “intelligible existence”: it is ourselves conceived as “a
noumenon” and as a “thing-in-itself”.
This also, in my view, goes a long way towards explaining why, for Kant,
the moral law has the authority that it does over us. Given his thin conception
of the agent qua practical reasoner, to act in accordance with the moral law (and
thereby in accordance with the dictates of pure reason) is to act in accordance
with the ethical demands that ﬂow from one’s true nature: i.e. to act in accor-
dance with the aspect of one’s self that is “a cause independent of all sensiblity”
and that is “the causality of that appearance” (1956, p.101) which each person
ﬁnds themselves to be in the phenomenal world.
The passages from Nietzsche’s works which I quoted above (GS 335 and A
11), I want to claim, are directed at this same question of where the authority of
ethical demands derives from. Moreover, the answer they give is basically the
same: the constraints that exist upon what we must (or must not) do or value
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follow from our own nature as agents. The crucial difference, however, lies in
what they take this nature to consist in.
For Kant, as was described above, the agent qua practical reasoner is a pure
rational will and nothing more. Nietzsche, on the other hand, has what we
might think of as a much thicker conception of which aspects of the human
being are relevant for ethical reasoning. He does not isolate some ‘metaphysi-
cal core’25 of human beings and then exclude every other aspect of their nature
from playing any signiﬁcant positive role in ethical reasoning. Rather, the ethi-
cally relevant unit for Nietzsche is the whole natural agent.
Hence, for Nietzsche, it is not the rationality of our agency that dictates
what we must and must not value. Instead, it is what “the most basic laws of
preservation and growth” prescribe for each agent, given the particular struc-
ture of their drives and affects. This point is brought out well by the passage
concerning value creation from The Gay Science, which I will now quote from
at some length:
What? You admire the categorical imperative within you? This ﬁrmness of your
so-called moral judgement? This absoluteness of the feeling, “here everyone must
judge as I do”? Rather admire your selﬁshness here! And the blindness, pettiness,
and simplicity of your selﬁshness! For it is selﬁsh to consider one’s own judge-
ment a universal law, and this selﬁshness is blind, petty, and simple because it
shows that you haven’t yet discovered yourself or created for yourself an ideal
of your very own—for this could never be someone else’s, let alone everyone’s,
everyone’s! No one who judges, “in this case everyone would act like this” has
yet taken ﬁve steps towards self-knowledge. For he would then know that there
neither are nor can be actions that are all the same; that every act ever performed
was done in an altogether unique and unrepeatable way, and that this will be
true of every future act; that all prescriptions of action (even the most inward
and subtle rules of all moralities so far) relate only to their rough exterior; that
these prescriptions may yield an appearance of sameness, but only just an appear-
25I put this phrase in scare quotes as it may seem to some people to suggest something along
the lines of the “two-world” reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism, rather than the (I take
it) more plausible “two-aspect” (Allison, 1990, p.4) reading advocated by commentators such as
Allison (1990) and Korsgaard (1996). This is certainly not my intention, however, and I take it
that both interpretations of Kant’s philosophy need to see the rational will as something along
these lines in order to account for his claim that spontaneously acting according to reason alone
resultsinautonomy, whereasincorporatingthedemandsofothermotivesintoone’simperatives
results in heteronomy.
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ance...our opinions, valuations, and tables of what is good are certainly some of
the most powerful levers in the machinery of our actions, but that in each case,
the law of its mechanism is unprovable. Let us therefore limit ourselves to the
puriﬁcation of our opinions and value judgements and to the creation of tables of
what is good that are new and all our own...We, however, want to become who
we are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves
laws, who create themselves! To that end we must become the best students and
discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world: we must become
physicists in order to be creators in this sense—while hitherto all valuations and
ideals have been built on ignorance of physics or in contradiction to it. So, long
live physics!
(GS 335)
This passage contains a great deal of material, and it would be impractical to
deal with it all here. For that reason, I propose to split the passage into three
parts.
The ﬁrst part (which runs up to the words “No one who judges, ‘in this
case everyone would act like this’”) gives a pretty good example of Nietzsche’s
attitude towardsthe categorical imperative, and shows onceagain that Nietzsche
seems to make some sort of connection between Kant’s philosophy and the
creation of value.
The second part (which runs from “No one who judges” up to “our opin-
ions, valuations, and tables of what is good are certainly some of the most pow-
erful levers in the machinery of our actions”) then complicates things slightly.
Here, Nietzsche gives an argument intended show that all universal prescrip-
tions of action are in some sense illegitimate or overly simplistic. This argument
proceeds by attacking one of the underlying assumptions of universal prescrip-
tions of action, namely that it makes sense to group different actions together
under a single description: as being fraudulent, for example, or as being compas-
sionate. This, Nietzsche seems to be implying, is to ignore important differences
between the particular circumstances the actions were performed in and, per-
haps more importantly, between the driving forces that led the agent in question
to perform the action.
This is a somewhat puzzling argument. For one thing, if it works it seems
to have serious repercussions for Nietzsche’s other claims in this section. This
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is because it would apply equally to the laws that Nietzsche recommends people
give to themselves, and not only to universal moral rules. After all, if the “laws”
Nietzsche imagines that some people will “give themselves” are to be laws in any
recognizable sense, they must have application beyond single highly speciﬁed
incidents. In fact, given the stress Nietzsche lays on individuals choosing values
that “are new and all [their] own”, it seems somewhat as if Nietzsche has chosen
to target the wrong aspect of universal moral prescriptions—it is the fact that
they treat all people as being similar that would seem to be the more natural core
of his objection, rather than the fact that they assume the possibility of classing
different actions together into broad categories.
I don’t think there is any indisputable way to resolve this puzzle, but one
suggestion might be to draw on the reaction that Nietzsche suggests we should
have to the realization that universal moral prescriptions group actions together
in an illegitimate fashion. According to the passage in question, the appropriate
response to this sort of consideration is to stop worrying about moral rules that
go beyond the sphere of our own actions, and “limit ourselves” to the smaller
task of improving the laws and values that we apply to ourselves. Given this, it
is possible that Nietzsche’s argument runs something along the following lines:
any rule of action, whether universal or speciﬁc to a particular individual, is
beset by incredible difﬁculties due to the highly unique, speciﬁc, and essentially
“unknowable” (GS 335) nature of every action. Therefore, we should give up
the more ambitious task of creating rules that will be applicable to everyone,
and concentrate on the more manageable (although admittedly still extremely
difﬁcult) task of creating a set of rules and values that are appropriate for our-
selves individually.
After this argument comes the ﬁnal section of the passage (running from
“our opinions, valuations, and tables of what is good” onwards). It is this sec-
tion which contains the material that I am really interested in here. At this
point, Nietzsche is satisﬁed that he has shown the erroneousness of accepting
the claims of any system of values to be universally valid, and has moved on
to a new question: what values should we endorse in the place of those which
falsely claim to be universally applicable? Nietzsche’s immediate answer to this
question is that we should “limit ourselves to the puriﬁcation of our opinions
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and value judgements and to the creation of tables of what is good that are new
and all our own”.
Thankfully this is not all the detail we get from Nietzsche in this passage,
and his point is ﬁlled out in more detail a few lines further along, where we
are given some clues about both the aims and the methods of those people who
create “tables of what is good that are new and all [their] own”. Their aim, we are
told, is to become who they are, individuals who are “unique, incomparable,
who give themselves laws, who create themselves”. In addition to this, we are
also told about the means that they will use to achieve this goal: “To that end
we must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and
necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be creators in this
sense—while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been built on ignorance of
physics or in contradiction to it”.
Neither the aims nor the method attributed to the creators of value in this
passage are in any sense obvious, and it is still somewhat perplexing what Ni-
etzsche means here. Yet, despite not using the same biologistic language here
as in the passage from The Antichrist, I think the point Nietzsche is making in
both places is essentially the same—that what is valuable for us are those things
which are “condition for life” for beings such as ourselves, things that accord
with our “most basic laws of preservation and growth”.
To make this claim sound plausible, we have to make two assumptions.
Firstly, that becoming who you are, in Nietzsche’s specialist sense, can be
roughly equated with maximizing your ﬂourishing as a speciﬁcally constituted
natural being. Secondly, it also involves assuming that when Nietzsche talks
about “physics” here, he is being somewhat ﬁgurative. He does not literally
mean that the creator of values must have an in-depth knowledge of modern
physics, rather he is using this term as shorthand for the study of “everything
lawful and necessary in the world”, somewhat like the way the term was used
in the ancient Greek world, to designate the study of everything that occurs—
physics as opposed to metaphysics, rather than physics as opposed to, say, biol-
ogy.
Ifwegrantthesetworelativelyplausiblesoundingassumptionsthough, both
of the passages by Nietzsche under discussion seem to converge on a common
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message: accepting the dictates of any universal system of values is (at least po-
tentially) harmful, and that we should therefore create our own values, and that
what these values should be is determined by what enhances our ﬂourishing, en-
ables us to “become who we are”, or acts as “a condition for life” for ourselves
as unique individuals.
If this analysis is correct, then it seems that both Kant and Nietzsche use a
very similar tactic to show that some ethical demands really do have authority
over us, despite the fact that they have no external or supernatural source. Both
thinkers agree that these demands are something that we must legislate for our-
selves, and both agree that they follow somehow from our nature as agents. The
major difference, it seems to me at least, is that Nietzsche has a much thicker,
person-speciﬁc picture of what really belongs to each person qua practical rea-
soner.
It should be noted that this disagreement does still warrant the term ‘major’,
as much turns on it. For example, it is an important premise in the Kantian sys-
tem that, when considered as practical reasoners, people are all fundamentally
alike. For Nietzsche, by contrast, it is ethically relevant that each individual
represents a unique arrangement of drives and affects, and is hence not identical
to anyone else, let alone everyone. This difference has signiﬁcant consequences.
In the Kantian system, due to the fact that everyone (qua practical reasoner) is
identical, the ethical demands that their rational nature places on them are the
same for everyone. There is only one moral law, and it applies to all rational be-
ings. With Nietzsche’s view, on the other hand, each different person is unique,
and hence the values which express the “most basic laws of preservation and
growth” for them will differ accordingly.
Along the same lines, this difference between Nietzsche’s and Kant’s views
also has serious repurcussions for the degree of knowledge we can have about
the constraints on what we can and can’t value. For Kant, the moral law is the
expression of reason, and as such the restrictions that it places on what people
can (or at least should) do can be known fully by anyone who reasons correctly.
In fact, there is even a direct question one can ask oneself as a test: can I will the
maxim of my action while at the same time willing it as a universal law? For
Nietzsche, by contrast, the values that a person should adopt are determined
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by facts about their own unique constitution, as well as by facts about what the
effects of adopting particular valuations will be upon that constitution. Neither
of these two factors can ever be known fully, hence the Nietzschean creator
of values will, unlike the Kantian agent, have to engage in some pretty hard
work (indeed, they will have to “become the best students and discoverers of
everything lawful and necessary in the world”) in order to make any headway
at all in the search for the set of values which will allow them to become who
they are.
In addition to the previous two points discussed, the difference between the
Kantian and Nietzschean agent also has another signiﬁcant consequence worth
noting, relating to the stability of the values adopted over time. For Kant, the
basic constitution of any agent will remain fundamentally the same through-
out their whole life—every agent is a rational free will,26 and only death, or a
condition which seriously hampers their mental faculties, can change this. For
this reason, the values and rules which they must endorse will remain the same
throughout their whole life, so long as they are still in a position to endorse any
values or follow any rules at all. According to the story Nietzsche gives us, by
contrast, each person is made up of a vast number of disparate and often con-
ﬂicting elements, each delicately balanced in constantly shifting power relations
with the others, causing some to grow and expand in their power and strength,
while others wither and fall away. Due to this agonal nature of the drives, the
constitution of individuals is constantly changing over time as well. This, in
turn, means that the values which will most effectively enhance their ﬂourish-
ing may also change over time in relation to these changes in their makeup.
Hence, for the Nietzschean creator of values as opposed to the Kantian ethical
agent, the values and laws one must give to one’s self are not eternal and unal-
terable. Rather, they will need to gradually be edited and amended in as much
as the agent who created them has undergone growth and change.
Aside from this difference between the agents that they plug into their re-
spective systems, however, there is still much that Nietzsche and Kant have in
common regarding this issue. They both agree that people must give their val-
ues to themselves, and that the way in which they do so should be a reﬂection
26Once again, qua practical reasoner.
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of their nature as agents.
Viewing the creation of value like this can also help to dispel a possible
misconception that an extremely casual (or indeed purely second hand) ac-
quaintance with Nietzsche’s philosophy can sometimes give rise to, which goes
roughly along these lines: Nietzsche believes that, in light of the death of God,
we can no longer believe in the existence of objective values. Therefore, there
are no constraints on what we can or should value, and we are at liberty to
create any values that we like, based on any reasons we choose, or even based
on no reasons at all.
If the analysis I have given of Nietzsche’s view here is correct, then this is
not the best way to understand what he takes the creation of value to involve.
Rather, as the passage from The Gay Science indicates, Nietzsche believes that
the creation of value involves detailed investigation into the effects values have
on us, and is heavily constrained by facts both about ourselves as agents as well
as about the effects on our ﬂourishing that holding certain valuations might
have.
This theme of the importance of detailed investigation is not only present in
“Long Live Physics!”.27 It permeates much of Nietzsche’s thought concerning
the creation of value, as this passage from the Genealogy suggests: “All sciences
must, from now on, prepare the way for the future work of the philosopher:
this work being understood to mean that the philosopher has to solve the prob-
lem of values and that he has to decide on the rank order of values” (GM I: Note).
If anything, the passage from TheGay Science is unique in putting so much stress
on the sort of causal knowledge that can be provided speciﬁcally by physics,
in Nietzsche’s extended sense of the word. As Nietzsche’s thought develops,
however, and particularly after he reﬁnes his doctrine of perspectivism, he in-
creasingly recommends an ever wider range of disciplines to those who would
create values. The following statement from Beyond Good and Evil provides a
particularly good case in point:
Perhaps the philosopher has had to be a critic and a skeptic and dogmatist and
historian and, moreover, a poet and collector and traveller and guesser of riddles
and moralist and seer and “free spirit” and practically everything, in order to run
27The passage from The Gay Science under discussion.
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through the range of human values and value feelings and be able to gaze with
many eyes and consciences from the heights into every distance, from the corner
onto every expanse. But all these are only preconditions for his task: the task
itself has another will,—it calls for him to create values.
(BGE 211)
Therefore, in spite of the initial impressions that the notion of value creation
can easily leave us with, it should be remembered that this process is less like a
free act of creation in a valueless void, and more like a labour-intensive and wide
ranging investigation into the sort of values or laws that will be conducive to
the ﬂourishing of the individual in question, given the type of natural creature
that they are, and the different consequences that can be discerned of holding
certain valuations.
Remaining questions
The account I have given so far matches up well with the passages I have been
looking at (GS 335 and A 11 most particularly), but there are a few questions
that still need to be answered in order to broaden its scope beyond what is said
merely in these few passages.
Firstly, there seems to be something of a contradiction between the de-
scription of the creation of value I have just given and the argument I used
on pages 73–74. In the account just given, I depicted value creation as being
a highly labour-intensive task, with the main aim of the person involved in it
being to discover/create the set of values which will, to the best of their knowl-
edge, most effectively enhance their ﬂourishing. Earlier, on the other hand,
when discussing the differences (or lack thereof) between the individual creator
of values and the moderately conceived future philosopher, I claimed that the
creation of a personalized set of values need not, in Nietzsche’s eyes, be done
for any speciﬁc reason, or indeed be engaged in deliberately and intentionally at
all. Clearly something needs to be said about this tension.
The ﬁrst thing to be said is that there is clearly textual evidence for both
points of view. In the passage from The Gay Science which was discussed at
length in the previous section, Nietzsche claimed that those who would create
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values “must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and
necessary in the world: [they] must become physicists in order to be creators in
this sense”. Similarly, the passage from Beyond Good and Evil quoted at the very
end of the previous section (BGE 211) also strongly suggests that the creation
of value is a task one deliberately engages in, and moreover a task that requires
a great deal of knowledge and preparatory work.
Some passages suggest the exact opposite though. Perhaps the most fa-
mous of these comes from Ecce Homo, where Nietzsche famously claims that
“[b]ecoming what you are presupposes that you do not have the slightest idea
what you are” (EH: “Why I am so Clever”, 9).28 This passage does not explicitly
discuss either value creation or personalized ethics, but the central notion of
“[b]ecoming what you are” is what provides the crucial link which allows the
tension here to rise to the surface.
As was seen in the discussion of GS 335, Nietzsche himself sees some sort of
connection between the creation of value and becoming who/what you are. In
fact, those who he suggests should become the “best students and discoverers of
everything lawful and necessary in the world” are precisely those who “want to
become who [they] are—human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who
give themselves laws, who create themselves”. It is here that the tension arises,
for in this earlier passage becoming who you are is pictured as the result of
exactly the sort of labour-intensive and highly cognitive process that I described
in the previous section—in other words, as involving a detailed investigation
into the effects of holding different values, and as also involving the creation
of new “tables of what is good” based primarily, if not exclusively, upon this
investigation. The passage from Ecce Homo, on the other hand, seems to suggest
that this is exactly how not to become who one is. One must not, according
to this passage, deliberately and consciously attempt to control and direct one’s
life, but rather one must keep one’s consciousness “free from all of the great
imperatives” so that “the organizing, governing ‘idea’” can get “the individual
qualities and virtues ready”, and all this must happen without the individual in
question having “any clue as to the domineering task, the ‘goal’, the ‘purpose’,
the ‘meaning’” (EH: “Why I am so Clever”, 9). If this is Nietzsche’s considered
28This issue was also touched upon in the previous chapter.
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picture of how to become who one is, then it seems that the sort of picture
of value creation that I painted in the previous section, and with it my more
general claim about the relationship between ethics and autonomy, cannot be
correct.
In general though, I think this conclusion would be a little too strong. For
whilst Nietzsche’s use of the phrase ‘has to’ in the sentence “The whole surface
of consciousness...has to be kept free from all of the great imperatives” suggests
necessity, I think the passage as a whole makes it clear that what Nietzsche is
doing here is more accurately seen as giving a description (and a highly ﬂattering
one at that) of his own development, rather than actually stating any sort of
universal rule that everybody must follow in order to become who they are. His
case may be illuminating in many ways, and obviously teaches the lesson that
becoming who you are need not necessarily involve explicitly formulating and
following any sort of goal, purpose, or ethic (although one must be present at
some level). However, to conclude from this one case (and indeed from this one
passage) that all becoming who one is must follow this general pattern is clearly
a mistake that we should not make, and ideally, one we should not attribute to
Nietzsche if we do not need to. To do so would be to conﬂate the process of
becoming who one is with the process of becoming who Nietzsche was.
In the ﬁnal analysis, therefore, I think the best option is to allow that the
ethic which guides one’s actions can be either the result of sustained enquiry or
the subconscious work of some master drive, and that both of these options can
have the same overall result, i.e. the agent in question achieving autonomy and
becoming who they are.
The next question that needs to be answered concerns the claims I made
about the differences between Nietzsche’s and Kant’s understanding of the hu-
man being qua practical reasoner. When characterizing Nietzsche’s position
on this issue, I claimed that he had a thicker notion of the practical agent than
Kant, whereby the speciﬁc rank order of drives and affects that constitutes an in-
dividual’s nature heavily constrains which choices they should make and which
values they should endorse.29 And this implies that, at the level of description
appropriate for ethical reasoning, there is no single shared human nature which
29If they are to become who they are, at least.
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could ground a single shared human ethic binding on all people. This sort of
claim though, seems to ignore one important point: that we are all, according
to Nietzsche, will to power.
There are several passages that seem to suggest that the will to power can be
the basis of some form of ethical standpoint for Nietzsche, but perhaps none
does so more forcefully than the following passage from the beginning of The
Anti-Christ:
What is good?—Everything that enhances people’s feeling of power, will to
power, power itself.
What is bad?—Everything stemming from weakness.
What is happiness?—The feeling that power is growing, that some resistance
has been overcome.
Not contentedness, but more power; not peace, but war; not virtue, but
prowess (virtue in the style of the Renaissance, virtù, moraline-free virtue).
(A 2)
Taken at face value, this passage seems to suggest that the theory of the will
to power can provide some sort of straightforward criterion for what is to be
deemed good and what is to be deemed bad. If we take this suggestion seriously,
Nietzsche’s ethics start to resemble someone like Bentham’s, only with power
replacing pleasure. Nietzsche would be proposing that (i) all human actions are,
as a matter of fact, caused by the pursuit of power and (ii) that, due to this, what
makes an action right/good or wrong/bad is the degree to which it promotes or
diminishes power. In other words, Nietzsche would be proposing some sort of
power-consequentialism on the basis of a descriptive claim about human nature,
i.e. that every action is motivated by will to power.
This sort of view is not entirely misguided, and Nietzsche certainly does
sometimes talk in this way. When properly understood, however, this aspect
of Nietzsche’s thinking does not actually stand in any sort of tension with the
claims I have made so far. To understand why this is so, it will be necessary to
make a couple of remarks about Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power.
There are many different possible understandings of both the content and
importance of Nietzsche’s will to power theory, and there is no need to in-
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vestigate the intricacies of all their agreements and disagreements here.30 As a
starting point for my own discussion, here is a characteristic statement of the
main import of the doctrine from Beyond Good and Evil:
Physiologists should think twice before positing the drive for self-preservation as
the cardinal drive of an organic being. Above all, a living thing wants to discharge
its strength—life itself is will to power
(BGE 13)
As was hinted at above, commentators have ﬂeshed out this position in a
variety of ways. Clark characterizes the will to power, as it functions in human
beings at least,31 as “a second-order desire for the ability to satisfy one’s other,
or ﬁrst-order, desires” (1990, p.211), Reginster describes it as “a desire for the
overcoming of resistance in the pursuit of some determinate ﬁrst-order desire”
(2007, p.37), and Owen portrays it as “an architectonic interest in the feeling
of power” (2007, p.34).32 Rather than focusing upon the potential differences
between these viewpoints, it will be most useful for my argument here to bring
out two points that virtually all interpretations of the will to power doctrine
agree on.
The ﬁrst is that ‘power’, in this context, is not any sort of political or social
dominance. Nietzsche is not claiming that all actions are motivated by some
sort of primitive desire for control over others, and it is not this sort of dom-
inance that Nietzsche is imagining when he says “What is good—Everything
that enhances people’s feeling of power, will to power, power itself”.
The second point of widespread agreement amongst interpreters of the will
to power is closely related to the ﬁrst. It can be brought out particularly clearly
by considering the following question: if the will to power is not claiming that
all human behaviour aims at achieving social or political power, what does it
30Some excellent treatments will be mentioned below.
31I add this caveat because Clark distinguishes sharply between the will to power as a psy-
chological hypothesis about human beings and will to power as a cosmological theory. Of the
latter she says: “[Nietzsche’s] cosmological doctrine of the will to power is an attempt to read
his values into the world and...he does not consider it to be true” (1990, p.221).
32These certainly do not represent the only commentators who have written on the will to
power, and worthwhile treatments can also be found in Danto (1980), Nehamas (1985), Poellner
(1995) and Richardson (1996) amongst others.
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claim that we are aiming at instead? The answer to this question, put bluntly, is
that the will to power doctrine does not posit any sort of speciﬁc universal goal
of human behaviour at all. Rather, when Nietzsche says that we are all will to
power, he does not think that we all aim at the same concrete goal, i.e. power.
Instead, he is trying to make a point about the way in which we pursue all of
our particular goals, whatever they may be. The exact nature of the point he
is trying to make is the source of some controversy, but the general idea seems
to be something like this: human beings (and indeed all of the organic world)
seek to express their strength through the pursuit of their goals, ideally in such
a way as to keep continually striving to overcome greater and greater obstacles
and resistances.
Perhaps this is not the best way of expressing this key Nietzschean idea, and
I would certainly not want to claim that it is either deﬁnitive or exhaustive as
a deﬁnition. However, it certainly captures that which is most important for
my present purposes: namely, that the will to power doctrine does not pro-
vide human beings with any speciﬁc goal at which to aim, but rather makes a
claim about the way they do (and should) pursue particular concrete goals. Due
to this, the recognition that the will to power motivates all human actions is
completely compatible with the idea that each of us should live by a personal-
ized ethics determined by the speciﬁcs of our own nature. The will to power
may well, as Nietzsche often suggests, provide some sort of standard for judging
how successfully we are pursuing our aims and goals, but it alone cannot di-
rectly provide an answer to which particular aims and goals we should actually
pursue.
My previous statement may not be entirely correct. It might be argued that
if we have both the will to power as a standard of evaluation, as well as the
relevant facts about a given person’s constitution, then we should theoretically
be able to calculate which goals/aims etc. will enable the individual in question
to most effectively maximize their ﬂourishing (conceived in terms of power). In
other words, there must be some one possible ethic which will, as a matter of
fact, allow any given individual to most effectively become what they are.
I take this to be essentially correct. It does, however, leave a slightly mislead-
ing impression. For whilst there is, on this understanding, a single personalized
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ethic which will most effectively enhance the ﬂourishing of any given individ-
ual, discovering it, or even having any idea of the extent to which you have
discovered it or not, remains little more than a theoretical possibility. There are
several reasons why this is so. Firstly, there are the extreme limits upon accurate
self-knowledge. As Nietzsche tells us in Daybreak:
However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more
incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute his being. He
can scarcely name even the cruder ones: their number and strength, their ebb
and ﬂood, their play and counterplay amongst one another, above all the laws of
their nutriment remain wholly unknown to him.
(D 119)
Given this, it clear that Nietzsche does not think we can simply survey our
nature, getacleargraspofwhatitinvolves, andthencreateanethicthatwilllead
to our ﬂourishing. Rather, any such attempt will meet with the immediate dif-
ﬁculty that we simply do not have anywhere near the degree of self-knowledge
required. This problem can, of course, be remedied to some extent, by gaining
whatever self-knowledge we can. As this passage strongly suggests though, the
sort of complete self-knowledge that would be required for an individual to cre-
ate the single ethic that would most effectively maximize their ﬂourishing is at
least practically impossible, and perhaps even conceptually impossible.
The difﬁculties associated with gaining adequate self-knowledge are not the
only complications that affect any individual trying to create a personalized
ethic. For, even if an individual had something like full self-knowledge, they
would still not be in a position to create the ethic most suited to their own
needs. This is because, on Nietzsche’s account, aside from lacking the requisite
degree of self-knowledge to create such an ethic, we also lack a sufﬁcient degree
of knowledge about the various physiological and psychological effects of living
by different ethical precepts. All study of ethics so far in human history has, in
Nietzsche’s eyes, consisted in little more than idle speculation or elaborate jus-
tiﬁcations of existing ethical codes. The sort of serious, systematic and scientiﬁc
(in the sense of wissenschaftliche) study of the different ethical options availble
to human beings required for this sort of enterprise simply does not exist, as
Nietzsche makes clear in the following passage:
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In Europe these days, moral sentiment is just as reﬁned, late, multiple, sensitive,
and subtle as the “science of morals” (which belongs with it) is young, neophyte,
clumsy, and crude:—an attractive contrast, and one that occasionally becomes
visible, embodied in the person of the moralist himself. Considering what it
signiﬁes, the very phrase “science of morals” is much too arrogant and offends
good taste, which always tends to prefer more modest terms. We should admit to
ourselves with all due severity exactly what will be necessary for a long time to
come and what is provisionally correct, namely: collecting material, formulating
concepts, and putting in to order the tremendous realm of tender value feelings
and value distinctions that live, grow, reproduce, and are destroyed,—all of which
would be a preparation for a typology of morals.
(BGE 186)
As Nietzsche goes on to make clear in the remainder of this section, even
this preliminary typological task has been neglected by all previous attempts at
a “science of morals”. Everyone who has previously attempted to contribute to
such a science, according to Nietzsche, has actually produced little more than
a short-sighted attempt to prove the universal validity of the morality of their
own particular time and place. Hence, no-one has ever even gone so far as
collecting data on the various types of ethical outlook that have existed so far
on earth, let alone grappling with the “genuine problems involved in moral-
ity, problems that only emerge from a comparison of many different morali-
ties” (BGE 186). For this reason, the sort of knowledge that would be required
for discovering the ethical code which would most effectively enhance an indi-
vidual’s ﬂourishing, i.e. a detailed knowledge of the speciﬁc physiological and
psychological effects associated with adopting any of the bewildering variety of
ethical options available to mankind, is simply not available.
Hence, the individual trying to create a personalized ethics is assailed by
difﬁculties in both the areas where they need knowledge most: they can neither
have adequate self-knowledge, nor adequate knowledge of the sort of conse-
quences that are to be expected from adopting different ethical stances. Add to
this the fact that the constitution of every individual is constantly shifting, and
we can begin to see why Nietzsche so frequently paints the task facing his “un-
known friends” (GM III: 27) as being arduous and uncertain. Yet, even though
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discovering the single ethic most suited to any given individual is little more
than an abstract theoretical possibility, it does still provide a useful concept for
understanding Nietzsche’s position. This is because the search for a personal-
ized ethics can be thought of as something akin to an ongoing attempt to reduce
the distance between this ideal ethic and the ethic one actually lives by—where
this is to conceived so as to include one’s deeply held ethical sentiments as well
as one’s more explicitly held ethical beliefs.
This may initially sound like a slightly odd claim. After all, given that a per-
son can have so little knowledge of what their ideal ethic actually is, how can
they possibly hope to approximate it? This is certainly a good question, and
a knowledge of this difﬁculty is plausibly cast as contributing to Nietzsche’s
strong desire to give ethical thinking a more scientiﬁc basis, which I have al-
ready noted on a couple of occaisons. Yet, in spite of the difﬁculties with as-
certaining which ethical options are genuinely in our best interests, Nietzsche
clearly does not conceive the whole project as being impossible. Rather, it is
a something we must engage in if we are to become who we are, in spite of
its difﬁculties. In terms of practical advice for people setting out on this road,
Nietzsche is clearly in a difﬁcult position, as each person must carve their own
unique path (as Zarathustra says to his disciples: “Now I bid you lose me and
ﬁnd yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you”
(Z I: “Of the Bestowing Virtue”, 3). Yet, in spite of the notorious lack of pos-
itive advice given by Nietzcshe in this area, his position does have one very
strong negative implication—that any individual consciously aiming to approx-
imate to their ideal ethic must constantly subject their existing ethical beliefs
and sentiments to critical scrutiny. The value of such an enterprise for an indi-
vidual trying to gain autonomy is shown nicely by the following description of
Schopenhauer’s development that Nietzsche gives in Schopenhauer as Educator:
a struggle by such a great man against his age seems to be only a senseless and
destructive attack on himself. But only seems so; for he is contending against
those aspects of his age that prevent him from becoming great, which means, in
his case, being entirely free and entirely himself. From which it follows that his
hostility is at bottom directed against that which, though he ﬁnds it in himself,
is not truly himself: against the indecent compounding and confusing of things
eternally incompatible, against the soldering of time-bound things on to his own
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untimeliness...Thus Schopenhauer strove from his early youth against that false,
idle and unworthy mother, his age, and by as it were expelling herself from him,
he healed and puriﬁed his being and rediscovered himself in the health and purity
native to him.
(UM III: 3)
This passage is not alone in suggesting that questioning one’s existing atti-
tudes and beliefs can be of beneﬁt. In fact, a great portion of Nietzsche’s later
works is dedicated to trying to show people33 the dubious nature of many of
(what he takes to be) their existing moral beliefs and attitudes, and also the po-
tentially harmful effect they have on them as unique individuals. In light of
this, I think it is safe to say that this sort of critical reﬂection on one’s exist-
ing ethic—taken very broadly, to include reﬂection on both one’s consciously
held attitudes and one’s more deeply held affective reactions, on any question of
what is of value, what rules or laws to follow, which virtues to cultivate etc.—is
at least potentially34 very useful for someone trying to attain to their ideal ethic.
There are some fairly straightforward Nietzschean reasons for this. Firstly,
given thathe takeshis targetaudience (higher individuals, freespirits, great men,
etc.) to have natures that are both rare and often fragile, it highly unlikely that
simply accepting the norms of their surroundings unquestioningly will provide
them with an adequate ethic for achieving their “highest potential power and
splendour” (GM P:6). This unlikeliness is increased heavily, in Nietzsche’s eyes,
by the fact that many of our existing moral beliefs have their roots in the feelings
of impotency and powerlessness of the weak and mediocre, and as such are
speciﬁcally suited to stiﬂing the strong and the rare.
But it is not only the prejudices that a person takes from their surrounding
that must be guarded against, on Nietzsche’s account. “Everything uncondi-
tional belongs to pathology” (BGE 154) and our own self-created ethical be-
liefs/dispositions etc. are no exception. To uncritically cling to one’s self-given
laws (for example) long after the circumstances in which they arose have passed,
and/or long after they cease to be of any obvious beneﬁt, can be just as harmful
33Or some people, at least.
34I say potentially here because Nietzsche does leave room in his account for people to arrive
unreﬂectively at a personalized ethic, as was discussed at the beginning of this section.
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as merely unquestioningly accepting the default ethical position of one’s age. It
is in the light of this sort of consideration, I take it, that Nietzsche issues the
following warning to the “free spirits”, concerning their one remaining virtue,
genuine honesty (Redlichkeit):
Our genuine honesty, we free spirits,—let us make sure that it does not become
our vanity, our pomp and ﬁnery, our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtue
tends towards stupidity, every stupidity towards virtue...let us make sure we do
not end up becoming saints or tedious bores out of genuine honesty!
(BGE 227)
Therefore, in spite of the fact that Nietzsche cannot tell his imagined higher
individuals of the future speciﬁcally what they should each value, there is still
some deﬁnite advice he can offer—namely, to be constantly on guard against
those prejudices and stupidities of our own perspective which stop us from be-
coming who we are, whether these prejudices have been forced upon us by the
“idle and unworthy mother” that is our society and age, or whether they repre-
sent a “condition for life” from an earlier stage of our development.
Personalized Ethics and Autonomy
In the previous section I gave an account of what the creation of a personalized
ethic amounts to, on Nietzsche’s view. To conclude, I will now look at the
relationship that holds between personalized ethics of this form and autonomy.
At ﬁrst glance, it might seem that there is an obvious argument linking au-
tonomy and personalized ethics that runs roughly as follows: the ethic a person
lives by (if they do genuinely so live) determines how they act. Therefore, given
that autonomy means self-determination, it is obvious that living by an ethic
that is one’s own will result in a higher degree of autonomy than living by an
ethic which one merely inherits or is born into.
This argument is not fundamentally ﬂawed in any way, and does capture
something of Nietzsche’s position. Yet, it is still not adequate on its own. To
understand why, it will be useful to expand upon a distinction I made at the
very beginning of this chapter, that between an ethic being personal and an
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ethic being personalized. When I call an ethic personal, I mean roughly that
it is reﬂectively endorsed by the agent. This need not mean that they have
ever gone through any speciﬁc procedure intended to prove that they genuinely
understand and believe that they should abide by the dictates of whatever ethic
they endorse. Rather, it can simply be shown through their behaviour over
time, the way they respond to certain types of questioning, and so on.35 By
calling an ethic personalized, by contrast, I mean something stronger. For an
ethic to be personalized, it must meet the same condition as a personal ethic,
but must also be such that it promotes speciﬁcally the ﬂourishing (conceived in
terms of will to power) of the person who holds it.
This last condition is obviously a little too vague as it stands, for at least two
reasons. Firstly, it might be thought that, given the earlier argument to the effect
that any ethic is better than no ethic in terms of autonomy, there might be some
grounds for thinking that virtually every ethic promotes ﬂourishing, and hence
that any personal ethic is also, by extension, a personalized ethic. Secondly,
saying it must promote speciﬁcally the ﬂourishing of the individual in question
might give the statement some strange implications. As an example, take the
following: a person creates an ethic which enhances their ﬂourishing to a high
degree. But, by sheer coincidence, there is actually another person somewhere
in the world who this ethic would enhance the ﬂourishing of to an even greater
extent. Now, it might seem that this ethic cannot be called personalized, even
though it seems intuitively to ﬁt the criteria.
There is a reason for this vagueness though, and it lies in the fact that Niet-
zsche takes autonomy to be something which is a matter of degree, rather than
something one either possesses or does not possess. Due to this, it is not pos-
sible to state any exact degree of ﬂourishing or power that must be achieved in
order for autonomy to be guaranteed, or to state in any speciﬁc way how much
greater an effect on one’s ﬂourishing an ethic must have to move from being
merely personal to being personalized. If any concrete statement can be made
here, it is something along the lines of ‘more power/ﬂourishing equals more
autonomy’. Also, in terms of differentiating between an ethic that is merely
35This deﬁnition is intended to be very general, and I have left it open how much (and to a
certain extent, if at all) it needs to differ in content from the ethic of one’s surroundings.
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personal and one that is personalized, the difference is one of degrees along this
scale, and might be thought of like this: a personalized ethic is one which is
self-given and has a high degree of ﬁt with the individual’s ﬂourishing, whereas
an ethic that is merely personal is one which is self-given but where the degree
of ﬁt with the individual’s speciﬁc character is left as an open question.36
With this distinction between personal and personalized ethics in place, it is
now possible to see the inadequacies in the straightforward argument given ear-
lier for linking autonomy and personalized ethics. According to that argument,
to recap, a person’s actions are caused by the ethic they live by.37 Hence, given
that autonomy means self-determination, living by an ethic that is one’s own
will result in a higher degree of autonomy than living by an ethic which is some-
how received or inherited. Now, the reason why this argument is not wholly
adequate is that it only shows why an ethic that is personal results in a higher
degree of autonomy than an ethic which is taken unquestioningly from one’s
surroundings. Nietzsche’s claim, however, is stronger than this. To achieve the
highest degrees of autonomy, according to the reading I am proposing, it is not
enough that the ethic one lives by be personal in this weak sense. Instead, it
must meet the stronger requirement of being personalized. What is the reason
for this? Why does an ethic that enhances a person’s power necessarily result in
more autonomy?
There is clearly more than one way this question could be answered. One
possible option might be to try and give another relatively straightforward ar-
gument, based on the idea of autonomy as self-determination. The thought here
might go something like this: when an ethic is merely personal, it is only one’s
own in one sense—i.e. in the sense of being genuinely endorsed by the person
who lives by it. When an ethic is personalized, on the other hand, it is one’s
own in two distinct senses. Firstly, because it is a species of personal ethic, it is
one’s own in the sense of being genuinely endorsed. On top of this though, it
is also one’s own in a second sense, in that it somehow follows from, is speciﬁc
to, or perhaps shows a high degree of ﬁt with, one’s own natural constitution as
36Hence, an ethic can be both personal and personalized: personalized ethics make up a
subsection of the larger category of personal ethics.
37Once again, assuming that they do so live.
100ETHICS AND AUTONOMY
an individual. From here, the rest of the argument is simple: given that auton-
omy means self-determination, and given that a person’s ethic determines their
actions, it follows that an ethic which is one’s own in both senses will give a
higher degree of autonomy than an ethic which is only one’s own in the ﬁrst of
the two senses.
Whatever the merits of this sort of argument, I will not examine it too
closely here as it doesn’t obviously reﬂect any line of reasoning that is found
in Nietzsche’s works. To understand the particularly Nietzschean reasons for
seeing a personalized ethics as being linked with the highest degrees of auton-
omy, it will be helpful to look at another aspect of Nietzsche’s ideas: his belief
in what might be called the relativity of autonomy.
The following remark from Beyond Good and Evil represents a famous state-
ment that I take to express Nietzsche’s belief in the relativity of autonomy:
“un-free will” is mythology: in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak
wills.
(BGE 21)
This remark comes from BGE 21, a passage containing perhaps Nietzsche’s
most famous denial of free will, and one that I have had reason to quote from
before.38 Nietzsche’s main aim in this passage is to deny the coherence of the no-
tions of both free will (“in the superlative metaphysical sense”) and its opposite
un-free will. Belief in either of these self-contradictory ﬁctions is, according the
argument of this passage, simply a sign of some sort of psychological weakness
on the part of its adherent (arrogance and vanity in the case of the belief in free
will, a cowardly desire to shift the blame for their actions onto other sources,
in the case of belief in un-free will). It is in this context where Nietzsche claims
that to think in terms of free and un-free will is to think “mythologically”, and
that “in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills”.
It is this proposed shift from talk of “free” and “un-free” wills to talk of
“strong” and “weak” wills that is important here, as this shift mirrors the move
38During my discussion of the sovereign individual as a counter-ideal on page 18, for example,
and also on page 59.
101NIETZSCHE’S AUTONOMY IDEAL
from what might be called an ‘absolute’ conception of autonomy to the sort of
‘relative’ conception that I am attributing to Nietzsche. To understand auton-
omy (or freedom) after the fashion of the absolute conception is to see it as being
something along the lines of a distinct property or capacity that human beings
could possess (or not possess) in complete abstraction from their circumstances
and relations to others. From within this perspective it should be possible to
imagine two human beings, similar in almost every respect, except that one is
free whilst the other is not (possibly due to the fact that the ﬁrst possesses a
faculty of free will, whilst the other does not)—just as it should be possible to
imagine two such people who differ only in that the ﬁrst has the capacity of
sight, whilst the other does not.
This absolute conception underlies both the belief in free will “in the su-
perlative metaphysical sense” and in its opposite, the absolutely un-free will, as
once such an all-or-nothing understanding of freedom has been accepted, the
only two plausible positions available seem to be all (i.e. absolute freedom of
the will in a metaphysical sense for every human being) or nothing (absolute
un-freedom of all human actions through determinism). Hence, when Niet-
zsche rejects both free will and un-free will as errors, it is at least partly due to
the fact that both rely on this absolute conception which treats human actions
using the binary pairing of free and unfree.
The alternative I take Nietzsche to be proposing to this absolute concep-
tion, as has already been mentioned, is the relative conception. This second
view essentially claims the opposite of the absolute conception: that autonomy
consists entirely in the nature of one’s relations to other things/people, and
cannot coherently be conceived as a property belonging to (or not belonging
to) the will of an isolated individual. According to this view of autonomy, the
thought experiment that was proposed in connection with the absolute concep-
tion is incoherent: if we imagine two people who are exactly the same in all
respects except that of their autonomy, then we have also necessarily imagined
two people with the same amount of autonomy. On this alternative picture,
autonomy is not a non-relational property that could be possessed (or not pos-
sessed, as the case may be) by an abstract individual, but is rather consequent
upon the relation of the individual to their circumstances and to other people.
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To be autonomous is for one’s will to be dominant (or perhaps active) in rela-
tion to these external forces, and to lack autonomy is simply the converse, i.e.
for one’s will to be subjugated by (or be reactive in relation to) other wills and
forces.
With this picture in place, we can now see why Nietzsche thinks that the
important distinction is not that between free and un-free wills, but is rather
that between strong and weak wills. Nobody, according to Nietzsche’s under-
standing, is either absolutely free or absolutely un-free in the senses required by
the classic free will/determinism debate. Rather, everybody stands somewhere
along a sliding scale of autonomy, depending upon the strength or weakness of
their will in relation to other wills,39 and the degree to which they are active
(rather than reactive) in relation to other forces.
It is this understanding of autonomy that underlies Nietzsche’s view that
a personalized ethic leads to a greater degree of autonomy than an ethic that is
merely personal. The reason for this is simple: a personalized ethic is, according
to the deﬁnition that I have given, a type of personal ethic (in the sense of being
somehow created or endorsed by the agent) that is distinguished by the high
degree of ﬁt it has with the nature of the agent who holds it, and which therefore
results in a high degree of power. Yet, as we have just seen, an ethic that results
in a high degree of power for its holder is, necessarily for Nietzsche, an ethic
that yields a high degree of autonomy. This is because in giving greater power to
the agent in question, it thereby improves the position of their will in relation
to that of others, as well as their ability to extend their will over long stretches
of time.
As things stand, this account is very abstract and could easily lead to misun-
derstandings. When couched in these terms, it can sound as if the relationship
between a personalized ethic and autonomy is a purely formal one between two
philosophical ideas, with little relevance to the lived life of an ethical agent. As a
matter of fact though, Nietzsche’s message is far more concrete than this—being
autonomous means living a life directed by goals and values that enable you to
39It is worth noting here that at least all organic matter, if not more, is will for Nietzsche,
hence this statement is not meant to imply that one’s autonomy is determined entirely by
relations to other people.
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ﬂourish as a person, and being strong enough to not be held back by others in
the pursuit of such a life.
This may sound like the sort of egoistic viewpoint that even someone like
Callicles could get behind, and this sort of accusation is not entirely misguided.
After all, a large part of Nietzsche’s project is to get a certain part of human-
ity, the supposedly higher individuals, to abandon the altruistic principles of
Judaeo-Christian morality so that they can achieve their “highest potential power
and splendour” (GM P: 6). This does not tell the full story though. Whilst
Nietzsche emphasizes the necessity of strength for those who want to achieve
power and autonomy, his reasons for doing so often differ greatly from the sort
of reasons we might expect from a Calliclean egoist. Strength is not required
merely in order to cut down one’s competitors and overpower those who are
weaker. Rather, strength is required for more subtle reasons: to resist the seem-
ing authority of traditional valuations, to avoid slipping into the comfortable,
cow-like existence of the ‘herd’, and even to avoid letting the distress of others
become one’s own downfall. This ﬁnal point is made forcefully in the following
passage:
How is it possible to keep to one’s own path! Some clamour is constantly calling
us aside; rarely does our eye see something there that does not make it necessary
to drop our own occupation instantly and spring to assistance. I know, there
are a hundred decent and praiseworthy ways of losing myself from my path, and,
verily, highly “moral” ways! Yes, the moral teacher of compassion even goes so
far as to hold that precisely this and only this is moral—to lose one’s own way
like this in order to help a neighbour...Yes, there is a secret seduction even in
all these things which arouse compassion and cry out for help, for our own way
is hard and demanding and so far from love and gratitude of others that we are
by no means reluctant to escape from it, from it and our ownmost conscience—
and take refuge in the conscience of the others and in the lovely temple of the
“religion of compassion”.
(GS 338)
Nietzsche’s claim that autonomy requires the strength to have one’s will in a
dominant relation to that of others is therefore not solely, and arguably even not
primarily, meant to imply that autonomy involves dominating and suppressing
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the will of others in the sense in which we would ordinarily mean a phrase
such as this. Rather, strength is required at least partly, if not largely, so that
the needs and beliefs of others do not become ‘seductions’ which allow higher
individuals to guiltlessly slip off one of the side roads along their own difﬁcult
and often thankless path.40
There are many other points that could be made along these lines. For one
thing, Nietzsche sometimes points out that altruism is useless unless it is built
on a solid foundation of egoism: the help you offer to others may be worth-
less if you have not ﬁrst helped yourself. Similarly, Nietzsche’s belief that the
achievement of power (and hence greater degrees of autonomy) requires over-
coming greater and greater obstacles can be seen as implying that one should
actively will the strengthening of one’s opponents. Finally, there are also many
familiar points about Nietzsche’s interests lying in the sort of ‘spiritual’ domi-
nance involved both in the creation of great works of art and philosophy, as well
as in the overcoming of the baser aspects of one’s self, rather than in external
dominance over others. However far one wants to go in these efforts to distance
Nietzsche’s stance from that of someone like Callicles, the fundamental point
remains the same: power and autonomy go hand in hand, and to achieve them a
person must live according to an ethic that enables them to become speciﬁcally
who they are.
40Hence we ﬁnd Zarathustra saying: “In sparing and pitying my greatest danger always lay;
and all human nature wants to be spared and pitied” (Z III: “The Homecoming”. cf. also Z IV:
“The Cry of Distress”, where pity is described as Zarathustra’s “last sin”).
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CONSCIOUSNESS
Over the course of the previous chapters a certain picture has started to emerge.
For Nietzsche, the degree of autonomy a person possesses is determined by the
power1 of their will in relation to other wills. Put extremely brieﬂy, the for-
mula which sums up the relationship between the two aspects of this equation
is basically more power equals more autonomy. In order to achieve the highest
degrees of autonomy possible, I have argued, one must impose (whether inten-
tionally or not) what I have called an ethic upon one’s self and one’s actions.
This ethic, if it is to result in the highest degrees of both power and autonomy
possible, must have several key features: it must be self-given rather than simply
inherited from one’s surroundings or accepted on authority, it must act to unify
the various drives and affects of the person who holds it, and it must match up
to the speciﬁc “conditions of life” (A11)2 of the individual in question in such
a way that it enables them to attain their “highest potential power and splendor”
(GM P: 6) and become who they are.
Some questions still remain with respect to this picture though, and in this
chapter I will be addressing an issue which has cropped up several times already:
namely, how this account coheres with Nietzsche’s views on consciousness. In
general, it is fair to say that Nietzsche offers what might be called a deﬂationary
account of consciousness, as he frequently questions both the efﬁcacy of con-
1Other words, such as strength, dominance or activity, might also be appropriate here.
2This is not an exact quote, but is rather a paraphrase from Nietzsche’s statement that
“Whatever is not a condition for life harms it”.
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scious thought in relation to our actions and avowed evaluations, as well as the
value of the sort of heightened level of conscious thought present in modern
European society. Yet, in the account I have given so far, I have still tried leave
room in Nietzsche’s viewpoint for conscious reﬂection and decision (especially
with regard to the ethic a person adopts) to play a possible role. My main aim
in this chapter will therefore be to justify the role I have preserved for con-
scious thought, and to show that it is compatible with Nietzsche’s deﬂationary
account of consciousness.
In order to reach this goal, I will take the two types of consideration men-
tioned above in turn. To begin with, I will look at those aspects of Nietzsche’s
works which question the efﬁcacy of conscious thought. As with many aspects
of Nietzsche’s thought, the relevant passages on this issue admit of more than
one interpretation, so my ﬁrst task will be to sketch out some of the different
ways in which they might be understood. For the purposes of my discussion, I
will distinguish between what I shall call ‘strong’ and ‘moderate’ interpretations
of the passages in question. According to those interpretations that I shall label
strong, consciousness plays no signiﬁcant role in determining our actions: the
true determinants of action lie far below the level of consciousness, and our con-
scious thoughts are at most links in the causal chain between these determining
factors and the actions that they produce. The interpretations which I shall call
moderate, on the other hand, maintain that the conscious part of our minds
is, for Nietzsche, merely the smallest and least signiﬁcant aspect of our mental
activity, and that its importance in determining what we think and how we act
is negligible when compared with the work done by non-conscious factors. In
relation to the strong interpretations, I will argue that they cannot be made
to ﬁt with Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism. With regard to the moderate
interpretations, I will agree that they present an essentially correct account of
Nietzsche’s views, but argue that they do not conﬂict with the possibility of
some role being left for conscious thought in Nietzcshe’s positive project.
After this, I will then turn to the considerations relating to the value of
consciousness. Here, I will look at Nietzsche’s claims that consciousness is
a negative phenomenon arising from “the community- and herd-aspects” (GS
354) of mankind’s nature, as well as his claim that modern Europeans suffer
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from an excess of consciousness. In both cases, I will not question the validity
of attributing these views to Nietzsche. However, I will argue that, according
to the account Nietzsche gives, nothing about the origin or present state of con-
sciousness can determine entirely what its value for future higher individuals
might be, and that whatever value it might come to have will be determined
entirely by the new uses to which it can be put. Therefore neither of these con-
siderations about the value of consciousness rule out the possibility that some
of those individuals who achieve a high degree of autonomy in the future will
make use of conscious reﬂection and decision-making on their way to attaining
it. I will then conclude with some remarks about the exact role that is left for
consciousness to play in Nietzsche’s account of autonomy.
Nietzsche’s Use of the Word ‘Consciousness’
Before beginning this chapter it will be worth making a few remarks about the
particular way in which Nietzsche uses the term ‘consciousness’ (Bewusstsein3)
and its cognates throughout his works. This is made necessary by the fact that
Nietzsche uses the term somewhat inconsistently and, at certain times at least,
slightly unconventionally.
In broad outline, Nietzsche uses the word consciousness in two distinct (al-
though obviously related) ways. Sometimes, he uses the term consciousness to
signify simply the capacity for a perceptual and intellectual awareness of both
the world and one’s own self. This use of the word consciousness, I take it, is in
line with the standard use of the term, and is fairly easy to recognize. According
to this use of the term, human beings are not the only animals who possess con-
sciousness,4 and conscious states can include perceptual sensations, feelings and
emotions, as well as (in human beings at least) abstract and discursive thoughts.
In some passages, however, Nietzsche seems to mean something signiﬁcantly
narrower by term consciousness. In this mood, Nietzsche often contrasts con-
3Whilst Bewusstsein is the term Nietzche almost always uses, there is at least one passage
(GS 11) where he uses both Bewusstsein and the slightly more unconventional Bewusstheit. This
point was brought to my attention by Bernard Williams’ editorial notes to The Gay Science.
4Although obviously the human form of consciousness will be seen as more complex or
advanced.
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sciousness to instinct, and associates it predominantly with the rational and re-
ﬂective element in human beings, as in the following quote from the Genealogy
(which we will have cause to return to later):
They [the men who were ﬁrst “enclosed once and for all within the sway of
society and peace”] felt they were clumsy at performing the simplest task, they
did not have their familiar guide any more for this new, unknown world, those
regulating impulses that unconsciously led them to safety—the poor things were
reducedtorelyingonthinking, inference, calculation, andtheconnectingofcause
with effect, that is, to relying on their “consciousness”, that most impoverished
and error-prone organ!
(GM II: 16)
This passage provides a particularly good example of Nietzsche’s narrower
use of the word consciousness. For one thing, Nietzsche simply cannot be us-
ing the term consciousness in the broad sense outlined above without involving
himself in some very strange claims. If he was using the term in the the more
conventional sense, the import of this passage from the Genealogy would have to
be something like the following: during their “unrestrained and shapeless” (GM
II: 17) existence in prehistoric times, human beings5 lived much like automa-
tons, reacting to external stimuli but without any actual awareness of them-
selves and the world around them. Then, due to the arrival of “a conqueror and
master race” that is “organized on a war footing, and with the power to orga-
nize” (GM II: 17) this nomadic populace suddenly ﬁnds itself under the power
of a state with various laws and traditions, along with the power to punish
those who disobey these laws. As a reaction to this “leap” (GM II: 17) into new
circumstances, these early human beings stop merely reacting like automatons,
and begin to have a conscious awareness of the world around them.
This is clearly not the point that Nietzsche was trying to make. What
changed about these early human beings was not that they went from being
unaware of the world around them to possessing a conscious awareness of it.
Rather, what changed is that they stopped acting solely according to instinct,
5Or at least some human beings.
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i.e. without thinking about their actions before doing them, and began to de-
pend on things such as: “thinking, inference, calculation and the connecting
of cause with effect”. Hence, in some instances of Nietzsche’s use of the word
consciousness it does not mean merely awareness, but something more along
the lines of reﬂective awareness. Or, put another way, sometimes Nietzcshe uses
the word consciousness to denote something like our ability to act on the basis
of judgements and reasoning.6
Earlier on in this section I accused Nietzsche of using the term consciousness
in a slightly unconventional sense. This might be slightly unfair, as there is a
sense in which we might ordinarily use the word ‘conscious’ which is roughly
equivalent to this. Imagine, for instance, a person walking through the park
lost in their own thoughts, who then suddenly becomes the target of a fast-
ﬂying ball. Then, at the last second, they instinctively (as we might say) throw
their arms up in front of their head and block the ball. Now, when talking
about this, it might be perfectly natural for the person to say things such as
“I didn’t consciously put up my hands” or “It wasn’t a conscious decision to
block that ball”. These sorts of remarks, however, are clearly not intended to
mean that the person’s conscious awareness played no part in the procedure, as
if they had continued to think that they were walking along the path for several
moments after the incident, or even that they had been having no experiences
whatsoever. Rather, they are intended to convey the fact that the action was a
reﬂex—an action which involved no prior thought or reasoning on the part of
the person performing it.
There may be some ground, therefore, for thinking that neither of the two
senses of the word consciousness that Nietzsche employs can fairly be called
unconventional. The fact remains though that Nietzsche does use this term in
two different senses, and gives little or no explicit indication of which sense he is
using it in any given passage. At certain points this doesn’t really matter, as the
narrower sense of consciousness is contained in the broader one. At other times
though it can cause confusions or make Nietzsche’s arguments appear strange.
For this reason, I will use certain strategic points in this chapter to indicate
which sense of the term consciousness is under discussion.
6A similar point is made and explored in detail by Katsafanas (2005).
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The Efﬁcacy of Consciousness
To begin this chapter, I will look at those aspects of Nietzsche’s deﬂationary
account of consciousness that touch speciﬁcally on the efﬁcacy of our conscious
thought in relation to our actions and evaluations. As was mentioned in the
introduction, these aspects of Nietzsche’s thought can be read in different ways.
For the sake of brevity, I will treat these different readings in the next two
subsections respectively under the broad categories of ‘strong’ and ‘moderate’.
Strong Readings: Consciousness as Completely Ineffective
The main claim of the readings that I am labelling ‘strong’ is that Nietzsche
believes that our conscious mental activity plays no signiﬁcant role whatsoever
in determining either our actions or our beliefs.7 The classic statement of this
view is to be found in Leiter’s book Nietzsche on Morality, so it is from here that
I will mainly draw in this section.
According to Leiter, Nietzsche holds an epiphenomenalist position. Or
rather, to be more precise, Leiter actually thinks that Nietzsche switches be-
tween two slightly different epiphenomenalist positions. However, before go-
ing into any sort of description of what either of these two different positions
involve, it will be useful to introduce some of Leiter’s terminology, namely his
idea of “type-facts” (Leiter, 2002, p.91). The notion of type-facts plays a crucial
role in the way Leiter puts forward his description of Nietzsche’s purported
epiphenomenalism, so I will begin by quoting Leiter’s account of exactly what
type-facts are:
each person has a ﬁxed psycho-physical constitution, which deﬁnes him as a par-
ticular type of person. Call the relevant psycho-physical facts here “type-facts”.
Type-facts, for Nietzsche, are either psychological facts about the person, or facts
about the person’s unconscious drives or affects. The claim, then, is that each per-
son has certain largely immutable physiological and psychic traits, that constitute
the “type” of person he or she is.
(Leiter, 2002, p.91)
7This statement may sound a little strange, as our beliefs are (at least usually) consciously
held. The meaning of this statement will, however, become clearer later on.
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The general claim then, which even when taken by itself is not uncontrover-
sial, is that Nietzsche believes that every single person possesses an unchanging
“psycho-physical” nature which marks them out as a certain type of individual—
as a master or a slave perhaps, or as one of the weak or one of the strong. With
this idea in place, we can now move on to looking at what Nietzsche’s sup-
posed epiphenomenalism involves. Yet, as was mentioned above, Leiter actu-
ally thinks that Nietzsche endorses two different forms of epiphenomenalism
at different times: what he calls kind-epiphenomenalism and token-epiphenom-
enalism.
Of these two positions, it is kind-epiphenomenalism8 that Leiter takes to be
Nietzsche’s more considered view. According to this view:
conscious states are only causally effective in virtue of type-facts about the person
(that is, not simply in virtue of their being conscious states). Put more simply:
consciousness is not causally effective in its own right. While a person’s conscious
states may be part of the causal chain leading up to action, they play that role only
in virtue of type-facts about the person.
(Leiter, 2002, p.91-2)
This view, then, holds that our conscious states play no signiﬁcant determin-
ing role in our lives. What our actions will be, along with everything we believe,
is determined long before any of this reaches consciousness by the interplay be-
tween the relevant type-facts about ourselves and facts about our environment.
Consciousness may be part of the causal chain that leads from type-facts (along
with environmental factors) to actions and beliefs, but all of the truly impor-
tant work is done long before any form of consciousness is involved. Or, as
Leiter puts this, type-facts are both “causally primary” and “explanatorily pri-
mary” (Leiter, 2002, p.91) with respect to the lives of human beings.
Alongside kind-epiphenomenalism there is also token-epiphenomenalism.
This is, on Leiter’s reading, a “more radical (and less plausible) view” which Ni-
etzsche “[a]t times...seems to embrace” (Leiter, 2002, p.92). Like kind-epiphe-
nomenalism, token-epiphenomenalism shares the core view that “consciousness
8As Leiter points out, this position would more naturally be called type-epiphenomenalism.
Leiter chooses the term kind-epiphenomenalism to avoid any confusion with the notion of
type-facts.
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is not causally effective in its own right”. The difference, however, lies in the na-
ture of the relationship that is held to maintain between type-facts, environmen-
tal factors, consciousness and action. According to kind-epiphenomenalism,
everything is determined by the interaction of type-facts and environmental
factors. These then give rise to conscious experience, which in their turn cause
actions. Token-epiphenomenalism, on the other hand, paints a more radical
picture. As with kind-epiphenomenalism, the crucial work is again done by the
combination of type-facts with environmental factors. On this view though:
“conscious states are simply effects of under-lying type-facts about the person,
and play no causal role whatsoever” (Leiter, 2002, p.92). In other words, token-
epiphenomenalism paints the relationship between type-facts, environmental
factors, consciousness and action in the following way: the determination of
what a person will do once again occurs through the interplay of type-facts
and environmental factors. The combination of these two things then indepen-
dently causes both our actions and our conscious mental states. Our conscious
thoughts, therefore, do not even act as a link in the causal chain between type-
facts and actions on this view. Rather, our thoughts and our actions are merely
two correlated phenomenon, which happen to match up to each other fairly
well solely because they both spring from the same original causes.
Overall though, the differences between these two views are fairly slight. At
base, they both revolve around the claim that “the real story of the genesis of an
action begins with type-facts, which explain both consciousness and a person’s
actions” (Leiter, 2002, p.92), or, in other words, that we must give both causal
and explanatory primacy to non-conscious factors in the explanation of human
behaviour. For this reason, I will proceed in this section as if I am addressing
both views at once, and will ﬂag up any points where their differences become
philosophically relevant.
Before examining to what extent, if at all, either of these views conﬂicts
with the role I have tried to preserve for consciousness in Nietzsche’s account
of autonomy, it will be worthwhile to examine the evidence that Leiter gives
for the presence of such views in Nietzsche’s texts. The majority of the passages
Leiter quotes, as far as I can see, actually do not support attributing an epiphe-
nomenalist view to Nietzsche at all. He talks about, for example, “the theme of
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the ‘ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness’ (GS 11)”
(Leiter, 2002, p.93) being a recurring one in Nietzsche’s works. This statement
is, however, extremely vague about the nature of the overestimation and misun-
derstanding in question. Moreover, in the very same passage (GS 11) Nietzsche
expresses concern about the fact that “[c]onsciousness gives rise to countless
mistakes that lead an animal to perish sooner than necessary”—a very strange
statement for a thinker supposedly committed to the explanatory primacy of
non-conscious factors, or at least a very strange one for such a thinker to see as
worth mentioning in an explanation.
Several of the other passages Leiter quotes as support fare no better. For
example, the following passage from Daybreak:
we are accustomed to exclude all [the] unconscious processes from the accounting
and to reﬂect on the preparation for an act only to the extent that it is conscious
(D 129)
While this statement certainly signals Nietzsche’s disapproval of giving ex-
planatory primacy to consciousness alone, it is still quite a leap from this to
the claim that explanatory primacy should be given entirely to non-conscious
factors—a leap which is certainly not warranted by this statement, and which ig-
nores all the various positions one could maintain between these two extremes.
Further examples could still be given. Take, for instance, Nietzsche’s state-
ment (quoted by Leiter) that “by far the greatest part of our mind’s activity
proceeds unconscious and unfelt” (GS 333). Once again, this statement can
easily be seen as ruling out giving either causal or explanatory primacy to con-
sciousness alone, but, importantly, does not go so far in the opposite direction
as to demonstrate that Nietzsche believes either causal or (more signiﬁcantly)
explanatory primacy is possessed solely by unconscious factors. And, in any
case, the scope of this statement is clearly limited by the phrase “by far the
greatest part of”. Moreover, immediately after giving this quote, Leiter directs
his readers (without quoting any particular part directly) to GS 354, a passage
we will have cause to return to at length later on in this chapter. A large part of
the focus of this passage from The Gay Science though, is Nietzsche’s attempt to
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show that consciousness is one of the “herd-aspects” of man’s nature, and hence
only deals in “generalities” and that which is “non-individual” and “average”.
For the “superﬁcialization” that results from our consciousness to be of any real
concern to Nietzsche though, it must be the case that he thinks that the nature
of our conscious thoughts must play some sort of explanatory role, even if this
is not as large a role as is usually assumed.
Perhaps more luck can be expected from what Leiter describes as Nietzsche’s
“strongest argument for the epiphenomenality of the mental” (Leiter, 2002,
p.93), namely his claim in BeyondGoodandEvil that “a thought comes when ‘it’
wants, and not when ‘I’ want” (BGE 17). This, however, will also not take us as
far as full-blown epiphenomenalism. As with some of the previous quotes, this
argument can certainly be seen as implying that Nietzsche is committed to the
causal primacy of non-conscious factors in relation to our conscious thoughts.
Given that the thought from Nietzsche’s example is, ex hypothesei, not caused
by a prior conscious mental event, it must either be self-caused or caused by a
prior non-mental event of some sort. And, given that Nietzsche believes that
the “causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has ever been conceived” (BGE
21), it is clear that he can only see one of these options can be plausible. Once
again though, it seems to have very few direct implications with regard to the
issue of the explanatory primacy of our conscious thought processes in relation
to our actions and beliefs. This can even be seen from Leiter’s analysis, in which
he describes it as a “phenomenological argument against the causal autonomy of
consciousness”.9
Many of these objections might at ﬁrst sound overly pedantic—particularly
those that rely heavily on the distinction between causal and explanatory pri-
macy. This distinction is, however, actually crucial for understanding the plau-
sibility of attributing epiphenomenalism to Nietzsche. The reason for this is
because, whilst Nietzsche must endorse both the causal and the explanatory
primacy of non-conscious factors in order to be a fully-ﬂedged epiphenomenal-
ist, the explanatory primacy condition is actually much more important than it
ﬁrst appears. If belief in the causal primacy of non-conscious factors in relation
to consciousness was enough to make a thinker into an epiphenomenalist, then
9The emphasis here is Leiter’s.
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just about everyone except the most ardent traditional free will theorist would
qualify for acceptance into the epiphenomenalist ranks. Everybody who ac-
cepted that human actions were events in the natural world and therefore must
have causal antecedants would have to be included. Hence, if the view is to be
given any bite, it must be combined with the explanatory primacy condition,
i.e. the view that the ‘true’ or ‘correct’ explanation of any human behaviour is
always one given in terms of non-conscious factors.10 Any quote taken from Ni-
etzsche must, therefore, not merely demonstrate that he believes consciousness
to not be causally autonomous, it must also show that he takes non-conscious
factors to be explanatorily primary.
Of the passages that Leiter cites which do seem to offer support for at-
tributing some sort of epiphenomenalist position to Nietzsche, all three seem
to point far more naturally to the “more radical (and less plausible)” view of
token-epiphenomenalism. Neither of the two passages which offer the most un-
equivocal support come from the published works, but rather both come from
The Will to Power. Of these two, only one puts forward the view uncondition-
ally: “everything of which we become conscious is a terminal phenomenon, an
end—and causes nothing” (WP 478). The other merely toys with the possibility
of such a view: “why could ‘a purpose’ not be an epiphenomenon in the series
of changes in the activating forces that bring about the purposive action—a pale
image sketched in consciousness beforehand that serves to orient us concerning
events, even as a symptom of events, not as their cause?” (WP 666). There-
fore, on the basis of these two passages, the safest conclusion would seem to be
that (token-)epiphenomenalism was a view that Nietzsche seriously considered
during the course of his note-taking, but did not see ﬁt to incorporate into his
published works.
10This is not how Leiter glosses the explanatory primacy condition. According to Leiter, to
believe in the explanatory primacy of type-facts means to believe that “all other facts about a
person (e.g., his beliefs, his actions, his life-trajectory) are explicable by type-facts about the per-
son (perhaps in conjunction with other natural facts about the circumstances or environment)”
(Leiter, 2002, p.91). This, however, seems much too weak. If all that is required is that one ac-
cepts that conscious states “are explicable” (in the sense of ‘can be explained by’) non-conscious
factors, without any commitment to which type of explanation is superior, then what we have
here would be more appropriately be called the explanatory equivalence condition. And, once
again, this would clearly cast the net of epiphenomenalism so wide as to include many people
who take themselves to be endorsing no such view.
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There is, however, one passage from the published works which Leiter
quotes which does seem to suggest that Nietzsche is a token-epiphenomenal-
ist. This passage comes from Twilight of the Idols and runs as follows:
The “inner world” is full of illusions and phantasms: will is one of them. The
will does not do anything any more, and so it does not explain anything any
more either—it just accompanies processes, but it can be absent as well. The so-
called “motive”: another error. Just a surface phenomenon of consciousness, an
“after-the-fact” that hides the antecedentia of an act more than it reveals them.
Not to mention the I! That has become a fairy tale, a ﬁction, a play on words: it
has stopped thinking, feeling, and willing altogether!...What follows from this?
There are no mental causes whatsoever!
(TI: “The Four Great Errors”, 3)
This certainly contains some epiphenomenalist-sounding claims. The idea
that the will “just accompanies processes” and can just as easily “be absent”, and
particularly the striking claim that “[t]here are no mental causes whatsoever”,
both seem to suggest epiphenomenalism. Moreover, his emphasis on the fact
that the will “does not explain anything any more”, along with his claim that
the motive usually “hides” the real antecedents of an act, means that this passage
touches on issues relating to both the causal and the explanatory primacy of
non-conscious factors. Therefore, of all the passages that Leiter cites, it seems
fair to say that this one passage from The Twilight of the Idols is the only one that
gives any concrete support to the claim that Nietzsche endorsed epiphenome-
nalism in his mature works.
The plausibility of attributing epiphenomenalism to Nietzsche obviously
cannot be deﬁnitively decided on the basis of the evidence Leiter gives alone,
however, so I will now look at the more philosophical issues relating to this
claim. Now, as has been mentioned already, if Nietzsche is to be an epiphe-
nomenalist, then he must endorse both the causal primacy condition, and the
explanatory primacy condition. In relation to the causal primacy condition,
which holds that conscious states must be caused by prior non-conscious states,
it seems highly plausible that Nietzsche would endorse such a claim. His fa-
mous claim in BGE 21 that the “causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has
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ever been conceived”, along with several others,11 could be enlisted in support
of this.
The explanatory primacy condition, on the other hand, is more problem-
atic. As I argued earlier, if it is truly explanatory primacy that is meant here, this
means that Nietzsche must believe that explanations in terms of non-conscious
factors are signiﬁcantly superior to explanations given in terms of conscious
states. This is a view that it seems very difﬁcult to attribute to Nietzsche. For
one thing, it seems to possibly go against the importance he attributes to psy-
chology. This is demonstrated well by Nietzsche’s desire that:
psychology again be recognized as queen of the sciences [Wissenschaften], and that
the rest of the sciences exist to serve and prepare for it. Because, from now on,
psychology is again the path to the fundamental problems.
(BGE 23)
Further evidence for this can also be seen in the nature of Nietzsche’s anal-
ysis in the Genealogy. There, he does not simply, or even primarily, rely upon
non-conscious factors in his explanation of the origin and development of mod-
ern European morality, but shows an active interest in the psychology of the
participants—in the sort of self-understandings and core beliefs of characters
such as the slave, the noble and the priest (and others), and how these self-
understandings and core beliefs enable them to deal with their situations and to
exert a certain power over others.
It might be thought that this objection is not decisive. Perhaps it could
be argued that the sort of psychology Nietzsche is in favour of involves exclu-
sively, or at least primarily, explaining conscious beliefs and motives in terms of
non-conscious factors about the person in question as well as facts about their
environment. This might then be seen as compatible with his endorsing some-
thing like the explanatory primacy condition. There is, however, another even
more serious reason why Nietzsche cannot endorse this condition: namely, his
doctrine of perspectivism.
11D 109, where Nietzsche’s remarks imply that the intellect is always the “blind instrument”
of some (presumably unconscious) drive, is one good example. GS 333, where he speculates that
every thought that rises to consciousness is “only the ultimate reconciliation scenes and ﬁnal
accounts” of a battle between unconscious drives, is another.
119NIETZSCHE’S AUTONOMY IDEAL
Here is not the place to go into great detail about Nietzsche’s doctrine of
perspectivism. In his most famous statement of this position though (GM III:
12), one of the things Nietzsche stresses on more than one occasion is the im-
portance of having a variety of perspectives on any given topic. As Nietzsche
says there, “we can use the difference in perspectives and affective interpretations
for knowledge”, and “the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same
thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ of the thing, our ‘objectivity’”.
This seems to directly contradict the very notion of explanatory primacy per se,
irrespective of whether it is used in regard to the explanation of conscious states
or of any other given phenomenon.
This issue clearly needs to be treated carefully. As Leiter himself points out
in his excellent essay “Perspectivism in Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals”, Niet-
zsche’s perspectivism certainly does not entail that every perspective is as good
as any other. The fact that there are only ever interpretations does not mean
that every interpretation is equally valid. Hence, it is perfectly possible within
the terms of perspectivism for one type of perspective to be superior to another.
A naturalistic perspective, for example, can plausibly be argued to be considered
superior by Nietzsche than say, the Christian religious perspective, just as one
visual perspective can be said to give us a better knowledge of an object than
another. However, whilst there is no reason why perspectivism should commit
Nietzsche to any sort of all-encompassing relativism about knowledge, his par-
ticular version of perspectivism does seem to be very much wedded to the claim
that there are always a variety of perspectives that can be taken on any issue, and
that any sort of extreme focus on one type of perspective will always be harmful
to true knowledge and “objectivity”.12 Hence, the idea that explanations given
in terms of non-conscious factors should always be primary, if the notion of
primacy is given any real force, will always be problematic when attributed to
Nietzsche.
This fact can be seen clearly from Nietzsche’s own work. To take the Ge-
nealogy as an example again, there we see Nietzsche using a variety of differ-
ent perspectives in tracing some of the different threads in the development
of Judaeo-Christian morality. Throughout this treatise, Nietzsche uses (at the
12This aspect of Nietzsche’s perspectivism is brought out very well in Schacht (1996).
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very least) philosophical, psychological, physiological, sociological, aesthetic,
and philological considerations in making his point. There is no suggestion
anywhere that any of these types of consideration are more basic or important
than the others, or that all of these different types of consideration would, in an
ideal world, be reduced to one single type of explanation. In fact, as has already
been shown, he explicitly makes the exact opposite claim: that we should make
use of a variety of perspectives in our understanding of any issue.
For this reason then, it seems that Nietzsche could not possibly endorse
anything like the explanatory primacy condition, and hence cannot be a fully
ﬂedged epiphenomenalist (even though he clearly endorses something along the
lines of the causal primacy condition). Before moving on, however, it is worth
making two further points. The ﬁrst point, which may well be familiar by
now, is that Nietzsche’s endorsing the causal primacy condition does not con-
stitute a threat to the very possibility of autonomy. This point is worth making,
as Leiter’s book treats Nietzsche’s supposed epiphenomenalism in the section
entitled “Critique of Free Will”. Yet, as has been mentioned previously, in Ni-
etzsche’s most famous passage concerning free will (BGE 21) he criticizes both
those who believe in the causal autonomy of the human will, and those who
believe that freedom does not exist because the human will is not causally au-
tonomous. Hence, Nietzsche himself obviously does not think human freedom
is impossible simply because our thoughts and actions have prior causes.
The second thing worth considering is exactly how Nietzsche’s endorse-
ment of something like the causal primacy condition relates to my original
question: namely, can our conscious thoughts play a role in the achievement
of autonomy? In answer to this question, at least one thing is obvious: if any
given person does achieve autonomy, this is not the result of any sort of spon-
taneous causality on the part of some conscious mental faculty they possess. In
terms of whether Nietzsche can plausibly recommend that people consciously
attempt to increase their degree of autonomy, however, the fact that Nietzsche
endorses the causal primacy condition has very little bearing. If Nietzsche en-
dorsed the explanatory primacy condition, on the other hand, things might
conceivably different. After all, it would then be the case that any adequate ac-
count of a person’s becoming autonomous would have to be given in terms of
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non-conscious factors. The nature of this process from the ‘inside’ would be at
best a sideshow, and something of very little real interest.
Given what has already been said about Nietzsche’s perspectivism, how-
ever, this simply cannot be the case. Rather, we would expect Nietzsche to be
interested in both the non-conscious and environmental factors that contribute
to a person becoming autonomous, and the sort of consciousness that the au-
tonomous person has of himself and his deeds. Moreover, this is exactly what
we ﬁnd in Nietzsche’s works—not only does he show an interest in the polit-
ical and sociological (and even dietary) conditions of human ﬂourishing, but
he also shows great interest in the psychology of the free man, and the sort of
self-relation that makes such autonomy possible.13
Moderate Readings: Consciousness as the Smallest Part of the
Mind’s Activity
Even if we do not wish to attribute some sort of thorough-going epiphenome-
nalism to Nietzsche, it is clear that his views on consciousness are still poten-
tially problematic for the kind of reading I am putting forward. It may be the
case that Nietzsche cannot (consistently) desire the total (or even near total)
elimination of conscious processes from our explanations and self-understand-
ings, but it is also equally clear that he does not want to leave his contempo-
raries’ “ridiculous overestimation” of the role of consciousness in generating
actions simply as it stands. In this section, then, I will look at a more moderate
interpretation of Nietzsche’s remarks about consciousness, and assess how this
ﬁts with the reading I have given so far.
To do this, I will begin by focusing on one passage in particular: BGE 32.
As I will look at this passage in some detail, it will be worth quoting it almost
in its entirety:
During the longest epoch of human history (which is called the prehistoric age)
an action’s value or lack of value was derived from its consequences; the action
itself was taken as little into account as its origin...We can call this period the pre-
moral period of humanity. At that point, the imperative “know thyself!” was still
13Pippin (2009) provides a very good analysis of the self-relation of the Nietzschean free
individual.
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unknown. By contrast, over the course of the last ten millennia, people across
a large part of the earth have gradually come far enough to see the origin, not
the consequence, as decisive for the value of an action. By and large, this was a
great event, a considerable reﬁnement of outlook and criterion, an unconscious
after-effect of the dominance of aristocratic values and the belief in “origin”, and
the sign of a period that we can signify as moral in a narrower sense. This marks
the ﬁrst attempt at self-knowledge. Origin rather than consequence: what a re-
versal of perspective! And, certainly, this reversal was only accomplished after
long struggles and ﬂuctuations! Granted: this meant that a disastrous new super-
stition, a distinctive narrowness of interpretation gained dominance. The origin
of the action was interpreted in the most determinate sense possible, as origin out
of an intention. People were united in the belief that the value of an action was
exhausted by the value of its intention. Intention as the entire origin and prehis-
tory of an action: under this prejudice people have issued moral praise, censure,
judgement, and philosophy almost to this day.—But today, thanks to a renewed
self-contemplation and deepening of humanity, shouldn’t we be facing a renewed
necessity to effect a reversal and fundamental displacement of values? Shouldn’t
we be standing on the threshold of a period that would be designated, negatively
at ﬁrst, as extra-moral? Today, when we immoralists, at least, suspect that the
decisive value is conferred by what is speciﬁcally unintentional about an action,
and that all its intentionality, everything about it that can be seen, known, or
raised to “conscious awareness”, only belongs to its surface and skin—which, like
every skin, reveals something but conceals even more? In short, we believe that
the intention is only a sign and symptom that ﬁrst needs to be interpreted, and
that, moreover, it is a sign that means too many things and consequently means
almost nothing by itself. We believe that morality in the sense it has had up to
now (the morality of intention) was a prejudice, a precipitousness, perhaps a pre-
liminary, a thing on about the same level as astrology and alchemy, but in any
case something that must be overcome.
(BGE 32)
This passage, like many of those quoted before, contains a great deal of in-
teresting material that cannot all be covered here. In broad outline, it posits
three distinct phases in the evolution of mankind’s practice of evaluating ac-
tions. During the ﬁrst “pre-moral period”, which spans “prehistory”, actions
are evaluated solely in terms of their consequences. Any action which has (or
seems to have) negative effects on the family or the community at large is con-
demned, irrespective of the motive of the person in performing the act. This
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distant stage of human evaluative practice is not especially relevant to the point
I am making here. The next two stages, however, are those that are of interest.
In the middle “moral” phase, according to Nietzsche, there occurs a “reversal
of perspective”. Instead of seeing the value of an action as residing solely in its
consequences, people begin to take the origin of the action to be of decisive
importance for determining its value. It is worth noting here that Nietzsche
clearly approves of this development, as is shown by the fact that he calls it “a
great event” and “a considerable reﬁnement of outlook and criterion”. Hence,
as far as Nietzsche is concerned at least, man takes a step forward when he learns
to take the origin of an action as being more important than its consequences
for assessing its value.
Following hot on the heels of this positive development in mankind’s prac-
tice of evaluation, however, comes another step in what Nietzsche takes to be
the wrong direction: people become “united” in their belief in a “disastrous new
superstition”, namely that “the entire origin and prehistory of an action” is to
be found in a conscious mental entity known as an intention. In other words,
people start (and indeed continue all over the earth) to think that the true, and
indeed only, causes of any human action are to be found within the conscious-
ness of the agent in question, and hence that the value of any action is entirely
determined by the value of its sole cause and origin—the intention which lies
behind it.
Many of the passages already quoted in the previous section demonstrate
that this development is not one which Nietzsche could endorse. Moreover, his
language in the passage at hand amply demonstrates the same point. He calls
the morality of intentions a “superstition”, “a distinctive narrowness of inter-
pretation”, a “prejudice”, and compares it to astrology and alchemy. It is due
to the insufﬁciencies of the “moral” mode of evaluation, then, that Nietzsche
proposes the move to the next “extra-moral” phase of mankind.
Nietzsche does not go into any sort of highly detailed analysis of what this
“extra-moral” phase consists in here. Some things, however, are clear. For one,
the “extra-moral” phase shares with the “moral” phase the belief that the origin
of an action is more important than its consequences when assessing its value.
The main difference between these two phases, on the other hand, lies in where
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they take this origin to lie. For the “moral” phase, as previously stated, the “en-
tire origin and prehistory of an action” is to be found in the conscious intention
which (supposedly) gives rise to it. For the “extra-moral” phase, by contrast,
“the decisive value is conferred by what is speciﬁcally unintentional about an
action”. This phrase is perhaps not as clear as it could be, but Nietzsche adds
a bit more detail with the gloss that: “everything about [an action] that can be
seen, known, or raised to ‘conscious awareness’, only belongs to its surface and
skin—which, like every skin, reveals something but conceals even more”.
It seems fairly safe to say, then, that non-conscious factors will far outweigh
conscious factors when determining the origin (and thereby the value)14 of an
action in Nietzsche’s envisaged “extra-moral” phase of mankind’s development.
It is worth noting immediately, however, that nowhere in this passage does
Nietzsche suggest any sort of total neglect of the conscious processes involved
in the genesis of an action. Rather, the most recent quote shows precisely the
attitude towards consciousness that Nietzsche associates with this new phase:
consciousness does indeed genuinely “betray” something about the value of an
action, even though, if it alone is focused on exclusively, it “conceals still more”.
And this, I take it, provides a neat summary of the view of consciousness
that a more moderate reading would attribute to Nietzsche. His core message
is directed against what he takes to be the misguided self-understanding of the
modern European. In line with this self-understanding, as Nietzsche sees it,
people take themselves to be in full conscious control of their actions, with the
conscious processes that proceed these actions being sufﬁcient to cause them on
their own, and with nothing else being needed to understand how they arise.
Nietzsche’s counter-claim to people who hold this sort of belief is that these
conscious processes are the tip of an extremely large iceberg. Our actions are
not merely caused by our conscious intentions, but rather also have a wealth
of subconscious, physiological, social and historical causes which, some indi-
vidually and certainly when all taken together, far outweigh the importance of
any of the conscious factors involved. These factors can be anything from facts
about our diet, the tempo of our metabolism, the customs of our homeland,
14Possibly in terms of whether an action results from the “superabundance of life” (GS 370) or
its opposite.
125NIETZSCHE’S AUTONOMY IDEAL
features of our upbringing, the balance of power between our various drives,
and even things such as the after-effects of the habits of ancient mankind which
continue to lead a subterranean existence in the psyche of modern man (cf. D
18, for example, or BGE 264). It is worth emphasizing again though that even
given that consciousness represents the tip of the iceberg that is the origin of
an action, it is still part of that iceberg nonetheless, and should in no way be
entirely disregarded in our understanding of its nature.
One question now remains. If this is the view of consciousness that is at-
tributed to Nietzsche, what are the consequences of this for the understanding
of autonomy that I have put forward thus far? Firstly, what it does not rule out
is that possibility which I have trying to preserve up to now, i.e. the possibil-
ity of an individual consciously and deliberately deciding an ethic according to
which they live their life and thereby achieve autonomy. It does, however, have
some serious consequences for the way we must understand such cases. When
a person does achieve autonomy through giving style to their character, or by
binding themselves to their own law, or by whatever phrase we choose to use
here, this can in no way be the whole, or even the majority, of the story of how
they came to be autonomous. Rather, things such as facts about their consitu-
tion, their subconscious drives, their circumstances and their upbringing will
also play the most signiﬁcant role here as in any other cause. But a role will
be played by this conscious formation of their character nonetheless, and Niet-
zsche’s works taken as whole do not rule out this kind of deliberate cultivation
of one’s self—in fact, as is well known, there are many places which positively
recommend it.15
One consequence of this view which some may ﬁnd unpleasant, however,
is that it does take the success of such an enterprise largely out of the agent’s
hands. In other words, merely forming some sort of ethic and directing all of
one’seffortstowardsfulﬁllingit, evenifthisethic‘ﬁts’extremelywellwithone’s
conditions of existence, is not enough to guarantee achieving the highest levels
15This is particularly true of the works of what is sometimes called Nietzsche’s middle period.
See D 560, and GS 290, 299 and 335 for some good examples. The idea is certainly not exclusive
to this period, however, and even in Ecce Homo when attributing his own cleverness to his
“choice of nutrition...climate and location” (EH, “Why I am so Clever”, 3) he emphasizes that
these are choices and that we should exercise judgement and reason in relation to them.
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of autonomy. One must, so to speak, be in the right place at the right time and
even, if the phrase is permitted, be the right person. This may be an unpleasant
truth but, importantly, it is a truth nonetheless in Nietzsche’s eyes. Those that
achieve autonomy are the “strokes of luck”, and no amount of conscious effort
on the part of an individual will help if that individual, for whatever reason, is
not one of “the unusual cases of spiritual and physical powerfulness” (GM III:
14). From where Nietzsche stands, a modern individual without the right bal-
ance of drives can no more achieve autonomy by force of intellectual effort than
could a prehistoric human being, existing prior to being made “predictable” by
the “social straightjacket” (GM II: 2). The one consolation that can perhaps be
offered to people who ﬁnd this truth unpleasant is that it is often extremely dif-
ﬁcult to tell whether one is such a person until after the fact, and that Nietzsche
recommends that “[o]ne should regard oneself as a variable quantity whose ca-
pacity for achievement can under favourable circumstances perhaps equal the
highest ever known” (D 326) in the meantime.
It is also worth making another thing clear. The fact that the achievement
of autonomy is a matter of luck need not be seen as a problem for this sort of
view. In some people’s eyes, it might seem paradoxical to claim that autonomy
is a matter of luck: if the causes of a person’s autonomy are out of the person
in question’s hands, then what they have cannot really be autonomy, rather it
is merely some natural process that befalls them and is outside of their control.
For Nietzsche, I take it, there is no such problem. Once the “causa sui” con-
ception of free will is rejected, the claim that the possession of the capacity for
autonomous action must somehow be within the individual’s power will lead
to an inﬁnite regress—it will require that every free act be the result of another
free act. This second free act will then also have to be the result of another free
act, and it is fairly easy to see that no end will be possible for such a chain of
free acts. Moreover, I take it that this consequence of Nietzsche’s view also sits
fairly easily with some of our ordinary intuitions about autonomy: the fact that
a person was born without any mental deﬁciencies which would make us rule
out their capacity for free choice, and indeed the fact that they were born at all,
are both chance events, but chance events which any sane theory would have to
recognize as preconditions of their autonomy.
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Finally, it is also worth noting that attributing this view of the role con-
sciousness to Nietzsche also ﬁts perfectly well with the second possibility that I
have kept open in the description of his views on autonomy that I have given so
far: namely, that associated with the account Nietzsche gives of his own devel-
opment in Ecce Homo whereby an individual becomes what they are without
consciously or intentionally aiming to do so. In fact, it is only if one accepts
a theory whereby facts other than those about our conscious processes can be
decisive in determining the course of an individual’s life that one can accept
such an account as plausible at all, so this second possibility harmonizes very
well with such a view. Therefore, if we accept the more moderate reading of Ni-
etzsche’s views on consciousness, one can become autonomous either through
consciously directing one’s life according to an ethic, or by having this done by
aspects (or perhaps an aspect) of one’s self that function(s) below the level of
conscious awareness. In both cases equally, however, chance will play a large
part, and individual striving (whether at the level of consciousness or not) will
not be enough on its own.
The Value of Consciousness
As was mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, worries about the efﬁ-
cacy of our conscious thoughts only make up part of Nietzsche’s deﬂationary
account of consciousness. Aside from the questions he raises about our ability
to determine both our actions and our beliefs using conscious means, he also
puts forward some concerns relating to the value of consciousness for modern
human beings. In this section, I will look at Nietzsche’s grounds for question-
ing the value of consciousness, and examine whether these grounds rule out
the possibility of conscious thought playing an important role in the life of an
autonomous Nietzschean agent.
As I read Nietzsche, his negative remarks about the value of consciousness
come in two different forms. At certain points, his worry about consciousness
is that, due to its social origin, it is essentially a herd phenomenon, and that any-
thing which rises to the level of consciousness can only be an expression of that
which is common and average in the individual in question. At other points,
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Nietzsche’s main concern is more about the degree of consciousness present
in modern man: too much consciousness can be a bad thing in terms of the
healthy functioning of the human (or indeed any) animal, and many moderns,
as far as Nietzsche is concerned, already possess a degree of consciousness which
far exceeds the ideal amount for leading a healthy life. In the next two sections I
will examine these two strands of Nietzsche’s thought in turn, before assessing
their signiﬁcance for the relation between autonomy and consciousness in the
section called “The Value of Consciousness for Future Higher Individuals”.
Consciousness as a Herd Phenomenon
When considering Nietzsche’s claim that consciousness is a herd phenomenon,
there is one passage in particular from Book Four of The Gay Science which
deserves special focus. Whilst the whole passage is relevant to the topic under
discussion, I will begin by quoting a couple of the most directly relevant parts:
My idea is clearly that consciousness actually belongs not to man’s existence as
an individual but rather to the community- and herd-aspects of his nature; that
accordingly, it is ﬁnely developed only in relation to its usefulness to community
or herd; and that consequently each of us, even with the best will in the world to
understand ourselves as individually as possible, “to know ourselves”, will always
bring to consciousness precisely that in ourselves which is “non-individual”, that
which is “average”; that due to the nature of consciousness—to the “genius of the
species” governing it—our thoughts themselves are continually as it were outvoted
and translated back into the herd perspective.
(GS 354)
and a little further on in the same passage:
the world of which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-
world, a world turned into generalities and thereby debased to its lowest com-
mon denominator,—that everything which enters consciousness thereby becomes
shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a sign, a herd-mark; that all becoming
conscious involves a vast and thorough corruption, falsiﬁcation, superﬁcializa-
tion, and generalization.
(GS 354)
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In typical Nietzschean fashion, a great deal of content is packed into these
short sections, and a bewildering variety of points are made in quick succession.
The point relevant to the current section is fairly clear though: everything that
happens at the level of consciousness is only that which is average and herd-like.
The reason why this so, on Nietzsche’s account, lies in the origin of con-
sciousness. Consciousness, according to Nietzsche “developed only under the
pressure of the need to communicate” (GS 354). Due to the fragile nature of most
(if not all16) human lives, people needed a way to quickly make their most press-
ing needs known to others, so as to get their assistance quickly and efﬁciently.
Consciousness is the capacity that was developed to meet this need, and there-
fore to act as “a net connecting one person with another” (GS 354). This origin,
however, deeply shaped the nature of consciousness. It was not developed in
order to express the unique, the personal, or the individual, but rather to pro-
vide a simple and effective way for people to communicate about their most
urgent needs—and these urgent needs are exactly those most basic ones which
all people share.
These supposed facts about the origin and function of consciousness have
big implications for the value of consciousness in Nietzsche’s eyes. At the
most general level, anything which is so closely related to the purposes of the
“herd-aspects” of man’s nature is bound to meet with Nietzsche’s disapproval,
and hence to immediately seem an unlikely candidate for integration into Niet-
zsche’s positive project. Aside from this more general point, however, there is a
more speciﬁc reason why conscious thought, if it is so inevitably linked to the
“herd-aspects” of man’s nature, cannot be linked to the Nietzschean conception
of autonomy as I have tried to describe it so far.
As I argued in the previous chapter, living according to the dictates of what
I called an ethic is a necessary condition of achieving autonomy. Moreover,
in order to achieve the highest degrees of autonomy possible, this ethic must
be such that it ﬁts with, and where appropriate even enhances, that which is
most speciﬁc and unique about the person who holds it. As Nietzsche puts this
16Nietzsche himself certainly did not seem to think that all human beings were in this state
of need, as he says of consciousness that “the solitary and predatory person would not have
needed it”. (GS 354)
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point, it must aid them in becoming who they are: “human beings who are
new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves!”
(GS 335). Yet, when we look back at the language used in the two parts of
GS 354 that I quoted above, it seems as if consciousness must work explicitly
against the discovery and creation of that which is “new, unique, [and] incompa-
rable”. Nietzsche there associates that of which we become conscious as being
thereby “non-individual”, “average”, “shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, a
sign, a herd-mark”, as well as being corrupted, falsiﬁed, generalized, and made
superﬁcial. Therefore, if becoming autonomous necessarily involves working
with everything about one’s self that is unusual and unique, then it seems that
any activity which relies primarily on conscious thought, such as the deliber-
ate creation of an ethic, could only act as a hindrance to a person’s becoming
autonomous.
Consciousness as a Sickness
The fact that consciousness is essentially a social phenomenon is not the only
reason Nietzsche provides for questioning its value. In addition to this, Niet-
zsche also questions the value of the heightened degree of consciousness pos-
sessed by modern Europeans. In fact, in the very section of The Gay Science
with which the previous section dealt, Nietzsche says that “[i]n the end, the
growing consciousness is a danger; and he who lives among the most conscious
Europeans even knows it is a sickness” (GS 354). This criticism of the value
of consciousness is obviously not totally unrelated to the concerns addressed in
the previous section—after all, it is partly due to the fact that consciousness is a
herd phenomenon that makes its increase a matter for concern. Yet Nietzsche
also gives another, independent reason for seeing the “growing consciousness”
of modern Europeans as not being a wholly positive phenomenon.
This further reason centres on Nietzsche’s belief “that ‘instinct’ is the most
intelligent type of intelligence discovered so far” (BGE 218). At many points in
his works, and in relation to many different topics, Nietzsche puts forward the
idea that functioning according to unconscious instinct is by far preferable to
functioning consciously. There are a number of different ways that such an idea
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can be supported. For one thing, virtually all of the most important functions
of the human organism, and, non-coincidentally for Nietzsche, all of those that
function with the most certainty, occur below the level of consciousness. Even
those that do involve conscious thought need not, according to Nietzsche, and
they gain nothing especially crucial from the “mirroring” (GS 354) they get in
consciousness.
The previous point about consciousness relied partly on the fact that those
activities which the human organism performs with most certainty are those
which never rise to the level of consciousness. The same point can also be
approached from the opposing angle though, by emphasizing the fact that we
generally get better at activities proportionally to the degree to which we are
able to perform them less consciously—or, as Nietzsche might put this same
point, we get better at them proportionally to the extent to which we incorpo-
rate them and they “become an instinct” (GM II: 2). This example is a familiar
one, and is not difﬁcult to make: whether it be riding a bike, driving a car,
learning a foreign language, playing a musical instrument or learning a sport, it
is generally accepted that improvement involves having to consciously think less
and less about the activity in question, and that the ideal state is to have these
things come so naturally to us that they are ‘second nature’ and something that
we can do ‘without even thinking about it’.
It is worth noting here that Nietzsche, as was the case with the term ‘con-
sciousness’, uses the term ‘instinct’ in what might appear to be a slightly id-
iosyncratic way. This is brought out particularly clearly by the previous point.
By many people’s understanding, an instinct is something along the lines of an
innate or inborn capacity of an animal to react in a particular way to certain
types of stimuli or circumstance. If this is correct, however, then Nietzsche’s
talk of things becoming an instinct (and his parallel talk of instincts disappearing
and weakening) may seem to verge on being nonsense—a capacity cannot either
become or stop being innate. That Nietzsche endorses such talk is undeniable
though. Take, for example, his talk in The Gay Science of embarking on the
“task of assimilating knowledge and making it instinctive” (GS 11).17
17The meaning of this task, and in fact Nietzsche’s purpose in The Gay Science in general, is
given a very illuminating discussion in Schacht (1988).
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If one wanted to, it might be possible to try and bring Nietzsche’s use of
the term instinct more into line with the more conventional sense. He may,
for example, only ever mean to imply that things can become instinct over the
course of many generations—after all, anyone who accepts something along the
lines of evolutionary theory must accept that instincts do gradually change over
time, or else must make the unattractive claim that all of mankind’s current
instincts have been possessed by the creatures representing every earlier stage
of his development, right down to the ﬁrst single-cell organisms that appeared
on the face of the earth. Hence, when Nietzsche talks of mankind gaining
or losing instincts, it may only be in this long-term sense. And, wherever he
seems to suggest that we should somehow embark on the task of making some-
thing instinctive, he may simply suggesting that we should attempt to begin
this long process by ourselves taking on the new qualities we desire mankind
to incorporate as what he elsewhere calls a “second nature” (D 455). We may
never live to see these qualities become instincts ourselves, but we can have the
“noteworthy consolation...of knowing that [our current] ﬁrst nature was once
a second nature and that every victorious second nature will become a ﬁrst”
(UM II: 3). Whilst this line of reasoning is plausible enough, however, and cer-
tainly contains more than a grain of truth, I still think that most people who
read Nietzsche will (correctly) come away with the impression that he believes
that instincts can be both gained and lost in much shorter spaces of time than
most people would normally suppose (cf. for example his claim in BGE 239
that women’s “feminine instincts” have undergone a signiﬁcant “weakening and
softening” since the French Revolution, i.e. in less than one century).
Here is also one of the places where it is worth returning to the distinc-
tion made at the very beginning of this chapter between two senses of the word
‘consciousness’ that are in play in Nietzsche’s works. This is because instinct, as
Nietzsche understands it, is only opposed to consciousness in one of these two
senses. When Nietzsche talks of an action being instinctive, he is not trying
to imply that the agent in question performed it without having any sensory
awareness of their surroundings. Rather, instinct is only opposed to conscious-
ness as a reﬂective and deliberative capacity. Hence, to say an action was per-
formed instinctively, for Nietzsche, means that it was not done on the basis of
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explicit reasons—the drive which impelled the person to perform the action in
question simply commanded, it did not offer itself to the conscious intellect as
an option with considerations in its favour.18
To get a clearer picture of the difference Nietzsche sees between functioning
consciously and functioning according to instinct, it will be useful to return to
the following passage from the Second Essay of the Genealogy. At this point,
Nietzsche is drawing an analogy to capture the situation that faced mankind
when they were ﬁrst “imprisoned within the conﬁnes of society and peace”:
It must have been no different for these semi-animals, happily adapted to the
wilderness, war, the wandering life and adventure than it was for the sea ani-
mals when they were forced to either become land animals or perish—at one go,
all instincts were devalued and “suspended”. Now they had to walk on their
feet and “carry themselves”, whereas they had been carried by the water up till
then: a terrible heaviness bore down on them. They felt they were clumsy at
performing the simplest task, they did not have their familiar guide any more
for this new, unknown world, those regulating impulses that unconsciously led
them to safety—the poor things were reduced to relying on thinking, inference,
calculation, and the connecting of cause and effect, that is, to relying on their
“consciousness”, that most impoverished and error-prone organ! I do not think
there has ever been such a feeling of misery on earth, such a leaden discomfort
(GM II: 16)
Whilst Nietzsche’s main point in this passage is not actually to present the
advantages of having one’s life guided by unconscious “regulating impulses” as
opposed to by conscious reﬂection,19 it still provides a neat summary of a famil-
iar Nietzschean view: healthy organic life functions according to instincts that
18Although even this is complicated by some of Nietzsche’s other assertions. In the section
of Twilight of the Idols discussed below, for example, Nietzsche endorse a strong opposition
between reason and instinct. In an early remark from Beyond Good and Evil, however, he
says that “the greatest part of conscious thought must still be attributed to instinctive activity,
and this is even the case for philosophical thought”. In the same passage, he also says that
it is a mistake to see “‘consciousness’ [as] opposed to instinct in any decisive sense—most of a
philosopher’s conscious thought is secretly directed and forced into determinate channels by the
instincts” (BGE 3). I take it that Nietzsche’s focus on the activity of philosophers here shows
that he is thinking of consciousness in the narrower sense of a rational and deliberative faculty.
19The actual point of this passage is to emphasize the scale of the effect on human life when
they made the sudden shift from a “formless” (GM II: 17) nomadic lifestyle to a life in what is
recognizably a state. That Nietzsche takes this shift to be sudden and not gradual is clear from
the content of GM II: 17.
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work below the level of consciousness, and guiding one’s life through conscious
thought is a sign of a dangerous decline of a once healthy set of instincts.
A further example of this can also be found in Nietzsche’s treatment of
the decline of Greek civilization, and the role he takes Socrates to have played
in this decline. When treating this topic talk of instinct, and its counterpart
reason (or dialectic, as Nietzsche also sometimes calls it), occurs frequently.20
The following passage from Beyond Good and Evil provides a particularly good
example:
The old theological problem of “faith” and “knowledge”—or, to be more precise,
of instinct and reason—and so, the question of whether, with respect to the value
of things, the instincts deserve more authority than reason (reason wants some
ground or “what for?”, some purpose or utility behind our values and actions)—
this is the same old moral problem that ﬁrst emerged in the person of Socrates
(BGE 191)
Nietzsche’s attitude towards Socrates is certainly not straightforward, and
any discussion is hindered by the fact that he references him in many different
contexts and for many different reasons.21 For the purposes of my current dis-
cussion though, I will focus upon the section of the Twilight of the Idols called
“The Problem of Socrates”. Here, Nietzsche’s story runs roughly as follows: in
the early, non-décadent days of Greek society, people functioned according to
instinct. They did not need or approve of dialectic and the giving of reasons,
and believed in the authority of that which came naturally to them:
Before Socrates, dialectical manners were rejected in good society: they were seen
as bad manners, they humiliated people...Nothing with real value needs to be
proved ﬁrst. Wherever authority is still part of the social fabric, wherever people
give commands rather than reasons, the dialectician is a type of clown
(TI: “The Problem of Socrates”, 5)
20In the section of Twilight of the Idols entitled “The Problem of Socrates”, for example, talk
of the opposition between reason/dialectic and the instincts runs through all the sections from
4 to 11.
21Kaufmann gives an excellent treatment of Nietzsche’s attitude towards Socrates in Chapter
13 of Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.
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This happy state did not, however, last forever, and the instincts of the an-
cient Greeks started to degenerate and to tend towards excesses of lust, greed
and violence. Moreover, Socrates had a special insight into this degeneration of
the instincts, as he himself presented a particularly advanced case of the same
phenomenon: “[Socrates] understood that his case, his idiosyncrasy of a case was
not an exception any more. The same type of degeneration was quietly gaining
ground everywhere: old Athens was coming to an end” (TI: “The Problem of
Socrates”, 9). So, to help his fellow citizens combat the newly arising tyranny
of degenerate instincts, Socrates demonstrated to them his own solution to the
problem. This involved opposing the tyranny of these degenerate instincts with
a new kind of tyranny—the tyranny of reason over the instincts (cf. TI: “The
Problem of Socrates”, 10).
This is obviously a highly truncated version of the story Nietzsche tells
in “The Problem of Socrates”, and it misses out many of the nuances of the
account Nietzsche gives there. The overall point, however, remains intact and
provides further evidence for my main claim in this section—namely that, as
far as Nietzsche is concerned, health and unconscious instinct go hand in hand,
just as do sickness (or décadence as Nietzsche is fond of calling it in this section
of Twilight of the Idols) and the preponderance of conscious reasoning. Or, as
Nietzsche himself puts this point:
The most glaring daylight, rationality at any cost, a cold, bright, cautious, con-
scious life without instinct, opposed to instinct, was itself just a sickness, another
sickness—and in no way a return to “virtue”, to “health”, to happiness...To have
to ﬁght the instincts—that is the formula for decadence: as long as life is ascending,
happiness is equal to instinct.
(TI: “The Problem of Socrates”, 11)
The Value of Consciousness for Future Higher Individuals
In the previous two sections, I have put forward some of the criticisms that
Nietzsche makes regarding the value of consciousness. These criticisms, fairly
obviously, sit uneasily next to certain claims that I have made so far: most specif-
ically, my claim that one way of achieving autonomy, on Nietzsche’s view, is by
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consciously creating (and adhering to) a personalized ethic which enhances the
ﬂourishing of the individual in question. If, as Nietzsche maintains, conscious-
ness is necessarily a levelling herd-phenomenon, which only deals in that which
is common and average, and, moreover, is a sickness which stands in the way
of a healthy functioning according to unconscious “regulating impulses”, then
it seems unlikely that consciousness can play anything like this positive role in
Nietzsche’s thinking. In this section, I will answer both types of concern with
one response, and thereby show that there is still space in Nietzsche’s ideal of
autonomy for conscious reﬂection to play a role.
Before giving this response, it will be worthwhile to say a little about what
type of response I am going to give. My aim will not be to deny or downplay
these aspects of Nietzsche’s thought. It is, in my opinion, undeniable that Ni-
etzsche questions the value of consciousness, and moreover that he does so for
the sort of reasons discussed above. The claim that I want to make, rather, is
that Nietzsche’s worries about the value of consciousness are perfectly compat-
ible with his allowing the possibility of conscious thought playing a beneﬁcial
role in the lives of future higher individuals who achieve the highest levels of
autonomy.
The reason why both types of concern can be answered with a single re-
sponse is because, in order to see either of them as presenting a problem for the
reading of Nietzsche that I have put forward, another underlying assumption
must be in place. This assumption is, put simply, that the origin and current
value of consciousness determines what its value will be for future higher indi-
viduals. This assumption, however, goes directly against a central Nietzschean
principle:
namely that the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness,
its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo
separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continu-
ally interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new
purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic
world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and
dominating consist of reinterpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their
former “meaning” and “purpose” must necessarily be obscured or completely
obliterated.
(GM II: 12)
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As this passage clearly shows, any attempt to use the existing state of con-
sciousness to gauge what its value will be in the future for higher individuals
is, in Nietzsche’s eyes, an illegitimate move. The fact that consciousness is cur-
rently fairly described as an illness, as well as the fact that it currently serves the
purposes of the ‘herd’, in no way rule out the possibility that it could be “trans-
formed and redirected to a new purpose” by those individuals in the future (if
there be any) who achieve the higher degrees of autonomy.
This might initially sound like a strange claim. If consciousness truly is a
sickness, and if it really does only allow a person to deal with what is “shallow,
thin, [and] relatively stupid”, it might seems reasonable to conclude that there
is no positive use that a higher individual could make of it, regardless of any
efforts they might make. Yet, to see that Nietzsche does believe that something
can be transformed from being a “sickness” into being something of positive
value, we can compare it to another phenomenon that he believes can undergo
a similar “reversal”: namely “bad conscience” (GM II: 24).
The “reversal” of bad conscience is a topic I have touched brieﬂy on before22
and it will not be necessary to go into any sort of extremely detailed analysis
here. Sufﬁce it to say though, that even the most cursory reading of the Second
Essay of the Genealogy shows that bad conscience is not something Nietzsche
considers to currently be of beneﬁt to humanity. For example, towards the end
of the Second Essay, when talking about the entanglement of bad conscience
with religious ideas, Nietzsche says:
this man of bad conscience has siezed on religious presupposition in order to
provide his self-torture with its most horriﬁc hardness and sharpness. Debt to-
wards God: this thought becomes an instrument of torture...We have here a
sort of madness of the will showing itself in mental cruelty which is absolutely
unparalleled: man’s will to ﬁnd himself guilty and condemned without hope of
reprieve, his will to think of himself as punished, without the punishment ever
being equivalent to the level of guilt...Here is sickness, without a doubt, the most
terrible sickness ever to rage in man
(GM II: 22)
22During the ﬁnal section of Chapter II, on pages 43–44.
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This passage is unequivocal in the judgement it passes on bad conscience.
Not only is it most certainly a sickness, it is in fact “the most terrible sickness
ever to rage in man”. Yet, in spite of this damning indictment, it is only two
sections later (in GM II: 24) that we ﬁnd Nietzsche hoping that this very same
bad conscience will be taken by someone possessing “great health” and transﬁg-
ured into something positive by turning it against “all the ideals which up to
now have been hostile to life”. It is for this reason that Nietzsche is able to say
that: “Bad conscience is a sickness, there is no point in denying it, but a sickness
rather like pregnancy” (GM II: 19).
The implications of all this are clear. If a higher individual of the future,
one possessing “great health”, is (at least in Nietzsche’s view) capable of convert-
ing “the most terrible sickness ever to rage in man” into something positive by
turning it to a new purpose, then it seems at least equally possible that con-
sciousness, despite currently being justiﬁably described as a sickness and a herd
phenomenon, could also be put to a positive use by a higher individual of the
future in the course of achieving autonomy. Therefore, Nietzsche’s critique of
the current value of consciousness should not be seen as any sort of signiﬁcant
barrier to the incorporation of conscious thought into his positive project.
Final Thoughts on Consciousness
The arguments I have advanced so far have been intended to establish two differ-
ent things. Firstly, that there is room in Nietzsche’s philosophy for conscious
states to play some explanatory role in relation to action, and secondly that the
capacity for conscious, reﬂective thought is capable of being a force for the good
in the life of a Nietzschean higher individual. These two conclusions, however,
actually look rather conventional for a philosopher who is normally considered
to be such a radical critic of traditional philosophical beliefs. In fact, the twin
beliefs that conscious states are the causes of actions, and that conscious reﬂec-
tion is a chief ingredient of the good life for man, have been shared by a great
number of philosophers prior to Nietzsche.
This appearance of conventionality, however, is only an appearance. For
whilst Nietzsche does endorse these fairly traditional sounding philosophical
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claims, he also marries them in both cases to a critique of the way he takes
these claims to usually be understood. And, in both cases, the essence of his
critique is basically the same: traditional philosophers have grossly exaggerated
and overestimated the force of these claims.
The claim about the explanatory role of conscious states in relation to ac-
tion, which was discussed at length on pages 122–128, provides a good example
of this. Here, Nietzsche’s claim that conscious states can play some, albeit fairly
limited, role in the understanding or explanation of an action, needs to be seen
against the background of what he takes to be the dominant view of the role
of conscious states that he is opposing. According to this view, as Nietzsche
understands it, conscious states are the sole causes of actions, and once we have
understood the preceding conscious intentions, there is nothing more of inter-
est to be known about how the action was generated. It is by comparison with
this view, which Nietzsche takes to be the standard view of both his contem-
poraries and immediate predecessors,23 that his own view, that our conscious
states are one of the least signiﬁcant determining factors of our actions, starts to
seem other than conventional.
The story is analogous in the case of the second claim, that conscious re-
ﬂection can play a positive role for a Nietzschean higher individual. This again
sounds like a pretty standard philosophical claim, that would sit comfortably
with the general trend of philosophical thought which is summed up nicely by
Socrates’ famous claim that “examining both myself and others is really the very
best thing a man can do, and that life without this sort of examination is not
worth living” (Plato, 1993, p.63). Once again though, to see what is not stan-
dard in Nietzsche’s position, we need to consider it in relation to his critique
of this very trend of philosophical thought. As far as Nietzsche understands
things, it is once again an almost universally accepted philosophical dogma that
the capacity for conscious reﬂection is straightforwardly a good thing, and that
conscious rational reﬂection on one’s self and one’s actions is a necessary com-
ponent of the good life for human beings. This is, in Nietzsche’s eyes at least,
another great overestimation and exaggeration on the part of the philosophical
tradition, only this time of the value of consciousness, as opposed to what we
23Although admittedly he is very vague about exactly when this view gained dominance.
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might call the power of consciousness. In opposition to this, Nietzsche wants
to make what he takes to be the far less extreme claim: that the capacity for
conscious reﬂection can be both harmful in some respects and beneﬁcial in oth-
ers, and that this capacity can play a part in the good life for human beings, but
is by no means a necessary component of it.24
Therefore, in the case of both these claims, it should be remembered that
they are advanced as corrections to the highly inﬂated claims Nietzsche takes
the philosophical tradition to make about both the power (both explanatory
and causal) and value of consciousness. I will now conclude by noting some of
the most signiﬁcant consequences that follow from the overturning of this pair
of philosophical overestimations.
The ﬁrst such consequence is that any explanation of a person’s behaviour
solely in terms of conscious states will necessarily be seen by Nietzsche to be
a very shallow explanation—one that deals only with surface phenomena, and
which for that very reason may well disguise the true facts of the case more
than it reveals them. An adequate explanation, on the other hand, will have
to bring in non-conscious factors (such as facts about the non-conscious drives
of the individual, their physiological constitution, their position is social and
historical space and so on) and will be committed to the view that it is only
when interpreted in the light of these non-conscious factors that our conscious
states can be of any real explanatory use at all.
The second consequence is pretty much an application of the ﬁrst conse-
quence to the personal case: it involves a recognition that in one’s own case, as
in the case of others, the true causes of our actions lie in more than our con-
scious thoughts and intentions. This might at ﬁrst sound like a purely negative
insight, but I think it is in fact tied up with Nietzsche’s belief in what might be
called the ethical importance of “the smallest and most everyday things” (WS 6).
For if we accept that the origins of our actions reach back further than merely
to our conscious thoughts, it is not a great leap to seeing that a change in diet,
for instance, can do just as much to improve our life, if not more, than any
24Obviously talk of ‘the good life for human beings’ doesn’t sound particularly Nietzschean,
but I take it that this phrase is permissible so long as it is remembered that the sense of ‘good’
here is that which is opposed to ‘bad’, rather than that which is opposed to ‘evil’ (cf. GM I: 17).
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change in our beliefs. And this is a point Nietzsche himself makes frequently,
as in the following passage from The Wanderer and His Shadow:
One should consider that almost all the physical and psychical frailties of the indi-
vidual derive from this lack: not knowing what is beneﬁcial to us and what is
harmful in the institution of our mode of life, in the division of the day, in for
how long and with whom we enjoy social intercourse, in profession and leisure,
commanding and obeying, feeling for art and nature, eating, sleeping and reﬂect-
ing; being unknowledgeable in the smallest and most everyday things and failing to
keep an eye on them—this it is that transforms the earth for so many into a “vale
of tears”.
(WS 6)
Moreover, this not merely something that Nietzsche is only concerned with
in early writings such as this but runs throughout his writings, as is shown by
his concern with issues surrounding things such as diet and climate in his last
published book Ecce Homo.25
Finally, the third consequence that I shall pick up on concerns exactly what
the value of the capacity for conscious reﬂection ﬁnally is for Nietzsche. The
answer to this is that the value of conscious reﬂection, like so many other things
for Nietzsche,26 is not something eternally ﬁxed, but is rather instrumental: it
is always a function of its current relationship to what Nietzsche often calls
“life” or “health”. When conscious reﬂection acts as a force “against life” (GM
P: 5), it meets with Nietzsche’s disapproval. This evaluation does not hold of
consciousness in all times and all places for Nietzsche though, and it will meet
with his approval wherever and in as much as it acts “in the service of life” (UM
II: 1).
25EH: “Why I am so Clever”, 1-3 are the sections of Ecce Homo where Nietzche is most
concerned with such issues. Good examples of this type of thinking can also be found in the
writings between these two passages. In Beyond Good and Evil, for example, he says that “[b]ad
cooking and the complete absence of reason in the kitchen have caused the longest delays and
the worst damage to the development of humanity” (BGE 234). See also D 115 and GS 7. For a
very intetesting treatment of the ‘biologism’ present in Nietzsche’s thought, see Moore (2002).
26Such as truth (BGE 4), historical sense (UM II), selﬁshness (TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely
Man”, 33) and religion (GM II: 23) to take but a few examples.
142CHAPTER V
UNITY
The discussion of the role of consciousness in Nietzsche’s ideal of autonomy
that I undertook in the previous chapter has added more detail to the account
that has been emerging. In general outline, however, the picture has remained
the same—autonomy, or rather the degree of autonomy that a person possesses,
is a function of the power of a person’s will in relation to the wills of others,
and of their ability to extend their will over long periods of time. Moreover, the
achievement of the highest degrees of autonomy, and by extension the achieve-
ment of the greatest levels of power, requires imposing (whether knowingly
or not) an ethic upon one’s actions and one’s self. There are several features
that this ethic must have if it is adequately to perform its function: it must be
self-chosen, rather than simply picked up from one’s surroundings, it must act
to give unity to the individual’s various drives and affects, and it must be well
tailored to the speciﬁc nature of the person who holds it.
Of all the elements of this account of autonomy, however, there is one that
I have yet to examine in any real detail: the notion of unity. In this chapter,
I will look to address this deﬁciency and give a more thorough analysis of the
role this concept plays in Nietzsche’s autonomy ideal.
To do this, I will begin by distinguishing two different types of unity that
are at work in Nietzsche’s account. In the ﬁrst section of this chapter I will
treat the ﬁrst, more basic type of unity—the unity that each person possesses
in virtue of having (or rather being) one and only one physical body. In this
section I will argue that, in Nietzsche’s eyes, it is the unity provided by the body
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which provides the most basic form of continuity for any given person, rather
than any sort of supposed unity of consciousness. I will also show how this
view links with the views on consciousness discussed in the previous chapter.
In the following section, I will discuss a more complex and interesting form
of unity in Nietzsche’s account: the sort of achieved unity amongst one’s drives
that Nietzsche associates strongly with autonomy. Here, I will highlight the
reasons why the more basic form of unity, that of the physical body, is only
necessary but not sufﬁcient for autonomy, in Nietzsche’s view. I will also look
at what a unity of drives (or character, as it might also be put) amounts to, how
it relates to autonomy, and also consider some of the ways this notion has been
treated in the secondary literature.
After this, I will look at another concept that often goes hand in hand with
unity in Nietzsche’s works: that of diversity. Here, I will look at Nietzsche’s
claim that the ideal for human beings is not merely to unify their various drives,
but rather to unify the most diverse array of potentially conﬂicting drives possi-
ble. My argument here will be that it is not some arbitrary or merely aesthetic
preference on Nietzsche’s part that makes him endorse this view. Instead, it is
a consequence of the fact that greater degrees of power can be expected from
those who successfully unify a vast number of conﬂicting or disparate drives, as
opposed to those who only unify a collection of drives that are either relatively
small in number, simple in nature, or else all fairly similar. I will also link this
argument to some of Nietzsche’s claims about the historical development of
modern European man.
Finally, I will conclude by looking at an objection that could be made to Ni-
etzsche’s notion of unity: that it is a purely formal requirement, and is therefore
perfectly compatible with the individual who achieves it being either highly de-
spicable or extremely uninteresting. In my response to this, I will treat the two
halves of this objection separately. As regards the ﬁrst half, i.e. the claim that
someone who achieved this type of unity might be a morally reprehensible char-
acter, I will essentially agree that this is possible, but question to what extent
Nietzsche would see this as an objection at all. With regard to the second half,
i.e. the idea that an individual who achieved this type of unity might yet still be
a fundamentally dull or uninteresting character, I will claim that Nietzsche has
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a couple of possible responses. Firstly, the insistence upon unity and diversity,
rather than unity alone, goes some way towards assuaging this worry. Even if
it is possible, however, for someone to unify a large number of diverse yet ba-
sically uninteresting drives, and hence remain a somewhat unimpressive person
overall, this still need not be seen as a major problem for Nietzsche as unity
alone is not his only standard for assessing people’s worth. Rather, as power
remains Nietzsche’s basic standard, it may well be the case that such a person
can be said to have achieved unity in Nietzsche’s specialized sense, but still falls
short according to this more fundamental standard of evaluation.
Basic Unity: The Body
The notion of unity is clearly an important one in Nietzsche’s thinking on the
nature and worth of human beings, and many commentators have picked up on
this theme and subjected it to analysis. Moreover, at least some things seem to
be fairly universally agreed upon. Firstly, there seems to be a general consensus
that Nietzsche sees the type of unity he is interested in as being something that
must be achieved, rather than something that is given merely in virtue of being
a fully developed human adult. Coupled with this is usually the claim that such
an achievement is not common, but rather difﬁcult, arduous and consequently
rare—particularly amongst the weak, effeminate and fragmented human beings
that Nietzsche takes to constitute the vast majority of modern ‘individuals’.1
Another point that is frequently made is that this sort of achieved unity is not
an all-or-nothing affair, but is a rather a matter of degree, and can never be con-
sidered complete or fully achieved. In addition to this, many commentators also
emphasize the fact that Nietzsche sees this kind of achieved unity as something
akin to a worthwhile goal, a standard of evaluation for assessing people, or as a
necessary component of becoming a ‘higher individual’.
Given the number of commentators who make use of the concept of unity
in their interpretations of Nietzsche, any sort of exhaustive list would be im-
practical. A few examples should sufﬁce to give the general ﬂavour though.
1I put this term in scare quotes as there is a very deﬁnite sense for Nietzsche in which these
people are not, in any strong sense, single individuals at all.
145NIETZSCHE’S AUTONOMY IDEAL
Nehamas, whose analysis of Nietzsche’s notion of the unity of the self in Niet-
zsche: Life as Literature is amongst the best available, states: “The unity of the
self, which therefore also constitutes its identity, is not something given but
something achieved, not a beginning but a goal. And of such unity, which is at
best a matter of degree and which comes close to representing a regulative prin-
ciple, Nietzsche is not at all suspicious” (1985, p.182). Gemes, to give another
example, stresses the difﬁculty involved with the achievement of this type of
unity, and associates it with the sovereign individual, who he takes to be a Ni-
etzschean ideal: “To have a character is to have a stable, uniﬁed, and integrated,
hierarchy of drives. This is a very demanding condition that most humans fail
to meet...The sovereign individual, who has a uniﬁed, independent, protracted
will counts as having a genuine character, being a person” (2009, p.38). And, as
a ﬁnal example, take the following statements made by Richardson, who also
gives an excellent account of Nietzsche’s notion of unity: “Nietzsche thinks the
unity of a person is never complete—this is why he sometimes denies any per-
sons exist—but a matter of varying degree...the extent of uniﬁcation achieved
by a person’s drives is a major valuative standard by which Nietzsche ranks
him” (1996, p.48–9).
Before looking at the issues relating to this kind of achieved unity, however,
I want to look at a more basic type of unity that is being presupposed here.
Some further elaboration will be needed to make what I am getting at here a
bit clearer. As was mentioned above, the type of unity that is usually discussed
in connection with Nietzsche is a goal to be constantly striven towards, rather
than any ﬁxed or static state. Moreover, it is a goal that is rarely achieved,
and most people exist not as living unities but rather as “the fragments and
limbs of human beings...in ruin and scattered about as if on a battle ﬁeld or
a butcher ﬁeld” (Z II: “On Redemption”). Yet, it is clear that, if we are to be
able to distinguish between people in terms of the degree of unity that their
characters/drives instantiate, there must be some more fundamental sense in
which every person, irrespective of the degree of unity their character possesses,
can be identiﬁed as a single person. Put another way, there must be some basic
form or sense of unity belonging to every person, in order for us to be able
to make any evaluative judgements using the notion of achieved unity outlined
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above. This more fundamental unity, on Nietzsche’s account, is provided by
the unity of the physical body.
Obviously this claim needs to be qualiﬁed. As with the character (or, what
amounts to the same thing for Nietzsche, the rank-order of drives and affects)
of a person, the body is not a unity in the sense of a simple singularity. The
physical body, like the human ‘soul’ as Nietzsche understands it, is composed of
many different elements, and any unity that is present is going to be something
like a harmonious unity, i.e. where all the parts co-operate towards a single end,
rather than the sort of unity possessed by things which are simple or indivisible.
The reason why the body can act as a more fundamental unity, therefore, is not
because it itself is a unity in some more basic way. Rather, it is because the
functional unity of the body is far more stable and well established than the
unity of a person’s character tends to be. This, I take it, is at least part of the
point Nietzsche is making in the following passage:
The body is a great reason, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace,
one herd and one shepherd.
Your small reason, what you call “spirit” is also a tool of your body, my
brother, a small work- and plaything of your great reason.
“I” you say and are proud of this word. But what is greater is that in which
you do not want to believe—your body and its great reason. It does not say I, but
does I.
What the sense feels, what the spirit knows, in itself that will never have an
end. But sense and spirit would like to persuade you that they are the end of all
things: so vain are they.
Work- and plaything are sense and spirit, behind them still lies the self. The
self also seeks with the eyes of the senses, it listens also with the ears of the spirit.
Always the self listens and seeks: it compares, compels, conquers, destroys.
It rules and is also the ruler of the ego.
Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a powerful comman-
der, an unknown wise man—he is called self. He lives in your body, he is your
body.
There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. And who
knows to what end your body requires precisely your best wisdom?
Your self laughs at your ego and its proud leaps. “What are these leaps and
ﬂights of thought to me?” it says to itself. “A detour to my purpose. I am the
leading strings of the ego and the prompter of its concepts.”
(Z I: “On the Despisers of the Body”)
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Obviously a large part of Nietzsche’s aim here is to emphasize the sub-
servience of the seeming goals of the “spirit” to the far more powerful goals
of the body. While he doesn’t put it in these terms here though, the reason
why the body is such a “great reason” and “ powerful commander” in relation
to the “ego” is because, whilst both body and ego are organized multiplicities,
the organization of the body is by far the far better established of the two.
There are presumably numerous reasons for such a fact. The most obvious,
perhaps, is that the body has simply been around longer than what we call the
conscious ego, which is, on Nietzsche’s account at least, “the latest development
of the organic, and hence also its most unﬁnished and unrobust feature” (GS
11). Aside from this, however, Nietzsche also suggests several other reasons
why the structural coherence of modern man’s psyche is not what it might be:
the inhibition of a great deal of natural aggressive instincts due to socialization,
and the self-laceration that results from turning these instincts back against their
very possessors; years spent under the inﬂuence of a self- and world-slandering
religious world-view; and the confusion of conﬂicting drives found in people
due to the all-too-sudden mixing of races, to name a few examples.2
The importance of the body in providing the site upon which different
drives can compete, coerce and co-operate, and as providing the basic unity
against the background of which the unity of a person’s character can either be
achieved or fail to be achieved, has not always been picked up upon by commen-
tators.3 The reason for this, I take it, is not any sort of negligence. Rather, it is
that this point is, in many ways, an obvious one. I mainly bring it up here be-
cause it ties in with the themes of the previous chapter in a couple of interesting
ways.
Firstly, the emphasis Nietzsche lays on the superior organization of the
body as being what accounts for a person’s identity over time is intended to
contrast with any account that explains personal identity in terms of any sort
2References for all these points can be found in the Genealogy at GM II: 16, GM II: 22 and
GM III: 17 respectively.
3A notable exception to this is Nehamas, who writes: “On a very basic level the unity of
the body provides for the identity that is necessary, but not at all sufﬁcient, for the unity of the
self...Because it is organized coherently, the body provides the common ground that allows
conﬂicting thoughts, desires, and actions to be grouped together as features of a single subject”
(1985, p.181).
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of individual spiritual entity such as a soul, or by means of a distinct single
faculty of consciousness which stands behind and accounts for all of a person’s
perceptions, feelings and thoughts. As we have seen, an important part of Ni-
etzsche’s thinking is the splitting of the human soul into a society of distinct
elements, and his account of the body plays a large role in this.
In addition to this, Nietzsche’s understanding of the body also ties into an-
other aspect of his understanding of consciousness that we looked at in the pre-
vious chapter. As the lengthy quote from Thus Spoke Zarathustra above shows,
Nietzsche’s account of the body strongly implies that, when considering hu-
man agency, we should give heavy explanatory preference to non-conscious ele-
ments. Because the organization of the body is so much more naturally coher-
ent and deeply-established than that amongst a person’s drives and affects, the
“unknown sage” that constitutes the whole bodily self plays a far larger role in
the determining of what a person does than the “small work- and plaything”
that is their conscious ego. This, as we saw in the previous chapter, is one of
the major thrusts of Nietzsche’s writings on consciousness in general—which
explains many aspects of his philosophy, from his suspicion of explanations in
terms of conscious motivations to his interest in, and belief in the hitherto unap-
preciated importance of, things such as climate, diet, exercise, and all the other
sorts of things discussed at the end of the previous chapter in connection with
people’s lack of knowledge concerning “the smallest and most everyday things”
(WS 6).
Further Unity: The Character
As has already been mentioned, the unity of the body is not Nietzsche’s pri-
mary concern when he shows concern about the unity of modern man. Unity
among the different parts of the body is something that is enjoyed without ef-
fort in the vast majority of human beings, although admittedly something that
can be maintained in better or worse ways by one’s style of life. Nietzsche’s
interest, rather, is in the unity of what might be called a person’s ‘soul’ or ‘char-
acter’. This unity of character, in contrast to the unity of the body, is something
Nietzsche believes is rarely to be found in modern European man, hence his
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conviction that it is this type of unity, and not that of the body, which needs
urgent attention.
One point which needs to be immediately, although brieﬂy, addressed is one
which takes its cue from the previous section. This is to stress that the difference
in the degrees of unity displayed by the character and the body respectively is
not to be explained by any fundamental difference between the two types of
thing under consideration. The soul of modern man is not less uniﬁed than his
body because it is made of some different, more complex material than that of
the body. Rather, the difference is basically contingent and historical. In other
words, modern man’s soul is less uniﬁed than his body only because of the sorts
of reasons given above: the fact that it is a more recent development of the
organic than its counterpart, along with a collection of historical reasons linked
to the development of ascetic religious views and the interbreeding of different
races. Hence we should not see the unequal degrees of unity possessed by these
two different aspects of modern man as arising from any sort of hard and fast
body/soul distinction.
With this point out of the way, it will be worth looking in a little more detail
at the nature of the problem at hand. The basic point is, I think, that Nietzsche
believes most modern European people have (or are) a disordered and disorderly
collection of drives, showing no rhyme, reason or ultimate coherence. As I have
already touched on the causes of this condition a couple of times, I will not
approach this issue from that direction. Instead, I will look at how this problem
reveals itself. This is not a problem that has any one single and obvious result,
but rather manifests itself in a variety of different ways. A comprehensive list
of all the ailments that Nietzsche believes arise from this condition would take
up far too much space and would perhaps never be complete. So, instead I will
use the next few paragraphs to look at a few prominent examples.
One consequence of the fragmented nature of the modern self is that peo-
ple contain multiple and conﬂicting value standards within themselves. The
most obvious example of conﬂict between value standards, at least as far as Ni-
etzsche’s understanding goes, is between values of noble and slavish origins. As
is well known, Nietzsche believes that all of the various “moralities”4 that do ex-
4Or various ‘ethics’, as the terminology of Chapter III would have it.
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ist or have existed fall into two basic categories: “master” moralities and “slave”
moralities. What is less well documented, however, is that Nietzsche believes
that these two types of morality, at least in modern culture, are no longer pure
and independent from each other, but rather tend to both exist side by side in
the soul of modern man. Nietzsche makes this point explicitly in the section
of Beyond Good and Evil where he discusses the distinction between these two
types of morality:
As I was wandering through the many subtle and crude moralities that have been
dominant or that still dominate over the face of the earth, I found certain traits
regularly recurring together and linked with each other. In the end, two basic
types became apparent to me and a fundamental distinction leapt out. There is
a master morality and a slave morality;—I will immediately add that in all higher
and more mixed cultures, attempts to negotiate between these moralities also
appear, although more frequently the two are confused and there are mutual
misunderstandings. Infact, you sometimes ﬁnd themjuxtaposed—inside the same
person even, within a single soul.5
(BGE 260)
Whilst Nietzsche makes this point in the abstract here, it is not difﬁcult to
make the idea more concrete. Most people, for example, have no problem em-
pathizing with, or at least imaginatively supporting, a classic ‘hero’ ﬁgure from
a ﬁlm or novel—someone who is bold, fearless and courageous, and who has
little regard for how many opponents need to be vanquished in pursuit of his
overall goal. Yet, in another context, the very same person will have no dif-
ﬁculty in getting affectively behind what we might describe as a ‘moral hero’
in the narrower sense of the word moral—someone who ﬁghts for the humane
treatment of all people, their opponents included, and passionately believes that
‘violence never solves anything’, as the saying goes. Or, to give an example that
is closer to home, we might cite Nietzsche’s own method in the Genealogy. In
that book, Nietzsche deliberately plays on the mixed valuative sensibilities of
his readers in order to get them to recognize, and eventually question, their own
deeply held emotional responses (or “moral prejudices” (GM P: 2) as Nietzche
5A similar point is also made at the end of the First Essay of the Genealogy, cf. GM I: 16.
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would call them).6 At certain points, he draws a sort of reverent awe from his
readers towards the healthy and active life of the nobles, whilst at other points
he makes his audience pull back in disgust from their capacity for cruelty and
heartlessness towards their inferiors and conquered foes. And similarly with the
slaves and their spiritual leader the ascetic priest: at some junctures Nietzsche
elicits contempt for the vengeful, underhand and ultimately mendacious nature
of their “revolt” against the nobles. At other times, however, even Nietzsche
himself cannot hide his admiration for “awe-inspiring consistency” and sheer
level of intelligence they show in overcoming their physically and socially su-
perior tormentors, so much so that he even says: “nobody else’s intelligence
[Geist] stands a chance against the intelligence [Geist] of priestly revenge” (GM
I: 7). Hence, a large part of Nietzsche’s method in the Genealogy relies on his as-
sumption that a modern reader will not side unequivocally with either of these
two viewpoints, but will rather be able to side with both at different times due
to the fact that they contain elements of both value standards within themselves.
The fragmentation of the modern self does not only mean that people now
contain multiple moralities within themselves, but also extends into other kinds
of value standards as well, such as aesthetics or broadly culture value standards
concerning things such as fashion and manners. The practical result of our
modern internal disorder in this area, according to Nietzsche, is that modern
culture does not really have any sort of recognizable “taste” of its own, but is
rather capable of understanding almost any and every taste from the past to a
certain degree. This is another point which Nietzche makes explicitly in Beyond
Good and Evil in relation to the newly developed “historical sense” of mankind:
this historical sense that we Europeans claim as our distinguishing characteristic
comes to us as a result of that enchanting and crazy half-barbarism into which
Europe has been plunged through the democratic mixing of classes and races,—
only the nineteenth century sees this sense as its sixth sense. Thanks to this
mixture, the past of every form and way of life, of cultures that used to lie side
by side or on top of each other, radiates into us, we “modern souls”. At this
point, our instincts are running back everywhere and we ourselves are a type
of chaos—. “Spirit”, as I have said, eventually ﬁnds this to its own advantage.
Because of the half-barbarism in our bodies and desires, we have secret entrances
6This point is also made by Janaway in Beyond Selﬂessness. See Chapter 12 in particular.
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everywhere, like no noble age has ever had, and, above all, access to the labyrinths
of unﬁnished cultures and to every half-barbarism that has ever existed on earth.
And since the most considerable part of human culture to date has been just such
half-barbarism, the “historical sense” practically amounts to a sense and instinct
for everything, a taste and tongue for everything7
(BGE 224)
In this section of the passage, it almost sounds as if Nietzsche is extolling
the virtues of the “historical sense”, and to some extent this is true: Nietzsche
does think that possession of the historical sense gives modern man certain
qualities which men from previous centuries could only dream of, and which
allow him a sort of direct access to a vast range of different cultural sentiments
and practices both past and present. However, as Nietzsche makes clear later
on in the same passage, the price that is paid for this ability to ‘get inside’ other
cultures is high indeed, and essentially amounts to no longer possessing the
necessary prerequisites for modern man possessing any genuine culture of his
own. Yet, whether we consider this capacity in its positive or negative aspect,
it connection to the disunity of modern man remains the same, and is summed
up neatly by Nietzsche in Richard Wagner in Bayreuth:
Regarded as a phenomenon for the eyes, however, and compared with the phe-
nomena of life of earlier times, the existence of modern men exhibits an unspeak-
able poverty and exhaustion, despite the unspeakable gaudiness which can give
pleasure only to the most superﬁcial glance. If one looks a little more closely
and analyzes the impression made by this vigorously agitated play of colours,
does the whole not appear as the glitter and sparkle of countless little stones and
fragments borrowed from earlier cultures? Is everything here not inappropriate
pomp, imitated activity, presumptuous superﬁciality? A suit of gaudy patches for
the naked and freezing?
(UM IV: 5)
The various value-standards contained in modern man due to his fragmented
nature are also related to another symptom that Nietzsche believes results from
7A similar point is also made in On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. See UM
II: 7-10 in particular.
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this condition: paralysis (or weakness) of the will. This can be seen clearly in
the following passage from Beyond Good and Evil where Nietzsche is discussing
the rise in popularity of a certain style of “lulling poppy scepticism”8 in the
modern world:
Scepticism is the most spiritual expression of a certain complex physiological
condition which in layman’s terms is called weak nerves or sickly constitution. It
originates whenever races or classes that have been separated for a long time are
suddenly and decisively interbred. The different standards and values, as it were,
get passed down through the bloodline to the next generation where everything
is in a state of restlessness, disorder, doubt, experimentation. The best forces
have inhibitory effects, the virtues themselves do not let each other strengthen
and grow, both body and soul lack a centre of balance, a centre of gravity and
the assurance of a pendulum. But what is most profoundly sick and degenerate
about such hybrids is the will: they no longer have any sense of independence in
decision-making, or the bold feeling of pleasure in willing,—they doubt whether
there is “freedom of will”, even in their dreams...Paralysis of the will: where
won’t you ﬁnd this cripple today? And often how nicely dressed! How seduc-
tively dressed! This illness has the prettiest fancy-dress clothes and liar’s outﬁts.
And most of what presents itself in the shop window these days as “objectivity”,
for instance, or “scientiﬁcality”, “l’art pour l’art”, or “pure, will-less knowing”, is
only dressed-up scepticism and paralysis of the will,—I will vouch for this diag-
nosis of the European disease.
(BGE 208)
As can be seen from Nietzsche’s talk of “different standards and values” in
the “bloodline” of modern man, this condition is clearly linked to those already
discussed. However, I think it is fair to say that Nietzsche’s analysis in this pas-
sage adds another layer to those features already discussed. For so far we have
mainly been considering the ‘intellectual’ results of the fragmentation of the
modern soul—modern man’s ability to understand and participate in the most
8Nietzscheisthinkinghereofscepticismintheclassicalsenseoftryingtosuspendjudgement
on any and every issue, rather than in the more recent sense whereby being a sceptic about some
issue, such as the existence of the external world, implies the positive belief that no proof or
justiﬁcation can be found of the phenomenon in question. In other words, the sort of scepticism
associated with ﬁgures such as the Stoics and Montaigne and their “sworn loyalty to the word
àpèqw: ‘I am in suspense’; I will not budge” (Montaigne, 2003, p.563), rather than the sort of
scepticism that Wittgenstein is out to combat in works like On Certainty.
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varied collections of moralities and cultural value-standards. Here, on the other
hand, Nietzsche is pointing directly to what might be called a more ‘practical’
effect of the disunity that Nietzsche takes to be characteristic of the modern
European: the inability, or at least the unwillingness, to decisively act. Once
again, the link to the previous points is obvious. If one contains remnants of
numerous different and conﬂicting value-standards, any action inspired by any
given one of these is liable to come into conﬂict with one or some of the oth-
ers. Nietzsche’s point in emphasizing the “paralysis” of the will, however, is to
bring out what he takes to be a distinctive type of response to this condition
that is becoming prevalent. This is to attempt to avoid taking any deﬁnite ac-
tion or holding any speciﬁc view whatsoever—to attain a sort of consistency by
becoming a spectator on life, an ‘objective’ merely mirroring observer of that
which is happening all around, and a passive subject who merely contemplates
the manifold collection of objects that are given to him through his senses.9
Holding back from active participation in life is of course not the only, and
probably not even the most common, practical response to the disunity of the
modern soul. Alongside it, there is also the option of turning this ‘inner’ incon-
sistency into ‘outer’ inconsistency. This occurs when people simply follow their
immediate inclinations and let whichever of their drives is in the ascendency at
a given time determine their actions. Given the confused state in which their
drives begin, however, the collection of actions that result from such a proce-
dure tend to be equally confused as well. Here we have Nietzsche’s picture of
modern individuals as “slaves of the mood and desire of the moment”10 (GM II:
3) who share “an inability to resist a stimulus” and who therefore obey “every
impulse” (TI: “What the Germans Lack”, 6). In this case, we have an almost
opposite response to the problem at hand to that exhibited by those who ex-
perience “paralysis” of the will. Instead of withdrawing from deﬁnite action11
through despairing of the possibility of ever acting consistently, any attempt at
9This might constitute one thread of a Nietzschean analysis of a tendency that Heidegger
diagnoses in Being and Time to give priority to seeing the world as “present-at-hand”, rather
than as “ready-to-hand” (1962, p. 142).
10Nietzsche is not actually talking about modern man when he uses this phrase, but it does
sum up his view of many moderns very nicely.
11Or at least attempting to do so. Obviously literally doing nothing is impossible, in the
same way as staying perfectly still remains a choice about how to move one’s body.
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consistency is sacriﬁced for the sake of action. Men of this sort essentially live
in the constant present, continually satisfying whichever of their immediate de-
sires is strongest, and displaying little or no overall consistency in the pattern of
their lives.
Whilst the disunity of the modern soul is often best characterized by the
notion of a confused, piecemeal fragmentation, this is not the only form it
can take. Another form (or perhaps manifestation) of this disunity can also be
found in men who are extremely over-developed in one, and only one, direction:
men who are “squashed beyond recognition...completely emaciated and jagged
except for one spot that is paradigmatically round” (GS 366). Nietzsche’s most
sustained description of such men, who Nietzsche charmingly calls “inverse
cripples”, is given in Thus Spoke Zarathustra where he describes them as:
human beings who [are] missing everything except the one thing they have
too much of—human beings who are nothing more than one big eye, or one big
maw or one big belly or some other big thing—inverse cripples I call such types.
...“That is an ear! An ear as big as a person!” And I looked more closely,
and really, beneath the ear something was moving that was pitifully small and
pathetic and thin. And, in truth, the gigantic ear sat upon a little slender stalk—
but the stalk was a human being! If one used a magnifying glass one could even
recognize a tiny, envious miniature face; even a bloated little soul dangling on the
stalk.
(Z II: “On Redemption”)
Initially, the difference between those who are “missing everything except
the one thing they have too much of” and those who possesses a diversity of
elements that is far too great may seem massive. In fact, however, they are both
simply different variants of the same phenomenon of disunity. In both cases,
what is essentially happening is a detriment to the whole being caused by the
relations between the parts. The only real difference is that here, as opposed
to in the case of a fragmented disunity, it is the excessive dominance of one
part, rather than the roughly equal degree of dominance possessed by various
heteronomous parts, that is at the root of the conﬂicted nature of the individual.
I will now draw a close to my consideration of the various effects Niet-
zsche takes the disunity of the modern soul to have on people. This last point,
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however, leads nicely into my next task: showing why Nietzsche thinks this dis-
unity poses such a threat to the autonomy of the individual. As I have argued
in previous chapters, Nietzsche takes the degree of an individual’s autonomy to
be essentially a function of the power of their will in relation to other forces—
the autonomous individual is the one with a “strong” rather than a “weak” will
(BGE 21), who is active and determining in relation to the external forces that
bear on him, rather than reactive and merely responsive. And the reason why
disunity, whether it be caused by fragmentation or by the over-preponderance
of one characteristic, is harmful to such strength of will is basically because it
divides the power of the individual and turns it against itself. Instead of the
“quantum of force” (GM I: 13) that is available to an individual being directed
in any sort of concerted fashion, it is instead squandered largely on the internal
battle that is going on between the various conﬂicting aspects of the individual
in question.
The ideal of unity is Nietzsche’s recommendation in the face of this prob-
lem: the individual who wishes to achieve autonomy (or the higher degrees of
autonomy) needs to impose a unity upon the “fragments, abundance, clay, dirt,
nonsense, [and] chaos” (BGE 225) that is his given nature. It should be noted
immediately, however, that the exact details of this ideal are far from clear, and
certainly need further elaboration. And for this purpose, I think there is no
better means than looking brieﬂy at some of the comparisons used by both Ni-
etzsche and also by commentators to elucidate this notion. There are a number
of such comparisons available, and my aim here will not be to give an in-depth
analysis of each one—that task would take up a whole chapter, or perhaps even
a whole thesis, in itself. Rather, what I aim to do is to give a brief description
of each, and to bring out a feature of Nietzsche’s conception of unity that this
speciﬁc type of analogy brings out particularly well. I will then take a step back,
and try to give a slightly more comprehensive view of what all these different
types of imagery are all, in their different ways, aiming at.
The ﬁrst such comparison is, as we might call it, horticultural: we should
imagine the sort of unity that an individual imposes on their character as being
analogous to the sort of unity that a gardener imposes upon the landscape with
which he works. The main passages for this sort of imagery are to be found
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at Daybreak 560 and The Gay Science 290. And the key thing to take from
these sorts of passages, I would suggest, is the extent to which the creation of a
uniﬁed character does not amount to anything like an unrestricted or entirely
free act of creation. In order to get clearer about why this is so, let us think
for a second about our imagined gardener. It seems fairly obvious that his best
bet would certainly not be to design the garden in question before having any
notion of what the landscape he is going to be working with is like. Rather,
if he is going to be successful in his endevour, he must know the nature of the
space he is working with and what possibilities it realistically offers him. And
the same is true, in Nietzsche’s eyes, with respect to the person who tries to
create a uniﬁed character out of the materials offered by his already existing
self. He cannot simply create whatever character he desires, but must work on
what is already there. This is brought out particularly well by thinking about
the circumstances in which a person will start to get to grips with the task of
unifying their character. Inevitably, this will not be a process which they will
be able to deliberately direct from their birth upwards. Rather, it is something
that they will begin to do, if at all, only later in their life. And by the time
they become aware of possibility of such intentional character-formation, they
will already have a character that has been formed in very deﬁnite ways by
their upbringing and the experiences that they have had in their life thus far.
There is no way of undoing what they have already done, and whilst it my be
possible for them to alter some of their basic character traits, the idea of wiping
the slate clean and starting again is clearly fantasy. Hence, on Nietzsche’s view
at least, they must take a more practical and realistic approach: where there
is something “ugly that [cannot] be removed” it must be “concealed”, and that
which is “vague and [resists] shaping” must be “saved and employed for distant
views” (GS 290).
Another comparison that Nietzsche is fond of using is the political: the
unity of a person’s character is similar to the sort of unity that exists between
the different elements of a body politic. Beyond Good and Evil 12 and 19, along
with GM II: 1, provide some good evidence of this sort of imagery within the
published works. And here the stress should be laid on the heirarchical or orga-
nizational nature of the unity that Nietzsche is recommending in his writings.
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This is important as it mitigates against the sort of ‘visual’ or ‘corporeal’ un-
derstanding of unity that can be tempting to fall into at times. The unity of a
soul is less a matter of all the ‘pieces’ ﬁtting together like a jigsaw, and more a
matter of the various aspects of our character having a role or function within
the whole, and, ideally at least, not rebelling against the structure at hand or
their place within it. In other words, the organization displayed between the
different aspects of a person’s soul will be the sort of organization that arises
through well-ordered relations of governing, obeying and co-operating between
the drives, rather than the sort of organization one might achieve through ar-
ranging physical objects into categories so that they are easy to manage and
manipulate.
Of all the comparisons that Nietzsche uses, however, the one which has re-
ceived the most attention is the artistic: the sort of unity that is displayed by
Nietzsche’s ideal type of man is analogous to the sort of unity to be found in
works of art. Section 290 of The Gay Science is once again a central passage
here, but section 299 of the same work and section 225 of Beyond Good and
Evil also link working on the raw materials of our self with artistic activity.
Now obviously there are many different forms of art, and the main lessons to
be drawn from the analogy will vary depending on which type of art we choose
to focus on. The two forms of art that will be most useful for our purposes
here, I would suggest, are literature and music—two forms of art very close to
Nietzsche’s heart. Hence, to sharpen the analogy, we should think of the sort
of unity displayed by a person’s character to be somewhat similar to the unity
that is displayed by a ﬁctional (or semi-ﬁctional) character from a piece of lit-
erature12 or by the different parts of a piece of music, whether it be something
short like a song or something longer like a well-constructed symphony. Whilst
there are obviously important differences between these two types of art, it is
one of their similarities that I think most effectively brings out one of the fea-
tures of the type of soul-unity that Nietzsche is trying to capture: namely, their
temporal nature. The unity displayed by a literary ﬁgure, like that to be found
12This point is one of the central themes of Nehamas’ excellent book Nietzsche: Life as Liter-
ature which, as already mentioned, provides one of the best accounts of the notion of unity in
Nietzsche’s works available.
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between the different sections of a song or symphony, is not wholly present at
any one moment. Rather, it is something that only emerges when considering
the literary character or musical piece as a whole. It is this feature of the ‘artistic
unity’ of such phenomena that sheds light on the sort of unity Nietzsche rec-
ommends to those who want to achieve the higher degrees of autonomy. Unity
of character is not any sort of static state that one could either possess or fail to
possess at a given time, but is rather something that is manifested in the whole
series of an individual’s actions over time. And, just as a literary character can-
not fully manifest the sort of deep consistency we associate with a well-crafted
literary character over the course of a lone paragraph, the unity of a real human
being’s character is not something which can be judged on the basis of a single
moment: rather, it is something that can only reveal itself through many differ-
ent actions, performed in a variety of different circumstances over a reasonable
period of time.
All of these different analogies are useful in understanding Nietzsche’s no-
tion of unity, and none of them should be considered primary or vastly superior
to the others. Aside from the individual features of Nietzsche’s conception of
unity that they each help to pick out, however, there are also a couple of more
general points that they all presuppose.
The ﬁrst such point concerns the nature of the relations that we should see as
obtaining between all the various different aspects of the uniﬁed person’s char-
acter. Nehamas is absolutely correct when he says that, on Nietzsche’s view,
“unity is unity only as co-operation” (1985, p.177). Yet, as reﬂecting on Niet-
zsche’s choice of analogies shows, we should be careful about the exact way we
think of such co-operation. When thinking of unity as co-operation, it can nat-
urally seem as if Nietzsche is somehow saying that every part of an individual’s
psyche should have the same aim, as if unity was equivalent to the bloody-
minded submission of every single moment of the person in question’s life to
the same concrete goal. If we think about the nature of the unity possessed by
any of the types of object Nietzsche chooses for his comparisons, however, we
will see that this is not so. All of the different parts of a good symphony do
not need to conjure the same mood, any more than every action of coherent
literary character needs to issue from the same basic motive or aim at some sin-
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gle overarching goal. Or, put even more brieﬂy, a good gardener does not plant
only roses. Therefore, when thinking of the nature of unity as co-operation, we
should resist thinking of it as simply meaning that all our drives and actions are
directed towards a single concrete goal, and think of it more in terms of them
all ﬂowing naturally from some sort of coherent underlying style.
Another point that is suggested by Nietzsche’s choice of analogies is that
there is, so to speak, no deﬁnitive ‘rulebook’ we could hope to employ in judg-
ing the extent to which a person has attained unity. Rather, this question will
always be somewhat open-ended, and the ﬁnal court of appeal will always be
the end-product itself. To make my point here clearer, let us take a literary
character as our example. It goes without saying that no-one has ever produced
a step-by-step manual that enables anyone to create their own uniﬁed literary
character, and it is probably not going too far to say that no-one will ever do
so.13 Granted, there are probably several rules of thumb that could be given. If,
however, a great author created a powerful literary ﬁgure, uniﬁed in the sense
being discussed here, that disobeyed these rules, we would take this as demon-
strating the inadequacies of these rules of thumb, rather than seeing the author
as being somehow at fault. And the same is true, I think it is fair to say, of the
sort of unity that Nietzsche sees as being intimately linked to autonomy. There
is no recipe for unity, any more than there is a recipe for making an aestheti-
cally pleasing garden or for writing a beautifully crafted symphony. The ideal of
unity provides no inviolable rules by itself, and it is only by a sort of aesthetic
(or at least quasi-aesthetic) judgement of the living whole that is, or was, an in-
dividual that we can determine the extent to which their character displayed a
stylistic unity.
The ﬁnal point that I want to bring out from these various analogies is that
they all also point to the fact that unity, in the sense being discussed here, is
a matter of degree. To take an example from our list again, we might look at
societies. It is clearly not the case that all societies fall into two well-deﬁned
camps: those that are uniﬁed and those that are not. Rather, every society will
13Unless, perhaps, the advice given is to make the character as simply as is humanly possible.
But this method would, of course, almost certainly purchase the unity of the character at the
cost of making them uninteresting and two-dimensional.
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display internal unity to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, owing to this fact,
there is no obvious top, or indeed bottom limit to the unity that they possess. A
society could seemingly always be either more or less uniﬁed than it currently
is. These exact points also apply to the unity of a person’s character. There is
no threshold which, once crossed, enables someone to say “Now I am uniﬁed”.
Instead, an individual will always ﬁnd themselves possessing a certain degree of
unity which could either be improved or reduced by their future actions. Unity,
therefore, is not a speciﬁc goal which an individual can be deﬁnitively judged to
have either achieved or failed to achieve, but is rather an ongoing project where
success (or indeed failure) are always a matter of degree.
These, I think, are the major points to be taken from the speciﬁc types of
comparisons that Nietzsche opts for when elucidating his conception of unity.
There are, however, a couple more things that are worth mentioned that are
yet to be covered. The ﬁrst, which is something of a commonplace when dis-
cussing Nietzsche’s ideal of unity, is that achieving this ideal is a difﬁcult task
that requires discipline.14 This is backed up by Nietzsche’s statement that the
man who gives style to his character does so “through long practice and daily
work at it” (GS 290), or by his claim that Goethe “disciplined himself to whole-
ness” (TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 49),15 to take but two examples.
A uniﬁed soul, therefore, is no mean feat, and there will be much effort and
self-control required by anyone who wishes to achieve it.
AndthisbringsmeonnicelytotheﬁnalpointIwanttomakeinthissection.
Initially, it may sound slightly paradoxical to claim that self-control is needed
in order to achieve unity. After all, unity is supposed to be a precondition of
genuine autonomy and hence, we might suppose, of any reasonable level of self-
control. It seems, therefore, as if we might be trapped in some sort of circle:
we need self-control to attain unity, and unity in order to exercise self-control.
This point would not be a worry for Nietzsche. The reason why such a circle
seems troubling is because one cannot ‘jump into it’ at any point. Nietzsche,
however, fully accepts this consequence. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche states that
making one’s self healthy “is possible—as any physiologist will admit—as long
14See, for example, Gemes (2009, p.37-39), May (2009, p.90-92) and Schacht (1983, p.307).
15Emphasis added.
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as you are basically healthy” (EH: “Why I sm so Wise”, 2). And the same thing, I
would suggest, is basically true of making oneself uniﬁed to a high degree. Not
everyone can achieve this task, and one of the preconditions of being amongst
those who are capable of doing so is plausibly that one already, through what is
basically luck, has a nature that is well suited to such treatment. A similar point
was made about the extent to which one can exercise conscious control over
one’s actions in the previous chapter, and here our instincts may be somewhat
similar: naturally, when we are presented with an ideal, we want it to be one
for which anyone can strive. Nietzsche, on the other hand, does not share this
intuiton. As far as he is concerned, the ideal of unity is only open to a certain
select group of individuals. Once again though, a similar sort of mitigating
argument can be given to that which was put forward in the last chapter: whilst
it is true that only those people with a fortuitous constitution can ever hope to
unify their soul to a high degree, it is also true that there is very little deﬁnite
knowledge available to any person as to whether they are one of mankind’s
few “strokes of luck” (GM III: 14) or not. Hence, even if this ideal can only
be achieved by a tiny minority, there is no ﬁnal way of knowing whether or
not any given person is in that minority, except by judging to what extent they
impose a unity upon the multifarious elements of their soul.
Unity and Diversity
I have now given a fuller account of the nature of Nietzcshe’s ideal of unity
and how it relates to autonomy. There is, however, one further issue which
I have yet to discuss, as it warrants a section all to itself: namely, how Niet-
zsche incorporates the notion of diversity into his ideal of unity. As was seen
above, Nietzsche sees the imposition of unity upon the raw materials presented
by one’s character to be of vital importance to the achievement of autonomy.
Yet whilst unity certainly seems to be something along the lines of a necessary
condition for the attainment of the higher degrees of autonomy for Nietzsche,
it is not by itself sufﬁcient. Rather, the very “highest” human beings perform
an even more difﬁcult feat than merely unifying their character—they unify the
greatest number of diverse and even conﬂicting drives that is possible. This as-
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pect of Nietzsche’s thought is put forward particularly clearly in the following
passage from The Will to Power:16
In contrast to the animals, man has cultivated an abundance ofcontrary drives
and impulses...a drive as master, its opposite weakened, reﬁned, as the impulse
that provides the stimulus for the activity of the chief drive.
The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives, in the rel-
atively greatest strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the plant “man”
shows himself strongest one ﬁnds instincts that conﬂict powerfully (e.g., in Shake-
speare17), but are controlled.
(WP 966)
This clearly adds something new to Nietzsche’s picture. If unity alone was
all that was needed to be ranked amongst the highest human beings, then this
status might be achieved by people who possessed such unity simply in virtue
of having very few different constituent elements to their character, or else by
people whose drives were all fairly similar and hence naturally tended to aim
towards similar goals or contribute to a recognizable overall style.18 As this
passage shows, however, unity alone is not Nietzsche’s full ideal. Rather, the
full-blooded version of Nietzsche’s ideal demands what might be called unity-
in-diversity.19
Before going on to look at why Nietzsche sees unity-in-diversity as being
superior to unity simpliciter, it will be worth getting a little clearer about ex-
actly what Nietzsche means, as it can intuitively look a little puzzling. In fact,
given the stress that is laid on the importance of internal unity for selfhood and
autonomy, the demand that the highest individuals should cultivate drives and
instincts that “conﬂict powerfully” can seem totally out of place. To begin with,
16This passage is from 1884.
17Nietzsche’s choice of Shakespeare here is interesting. For a good treatment of how Niet-
zsche’s relationship to Shakespeare developed throughout his life see Large (2000).
18It might be thought that this ‘simple’ unity was possessed by the masters (as well as possibly
the sovereign individual, cf. Chapter II of this work) of the Genealogy. I will come back to this
thought at the end of this section.
19The phrase unity-in-diversity is also used by Hurka (2007, p.24). Other commentators use
different terms to capture what I take to be a similar idea. Richardson, for example, calls it an
ideal of “complex unity” (1996, p.67), and Poellner describes it as “the ideal of ‘unity in maximal
diversity’” (2009, p.153).
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then, I will put these remarks a little more into context. To do this, I will look
at two different people who can help throw some light on Nietzsche’s ideal of
unity-in-diversity: Goethe and Nietzsche himself.
As is well known, Goethe is frequently associated with Nietzsche’s ideal
of unity, and the passage entitled “Goethe” from Twilight of the Idols20 is one
of the standard passages to deal with when discussing this issue. And when
we look closely at the passage, we see many indications that the “wholeness”
that Goethe “disciplined himself” into was one containing many diverse and
potentially conﬂicting elements, rather than one where the similarity of the
features involved made his task easier. Below, I have joined together two parts
of the passage in question which support this point:
[Goethe] took as much as he could on himself, to himself, in himself. What he
wanted was totality; he fought against the separation of reason, sensibility, feel-
ing, will...Goethe conceived of a strong, highly educated, self-respecting human
being, skilled in all things physical and able to keep himself in check, who could
dare to allow himself the entire expanse and wealth of naturalness, who is strong
enough for this freedom; a person who is tolerant out of strength and not weak-
ness because he knows how to take advantage of things that would destroy an
average nature; a person lacking all prohibitions except for weakness, whether it
is called a vice or a virtue.
(TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 49)
It seems that here then, we clearly have at least a fairly good example of
someone who has achieved something along the lines of unity-of diversity. And
it is not difﬁcult to see why Nietzsche might choose such an example: Goethe
was a poet, author, dramatist, statesman and scientist. If Goethe is a fair example
to take, however, we should immediately use it to reﬂect on the nature of the
“conﬂict” that Nietzsche takes to be constitutive of his ideal type.
There are clearly some senses in which Goethe’s notable achievements are
in conﬂict with one another which are of no real interest to us here. They all
conﬂict in that they all make demands on the same persons (i.e. Goethe’s) ﬁnite
amount of time, for example. This is a fairly trivial sense of conﬂict, and even a
20Section 49 of “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”.
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large collection of extremely similar drives would be conﬂicting in this uninter-
esting sense. In the case of Goethe, by contrast, we clearly have a case of conﬂict
at the level of content, rather than simply a conﬂict over limited time. Art and
science, for example, are often seen to be in some sort of relation of conﬂict—if
not be everyone, then certainly by the early Nietzsche, given his treatment of
these issues.21 Similarly, we might see some sort of conﬂict between the prac-
tical man of action that is the statesman and the idealistic dreamer that is the
romantic poet. Or again between the disinterested observer of phenomena that
is the scientiﬁc man and the actor in the world that is the statesman. Hence Ni-
etzsche is clearly not primarily interested in the sort of ‘formal’ style of conﬂict
that would arise between any large collection of drives, if his choice of Goethe
as an example is anything to go by, but is more interested in there being some
sort of conﬂict or tension between the aims and methods of the various drives.
We should be careful, however, not to go too far with this point. Whilst
Goethe may certainly have, in Nietzsche’s opinion at least, successfully uniﬁed
some pretty diverse tendencies, there is no evidence in this passage to suggest
that any of the drives or capacities that he “disciplined” to “wholeness” were
actually directly contradictory: he did not combine, for example, his playwrit-
ing with a passionate and drawn-out campaign to eradicate theatre wherever he
found it, and neither could he have done so successfully.22 Hence, from looking
at the Goethe example at least, it seems we should understand Nietzsche notion
of conﬂicting drives as entailing that the drives in question are contrary to one
another, rather than directly contradictory.
There is, however, another example available that might allow us to give a
somewhat stronger reading of the notion of conﬂict at work here: that of Niet-
zsche himself. The main text to draw upon for this example is somewhat longer
than that used in connection with Goethe. It is the whole of Ecce Homo, the
subtitle of which is “How to Become What You Are”. This subtitle is impor-
tant, as it both implies that Nietzsche considered himself to have achieved the
21Something along these lines, for example, seems to be behind the “eternal struggle between
the theoretical and tragic views of the world” (BT 17) that Nietzsche sets forth in The Birth of
Tragedy.
22At least, he could not have combined them at the same time. I will return to this point
when discussing Nietzsche himself below.
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ideal of becoming what one is, at least to a certain extent,23 and also that there
are lessons that can be learned from this account of Nietzsche’s development by
others who want to become who they are. And when we turn to the text itself,
we see that Nietzsche does try to ﬁnd a place in the narrative of his development
for certain aspects of his past that might be seen as being in more direct con-
tradiction with the life-afﬁrming immoralist he took himself to be. His early
career as a traditional scholar, his youthful infatuation with Wagner, as well as
his early adherence to Schopenhauerian pessimism are all elements of his de-
velopment that came to be deeply incompatible with his later worldview. Yet,
he does not deny or downplay these, or argue that these views were not really
his, but rather incorporates them into his narrative by claiming that “even life’s
mistakes have their own meaning and value”, as well as by arguing that these
“occasional side roads” all helped to prepare “individual qualities and virtues”
which would one day prove “indispensible as a means to the whole” (EH: “Why
I am so Clever”, 9). And at other points we get even stronger sounding claims.
Early on in the work, for example, he explains his (self-professedly) unique ca-
pacity “for switching perspectives” by saying “[g]ranting that I am a decadent, I
am the opposite as well”. This, he tells us, enables him to “look out from the
optic of sickness towards healthier concepts and values, and again the other way
round, to look down from the fullness and self-assurance of the rich life into
the secret work of the instinct of decadence” (EH: “Why I am so Wise”, 1-2).
If we take Nietzsche himself as our example instead of (or at least in addition
to) Goethe, then, there are grounds for giving an even stronger interpretation
to the notion of conﬂict Nietzsche sees as being involved in the ideal of unity-
in-diversity.
We should be careful here once again though, as it must be remembered
that the temporal element of Nietzsche’s ideal (i.e. the fact that it is not static
or achieved at any one moment, but rather takes place over time) is crucial for
understanding how Nietzsche incorporated such conﬂicting tendencies in him-
self. This is particularly obvious with the relation of his youthful ‘follies’ to his
23This is also backed up by many passages in the text itself. EH: “Why I am so Clever”, 9,
which will be discussed presently, provides an obvious example as Nietzsche explicitly describes,
in these very terms, how to become what one is by reference to his own case. See also EH: “Why
I am a Destiny”, 1-2.
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fully-developed self, but no less true when considering the fact that he was, by
his own account, both a decadent and its opposite. As he tells us himself in Ecce
Homo, he went through long periods of sustained sickness and, at other times,
prolonged convalescence. Hence, even here, the sort of unity-in-diversity that
allowed Nietzsche to become a master of shifting between perspectives did not
involve some sort of schizophrenic ability to be both deeply sick and power-
fully healthy in one instance. Rather, like a piece of music where the successive
sections can express differing and even conﬂicting moods, the development of
Nietzsche’s character involved various different stages which enabled him to see
life in various contradictory ways when compared with each other.24 Therefore,
even in this more extreme picture of what it is for an individual to contain
“instincts that conﬂict powerfully” (WP 966) it is still not the case that Niet-
zsche demands that people simultaneously manifest two powerful, yet directly
contradictory drives or impulses.
Aside from the issue of exactly what Nietzsche’s ideal of unity-in-diversity
entails, which I hope to have just made a little clearer, there is also the issue of
why Nietzsche sees unity-in-diversity as being superior to unity simpliciter. It is
this that I shall address in the remainder of this section.
The answer to this question, put simply, is to be found in the notion of
power. Nietzsche’s preference for the maximum degree of unity-in-diversity is
not any sort of arbitrary or merely aesthetic preference, but is rather guided
by his belief that people who possess this sort of character will also display the
highest degrees of power. And there are, moreover, at least two ways in which
Nietzsche links unity-in-diversity and power. As we have already seen, Niet-
zsche sees power, in his special sense, as being consequent upon the attainment
of his ideal of unity-in-diversity. It is because Goethe “disciplined himself to
wholeness” while taking “as much as he could on himself, to himself, [and] in
himself” that he was able to live according to “the highest of all possible beliefs”
(TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 49). And, similarly, it was Nietzsche’s
24This point is also made by Nietzsche throughout his 1887 preface to The Gay Science. He
there says, for example: “I am well aware of the advantages that my erratic health gives me
over all burly minds. A philosopher who has passed through many kinds of health, and keeps
passing through them again and again, has passed through an equal number of philosophies”
(GS P: 3).
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ability to unify both decadent and life-afﬁrming impulses that provide the “rea-
son why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps to [him] alone” (EH:
“Why I am so Wise”, 1).
The power that is consequent upon achieving unity-in-diversity, however, is
only half the story. This is because, in addition to this, power is also a precondi-
tion of attaining this ideal. A great deal of power is already required in order to
control a collection of powerful and diverse instincts, and hence the individual
who is able to achieve any reasonable degree of unity-in-diversity will already,
irrespective of their ‘outward’ accomplishments, have demonstrated that they
possess a high degree of power and are therefore, by that very token, well on
their way to attaining autonomy. This is shown clearly in a section of Twilight
of the Idols called “My Idea of Freedom”:
Sometimes the value of a thing is not what you get with it but what you pay for
it,—whatitcosts...Thefreehumanbeingisawarrior.—Howisfreedommeasured
in individuals and in peoples? It is measured by the resistance that needs to be
overcome, by the effort that it costs to stay on top. Look for the highest type of
free human beings where the highest resistance is constantly being overcome: ﬁve
paces away from tyranny, right on the threshold, where servitude is danger. This
is true psychologically, if you understand “tyrant” to mean the merciless and
terrible instincts that provoke the maximal amount of authority and discipline
against themselves
(TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 38)
As this passage demonstrates, it is not only the case that an individual must
possess a uniﬁed collection of the most conﬂicting possible drives in order to
express the maximum degree of power possible outwardly. It is also the case
that unifying such a diverse collection of drives is itself a sign of the power of
the individual question. Hence, attaining a high degree of unity-in-diversity is
both a cause of, and in itself a sign of, a high degree of Nietzsche’s special sense
of power being present in the person at hand.
This double relationship with power is clearly the main driving force in Ni-
etzsche’s commitment to the ideal of unity-in-diversity. Aside from this, how-
ever, it is also illuminating to look at this aspect of Nietzsche’s through the lens
of his conception of the development of European man. Here, I borrow heavily
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from Richardson’s excellent treatment of these issues, which I also discussed in
Chapter 2. According to the picture Richardson gives, to recap brieﬂy, mod-
ern man has thus far gone through two main stages since emerging from the
morality of custom. The ﬁrst such stage is represented by the dominance of the
master. The master possesses roughly what I have called unity simpliciter, as a
sort of instinctive animal health, but largely because he only possess a relatively
simple collection of drives which are all fairly brutish and similar. The second
stage, which is ushered in by the slave revolt in morals, brings about the domi-
nance of, somewhat unsurprisingly, the slave.25 The slave is, in many ways, the
mirror image of the master: instead of a relatively simple yet coherent set of
drives, he possesses an abundance of diverse and conﬂicting drives, yet which
ﬁght vehemently against each other. Put extremely brieﬂy, the master is uniﬁed
but simple, whereas the slave is complex yet fragmented. The third stage of this
development, then, which is yet to come and which Nietzsche hopes to bring
about through his writings, occurs when the best qualities of the two previous
stages are united in a new type, which Richardson labels the “overman”. This
type possess both the complexity of the slave, along with the “wholeness” (1996,
p.69) of the master.
This picture of the development of modern European man clearly ties in
with the notion of unity-in-diversity that has been under discussion: the “over-
man” who unites the best qualities of both the master and slave types is simply
identical with the man who has attained Nietzsche’s ideal of unity-in-diversity
to a high degree. Moreover, as Richardson also points out,26 this story also
gives us an insight into why Nietzsche thinks that the present state of Euro-
pean man provides an excellent opportunity for the achievement of just such
an ideal. Modern man, in Nietzsche’s opinion, has already got the vast array of
conﬂicting drives that are necessary for the higher type he imagines. All that
is needed are individuals capable of uniting them all into some sort of whole,
instead of merely suffering from their demands as if they were an unruly and
uncontrollable mob. Or, to take Nietzsche’s own words from Beyond Good and
25Although, technically speaking, the type of person that Richardson describes under the
heading of “The slave” (1996, p.57) is actually modern man as the inheritor of the slave revolt,
rather than the original slaves who actually brought about the revolt.
26See Richardson (1996, p.66).
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Evil:
In an age of disintegration where the races are mixed together, a person will have
the legacy of multiple lineages in his body, which means conﬂicting (and often
not merely conﬂicting) drives and value standards that ﬁght with each other and
rarely leave each other alone. A man like this, of late cultures and refracted lights,
will typically be a weaker person: his most basic desire is for an end to the war
that he is...But if conﬂict and war affect such a nature as one more stimulus and
goad to life—, and if genuine proﬁciency and ﬁnesse in waging war with himself
(which is to say: the ability to control and outwit himself) are inherited and cul-
tivated along with his most powerful and irreconcilable drives, then what emerge
are those amazing, incomprehensible, and unthinkable ones, those human riddles
destined for victory and for seduction
(BGE 200)
Final Questions
We now have a clearer picture of what Nietzsche’s idea of unity amounts to, and
why it is linked to his idea of autonomy. When an individual has uniﬁed their
character, their various drives and affects all co-operate towards shared ends,
rather than each drive trying to thwart and obstruct the activities of all others
in an attempt to put itself in control. This co-operative behaviour from the
various drives and affects, fairly obviously, allows the individual in question to
act far more effectively, and the ability to act effectively is almost synonymous
with autonomy in Nietzsche’s eyes. Moreover, given that this uniﬁcation of the
drives is something that must be worked on over time, it also means that anyone
who goes some way towards achieving this goal will not be a slave “to the mood
and desire of the moment” (GM II: 3) but will have “his own, independent,
enduring will” (GM II: 2).
We have also seen how Nietzsche builds the idea of diversity into his notion
of unity, essentially believing that individuals who manage to unify the most
diverse collections of drives will have characters capable of greater expressions
of power, and by extension even higher degrees of autonomy. In addition to
this, we have seen that modern individuals, due to their richer inner lives, as
well as due to supposed facts about the interbreeding of various different races,
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have a unique opportunity for the creation of such diverse-yet-uniﬁed characters
from the fact that they contain “conﬂicting (and often not merely conﬂicting)
drives and value standards that ﬁght with each other and rarely leave each other
alone” (BGE 200).
To conclude, I want to look at a fairly natural worry that might be had
about treating such a conception of unity as an evaluative standard—namely,
that it is a purely formal conception. The point of this worry is that Nietzsche’s
notion of unity seems to be totally focused on the power relations between
people’s various drives and affects, and not at all concerned about what the
drives and affects are drives and affects towards. Put another way, Nietzsche’s
attention seems to be entirely preoccupied with the question of the effectiveness
of a person’s will, whilst he has little or no interest in what it is that they
actually are willing. As we saw Nietzsche himself say earlier: “whether the taste
[according to which one formed one’s character] was good or bad means less
than one may think; it’s enough that it was one taste!” (GS 290).
The point of this worry can be brought out even more clearly by consid-
ering the following two questions: 1) Could someone achieve the Nietzschean
ideal of unity and still be a morally reprehensible individual? and 2) Could
someone achieve the Nietzschean ideal of unity and still be fundamentally dull
or uninteresting? In the remainder of this chapter, I will treat these two ques-
tions in turn.
1) Could someone achieve the Nietzschean ideal of unity and still be a morally
reprehensible individual?
One immediate concern that might arise from the formal nature of Niet-
zsche’s notion of unity is the possibility of someone fulﬁlling it to a high degree
whilst still being a morally reprehensible person. As was mentioned above, Ni-
etzsche does not seem to rule out in principle any particular drives or types
of drives from being forged into the unity of a person’s character. In fact, his
insistence on the claim that more diversity is better seems to, if anything, go
directly against the idea of excluding certain types of drive in principle. Given
this, there seems to be nothing that rules out a person having a uniﬁed character
composed largely of drives of which most people would naturally disapprove:
drives to steal, cheat, manipulate, hurt and deceive. Provided all these drives
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stood in the right relationship to each other, all subservient to one ‘evil’ master
drive perhaps, this person would presumably meet with Nietzsche’s approval.
This argument, I take it, is meant to point out the counter-intuitive implica-
tions of this notion of unity: Nietzsche’s evaluative standard cannot be correct
if it implies that we should be lauding people who we intuitively believe that we
should be condemning. This, however, obviously ignores the extent to which
Nietzsche intends his work to be a challenge to our current intuitions about
who deserves our respect and admiration, as well as who deserves our contempt
and disapproval. As the self-proclaimed “ﬁrst immoralist” (EH: “Why I am a
Destiny”, 2), a large part of Nietzsche’s project involves trying to persuade his
readers that those who are currently considered ‘the good men’ are akin to tame,
domesticated house-animals, and as such are more worthy of disgust than of ad-
miration. And, as a ﬂipside to this, he also tries to show his readers that whilst
there may be something terrifying about the people we currently label ‘evil’,
these are also often the strongest specimens of mankind. Hence the following
question, which was also noted in Chapter II, that Nietzsche poses to his readers
in the Genealogy:
We may be quite justiﬁed in retaining our fear of the blond beast at the centre of
every noble race and remain on our guard: but who would not, a hundred times
over, prefer to fear if he can admire at the same time, rather than not fear, but
thereby permanently retain the disgusting spectacle of the failed, the stunted, the
wasted away and the poisoned?
(GM I: 11)
In the interests of fairness, however, it must be ensured that this point is not
overstated. As any careful reader of Nietzsche will know, he is not some sort of
bloodthirsty monster who straightforwardly idolises the cruel, unthinking and
violent amongst mankind, and many points could be made that support this
fact. One could point to his basic ambivalence towards the “blond beast at the
centre of every noble race”, which combines an admiration for their healthy
and active way of life with a disdain for their simplicity and stupidity. Or,
one could point to the fact that he tends to save his most powerful eulogies
for literary and artistic ﬁgures like Schopenhauer and Goethe, rather than for
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cruel and violent tyrannisers of men. Or, again, one could point to the fact that
his frequent praising of hardness and cruelty are, at least in the vast majority
of cases, concerned with hardness and cruelty towards one’s self rather than
towards others.
Whatever apologetics we choose to employ in Nietzsche’s defence, however,
the main point remains the same: the fact that Nietzsche’s evaluative standard
of unity does not necessarily cohere with our current moral intuitions could be
just as easily used by Nietzsche as a criticism of our current moral intuitions
as it could be used to try and demonstrate the implausibility of Nietzsche’s
theory. Therefore, it would be begging a very large question—in fact, possibly
the central one of Nietzsche’s later years, relating to the value of our current
moral values—to assume that this criticism has any real force without signiﬁcant
further argument.
2) Could someone achieve the Nietzschean ideal of unity and still be fundamen-
tally dull or uninteresting?
Aside from any questions about the possible moral status of someone who
achieved the Nietzschean ideal of unity, there is also a question as to whether
such a person might attain this ideal to a relatively high degree yet be basi-
cally dull or uninteresting. Initially, this might seem like a far less signiﬁcant
question, as we ordinarily take someone’s moral worth to be of far more impor-
tance than any questions about how interesting they are. Given what was said
in response to the previous question, however, it is now obvious that Nietzsche
cannot wholly share this view. In fact, it might even seem fair to say that a large
part of Nietzsche’s problem with the “tame and civilized...household pet” (GM
I: 11) that is the modern European individual is basically a sort of aesthetic re-
vulsion at just how uninteresting such a type of man is. This is shown well by
the following famous passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra:
Beware! The time approaches when human beings will no longer give birth
to a dancing star. Beware! The time of the most comtemptible human is coming,
the one who can no longer have contempt for himself.
Behold! I show you the last human being.
“What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?”—thus
asks the last human being, blinking.
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Then the earth has become small, and on it hops the last human being, who
makes everything small. His kind is ineradicable, like the ﬂea beetle; the last
human being lives longest.
“We have invented happiness”—say the last human beings, blinking.
They abandoned the regions where it is hard to live: for one needs warmth.
One still loves one’s neighbour and rubs up against him: for one needs warmth.
...
One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one sees to it that
the entertainment is not a strain.
One no longer becomes poor and rich: both are too burdensome. Who
wants to rule anymore? Who wants to obey anymore? Both are too burdensome.
No shepherd and one herd! Each wants the same, each is the same, and
whoever feels differently goes voluntarily into the insane asylum.
(Z: “Zarathustra’s Prologue”, 5)
Nietzsche’s attack in this passage is directed at those people, who he takes
to be very common in his day, who complacently assume that the whole pur-
pose of history has been to breed “the ultra-modern, humble moral weakling
who ‘no longer bites’” (GM P: 7) and that no higher goal could possibly be
conceived for mankind. He highlights a number of unattractive features of such
individuals: self-satisfaction, lack of independence, squeamishness in the face
of suffering or hardship, desire to conform and so on. Of all the impressions
one gets of the “last human being” from this passage, however, one of the most
abiding is of just how unimpressive he is.
In light of this, it might well be a worry for Nietzsche if his idea of unity is
perfectly compatible with its being achieved by such unimpressive individuals as
this, or indeed of any other kind. This argument is, in many ways, like the pre-
vious argument (discussed as the ﬁrst question). The difference, however, is that
instead of using our standard moral intuitions to raise doubts about Nietzsche’s
theory, this argument attempts to draw more upon what we might reasonably
take Nietzsche’s intuitions to be on the question of who is to be admired and
who is to be seen as worthy of contempt. Given that Nietzsche seems to reserve
some of his most venomous contempt for those who are basically unimpressive
or uninteresting (or incapable of arousing fear, as we might also put it), there is
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certainly a genuine question about whether such people might not be capable
of achieving unity in Nietzsche’s specialized sense.
As Nietzsche’s conception of unity is purely formal, there is nothing to
immediately rule out people who unify a collection of drives that it seems Ni-
etzsche would basically disapprove of: drives towards safety, towards the avoid-
ance of pain, towards mechanical activity, towards effeminacy and softness and
so on. Moreover, parallel with the example used in connection with the pre-
vious question, it is not to difﬁcult to imagine all these drives standing in an
appropriate relation to each other—all subservient to one master conforming-
to-the-herd drive or something similar.
There are, however, certain responses it seems Nietzsche could make to this
sort of worry. Perhaps the most natural response would be to point to the
notion of diversity that Nietzsche builds into his thinking on unity. As was
discussed in the previous section, unity amongst one’s various drives and affects
alone is not the whole of Nietzsche’s ideal for human beings. Instead, his ideal
individual is one who creates a uniﬁed character from a large range of diverse
and conﬂicting (or at least potentially conﬂicting) tendencies, as he believed
happened with one of his favourite examples, that of Goethe.27 Given this,
it might be possible that anyone who uniﬁes enough such conﬂicting drives is
bound to be interesting or impressive by that token alone.
Whether this response is satisfactory or not raises further questions that are
related to some of the issues discussed in the previous section. There I argued
that Nietzsche’s notion of conﬂicting drives can presumably only mean drives
that are contrary to one another in some sense, rather than directly contradic-
tory. If this is the case, then it may well still seem possible to imagine a person
who unites enough contrary yet uninteresting drives into a coherent and uniﬁed
character: a drive to fastidious cleanliness alongside a drive to know every last
available detail about the life of Aristotle, with further drives to play ping pong
and become ﬂuent in Spanish, all combined with a large number of unrelated
further drives which, while in no way objectionable or necessarily uninterest-
ing in themselves, do not exactly add up to anything like our normal picture of
27See TI: “Expeditions of an Untimely Man”, 49. This example was also discussed in the
previous section.
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a great individual in anything like the grand-historic sense.
Perhaps it could be argued that this collection of drives is simply still not
conﬂicting enough, and that once the required degree of conﬂict between drives
has been achieved the result will inevitably be an individual worthy of respect
and admiration. As Nietzsche never goes into any great detail on questions such
as this, however, this type of argument might be seen to come worryingly close
to begging the question: in other words, to the unsupported insistence that only
interesting individuals be recognized as displaying the requisite degree of unity-
in-diversity, and that all unity-in-diversity produces an interesting individual.
These sorts of questions need not detain us for too long, however, as I think
there is a slightly more satisfactory answer to this issue available than merely
pointing to the notion of diversity that Nietzsche builds into his concept of
unity. This answer involves recognizing that, whilst Nietzsche does use his no-
tion of unity as a standard of evaluation, it is not his main or primary standard.
The main standard is, of course, power.
As probably goes without saying, any individual who achieved a great deal
of power (in Nietzsche’s speciﬁc sense) could not fail to be interesting, at least by
Nietzsche’s lights, and very probably by a more common sense understanding
of the notion of ‘interesting’. Therefore, there is no danger of an unimpressive
individual being capable of meeting the requirements of this more prominent
standard of evaluation. This obviously does not, however, provide a direct an-
swer to the question currently being considered: we may well be able to accept
that an individual who achieves a high degree of power, by overcoming great
resistances in the pursuit of worthwhile goals, will be interesting, but this still
does not provide an answer to whether someone could attain the Nietzschean
ideal of unity whilst still being, for lack of a better word, dull. It does present
us with a new question though, namely about the relation between power and
unity.
This new question, as far as I can see, has two different possible answers.
The ﬁrst is that unity is a necessary, but not sufﬁcient, condition of achieving
the higher degrees of power. If this is the view that we attribute to Nietzsche,
then anybody who performs great deeds or creates great works will necessarily
possess a high level of unity in their character, but not everybody who attains to
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a uniﬁed character will therefore produce impressive works or deeds. The sec-
ond option, by contrast, would be to see Nietzcshe as endorsing something akin
to the belief that great achievements are the only accurate or reliable evidence
that a person has truly attained to his ideal of unity, therefore ensuring that
the categories of ‘great individuals’ and ‘individuals who have uniﬁed a diverse
collection of conﬂicting drives’ are necessarily co-extensive.
Each of these two options will yield a different answer to the overall ques-
tion currently being considered, namely whether an individual can achieve the
Nietzschean ideal of unity whilst still remaining uninteresting or unimpressive.
If the ﬁrst option is chosen, this will indeed be possible, although mitigated
by the thought that such an individual will still not have come far along Niet-
zsche’s primary standard of evaluation, that of the degree of power displayed. If
the second option is chosen, on the other hand, great deeds, such as the creation
of great works, the founding of mighty nations, or indeed effecting massive
changes in values, will be the only possible evidence of having attained to the
ideal of unity, hence it will not be possible to attribute such an achievement to
uninteresting individuals.
There is little in terms of textual evidence to help us choose between these
two interpretations. On the one side, the fact that one of most famous passages
concerning unity, i.e. the passage from Twilight of the Idols discussed a couple
of times already (TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 49), links this notion
so strongly to Goethe, a ﬁgure Nietzsche would undoubtedly class as a great
individual, could be seen as supporting the second option.
The ﬁrst option, on the other hand, would cohere more naturally with a
reading of Nietzsche given by Richardson, and also supported by some of the
conclusions I reached in Chapter II of this thesis.28 In order to show why this is
so, I will brieﬂy recap some of the content of this reading. This interpretation
of Nietzsche’s thinking, particularly as it presents itself in BeyondGoodandEvil
and the Genealogy, involves splitting the development of mankind (or at least
European man) into three stages. In the ﬁrst such phase, represented by the
dominance of noble morality, mankind (or at least a certain class of men, the
nobles) displayed a high degree of unity in their character, but only amongst a
28It was also discussed more recently on pages 169–171.
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relatively small and fairly naturally coherent set of drives. Then, during the sec-
ond phase, which is marked out by the dominance of slavish morality, mankind
started to possess a far greater number of drives, with much more diversity
between them. However, this new diversity was also combined with far less
internal unity, hence turning man into “the sick animal” (GM III: 13). Then
ﬁnally, in the third phase, which is yet to come and which Nietzsche hopes
to help bring about through his writings, mankind is able to unite the virtues
of both of these phases—combining the unity of character associated with the
noble man with the far more interesting and eclectic range of drives associated
with his slavish counterpart.29
Now, it might be argued that the very possibility of such a reading rests
upon severing the achievement of unity from its being displayed in great deeds
as the whole class of nobles, who possess a reasonable degree of unity on this
reading, cannot plausibly all be taken to have distinguished themselves through
remarkable achievements. Perhaps this is still not entirely correct as the ancient
nobles, due to the relative simplicity and sparseness in number of their drives,
have only attained to unity and not to the full-blown unity-in-diversity that
it Nietzsche’s true ideal. Even if this is so, however, the point might still be
pushed: after all, if Nietzsche hopes that a fair number of future individuals
will achieve such unity-in-diversity, it might well seem unreasonable for him to
assume that all such people will, as a result of this fact, bring forth noteworthy
deeds and achievements.
In the ﬁnal analysis, however, I think it would be stretching the truth to say
that the textual evidence points conclusively to either of these two interpreta-
tions. And similar sentiments could be expressed when considering the different
philosophical merits of these two approaches. Somewhat unsurprisingly, they
have complementary advantages and failings. The view that the only reliable
evidence that someone has achieved Nietzsche’s unity-in-diversity ideal is great
works or deeds, for example, seems to have one major beneﬁt. This lies in the
way that it treats drives. Given all Nietzsche’s talk of unity and rank-ordering
of drives, it can often be tempting to slip into a kind of visual metaphor in
relation to drives—to imagine that they are somehow discreet items, and that
29For Richardson’s more detailed version of this story, see Richardson (1996, p.52-72).
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we possess a way of identifying them independently of their actual expressions
through action. As Nietzsche himself recognizes, however, this is not the case.30
Rather, the only real evidence we have in respect to nature and coherence of a
person’s drives is their observable behaviour.31 This view of the relationship
between unity-in-diversity and evidence in the form of great deeds takes this
fact into account in a far more satisfactory fashion than the view which sees
unity-in-diversity as only necessary, but not sufﬁcient for the achievement of
the higher degrees of power.
With this advantage, however, come certain disadvantages. For one thing, it
highly restricts the range of possible character types in Nietzsche’s repertoire,
almost to the extent that it would seem to only contain grand-historical indi-
viduals and those with disordered psyches. And, to go along with this, it might
seem to tie the state of coherence amongst a person’s drives directly to a sort of
social recognition of the merit of their achievements, when it might plausibly
be argued that these two things could be separated at least to a higher degree
than this interpretation would seem to allow. If we take the view that unity-in-
diversity can also be displayed by others than those who have produced great
works and deeds, however, these concerns will be nowhere near as pressing.
And ﬁnally, seeing remarkable works and actions as the only evidence of inter-
nal unity might make this ideal seem so unattainable as to scare many people off
trying to achieve it, although it is not immediately obvious whether Nietzsche
himself would count this as an advantage or a disadvantage.
In the ﬁnal analysis, then, I do not think that there is much to enable us to
choose between these two competing readings. The one thing that can be said
with certainty, however, is that whichever one is opted for will bring with it
certain interpretive advantages, but also a related set of costs that the alternative
30Take, for example, the following statement from Daybreak: “However far a man may go
in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of
drives which constitute his being. He can scarcely name even the cruder ones: their number
and strength, their ebb and ﬂood, their play and counterplay among one another, and above all
the laws of their nutriment remain wholly unknown to him” (D 119).
31I include under the idea of observable behaviour here the sort of thing, such as inner
thoughts and feelings, that can only be observed by the individual through introspection, as
these too only reveal consequences of the relations between a person’s drives and never some
sort of direct view of discrete entities which are the drives themselves.
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reading would be better equipped to avoid.
181CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Throughout the main chapters of this thesis, I have tried to reconstruct a plau-
sible version of what I have been calling Nietzsche’s autonomy ideal—his ideal
of the post-moral autonomous individual who is, or at least should be, possible
after the destruction of Judaeo-Christian morality for which Nietzsche takes
himself to be (at least partly) responsible. According to the interpretation I
have given, Nietzsche measures the degree of an individual’s autonomy by the
power of their will in relation to other wills, as well as by their ability to ex-
tend their will over long periods of time. I have also looked at the methods
that Nietzsche proposes as being necessary to the attainment of this goal: the
individual in question must impose a unity on the raw materials provided by
their natural self, either intentionally or ‘instinctively’, through the discipline
of a self-imposed and personalized ethic.
This task has, however, most certainly been one of active reconstruction
rather than mere elucidation. As is well known, Nietzsche is not a systematic
philosopher,1 and there is certainly at least some truth in Bernard Williams’
famous claim that Nietzsche’s work “is booby-trapped not only against recov-
ering theory from it, but, in many cases against any systematic exegesis that
assimilates it to theory” (1995b, p. 66). Hence, in reconstructing as I have done,
I have inevitably had to ignore or downplay certain elements of Nietzsche’s
thinking that another, alternative reading with differing interpretive aims might
1He himself even goes so far as to say: “I distrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will
to a system is a lack of integrity” (TI: “Maxims and Arrows”, 26).
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have been able to give more prominence to. In this conclusion, I would like to
go some way towards compensating for this fact by highlighting one particu-
lar collection of ideas whose omission might seem surprising in a thesis on a
Nietzschean ideal: namely, amor fati, the eternal return, and the afﬁrmation of
life.
These three elements of Nietzsche’s thought have not been chosen at ran-
dom. Rather, they are all closely related to each other. Moreover, they con-
stitute the core concepts of what, I will suggest, might potentially be seen as
another Nietzschean ideal, different from the ideal of autonomy. It is the rela-
tionship between this second ideal, which might fairly be called the afﬁrmation
ideal, and Nietzsche’s autonomy ideal which I want to examine brieﬂy in this
conclusion.
Before going on to compare these two strands of Nietzsche’s thought, how-
ever, it will be worth making some preliminary remarks to prevent a possible
misconception. What I do not want to claim here is that Nietzsche himself
distinguished in any particularly obvious way between these two ideals. They
do not come from different periods of his philosophical development, and the
passages with elucidate them do not primarily come from different books. In
fact, there are even certain passages which one might expect to ﬁnd discussed in
connection with both of these ideals.2 Therefore the distinction between these
two ideals is something that I am taking to Nietzsche’s work in order to high-
light some of the tensions between his various positive recommendations for
mankind, rather than something which can be straightforwardly read off from
these works themselves.
To begin with, I will say a bit about what I take Nietzsche’s ideal of afﬁrma-
tion to involve. The account I give here will have to be, inevitably, slightly brief
and schematic. As with the ideal of autonomy that I have been discussing up
to this point, Nietzsche’s ideal of afﬁrmation is complex and open to numerous
different interpretations, and could easily be the subject of a whole thesis by
2TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 49 is the most obvious example of a passage that
one would expect to see mentioned in relation to both of these aspects of Nietzsche’s thought.
In addition to this, it is worth noting that GS 290 closes by saying that the “one thing [that] is
needful” (which is also the title of the passage) is that “a human being should attain satisfaction
with himself”—a thought that might seem to link it to Nietzsche’s ideal of afﬁrmation.
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itself. I will therefore be assuming a certain amount of pre-existing knowledge
on the part of the reader on the general nature of these issues.
The main recommendation of Nietzsche’s ideal of afﬁrmation, as I take it,
is that one should aim to be able to afﬁrm one’s life as a whole: that one should
‘say yes’ to the entirety of one’s life, down to its smallest detail and without
leaving anything out. In other words, one should not merely accept, but actu-
ally love or desire to repeat the whole course of one’s life exactly as it currently
is and has been, including the parts of it which were experienced as negative or
painful as much as the parts that were experienced as positive and enjoyable.
This primary goal of Nietzsche’s ideal of afﬁrmation gives sense to the two
connected ideas mentioned above. Firstly, there is the attitude of amor fati:
cultivating this attitude in one’s self, and hence coming to love that which is
necessary, is a crucial part of coming to love one’s life as a whole. This is
because, on Nietzsche’s view, there will inevitably be a great many features
of a person’s life that cannot be altered. Such features would naturally seem
to include at least facts about the person in question’s past, and possibly also
facts about the “brick wall of spiritual fatum” (BGE 231) that constitutes the
unalterable aspects of their character. If a person cannot come to love such
necessities and see them as beautiful, they will never be capable of afﬁrming
their life as a whole.
The second major idea which is intimately connected to this ideal of afﬁr-
mation is that which Nietzsche calls the “basic idea” of Zarathustra and dubs as
“the highest possible formula of afﬁrmation” (EH: “Why I Write Such Good
Books”, Z I): the notion of the eternal return. This notion ﬁrst crops up at the
end of Book Four of TheGayScience (GS 341), where it is presented as a thought
experiment, the basic question of which is: how would you react if you found
out (or rather, if “a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to
you”) that you were going to live your current life, down to the very smallest
detail, over and over an inﬁnite number of times? This thought experiment is
then meant to act as the ultimate test of life-afﬁrmation. If a person reacts joy-
ously to the discovery that they will have to live the exact course of their life
“once again and innumerable times again”, then they clearly afﬁrm their life to
an extremely high degree. If, on the other hand, they throw themselves to the
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ground, gnash their teeth and curse this news, then they obviously do not af-
ﬁrm their life to anywhere near the extent that Nietzsche’s ideal of afﬁrmation
requires.
Described so brieﬂy, there are many questions left unanswered about Niet-
zsche’s ideal of afﬁrmation: is the eternal return merely a thought experiment,
or did Nietzsche seriously propose it as a cosmological hypothesis? What is the
exact relation between the eternal return as a cosmological hypothesis and as
test of afﬁrmation? Is the eternal return even successful merely as a test of afﬁr-
mation? Is it conceptually and psychologically possible, or even desirable, that
one afﬁrm literally everything about one’s life? Should the negative aspects of
one’s life be afﬁrmed instrumentally (i.e. for the role they played in making one
who one is today) or for what they are in themselves? Do we need to merely
afﬁrm our own lives, or is the ultimate goal of this ideal for the individual who
attains to it to afﬁrm the whole history of the world? As interesting as these
questions are, however, I will have to leave them aside here. Instead, the ques-
tion I want to focus on is: how well does this ideal of afﬁrmation cohere with
the ideal of autonomy that I have been describing throughout this thesis.
The reason why I raise this question is, of course, because I think that we
can detect at least a prima facie tension between these views, if not a tension
that goes even deeper into the positive recommendations Nietzsche makes to
his readers. And this tension can be brought out most clearly by considering
the attitudes required of their adherents by these two ideals towards themselves
and their lives. As stated above, the main aim (or at least a major aim) of the
ideal of afﬁrmation is to say yes to oneself and one’s past—to love these things
as they are and to not want them to be any different. Now let us listen to
Nietzsche’s account of individuals “who have become free”:
How is freedom measured in individuals and in peoples? It is measured by the
resistance that needs to be overcome, by the effort that it costs to stay on top.
Look for the highest type of free human beings where the highest resistance is
constantly being overcome: ﬁve paces away from tyranny, right on the threshold,
where servitude is danger. This is true psychologically, if you understand “tyrant”
to mean the merciless and terrible instincts that provoke the maximal amount of
authority and discipline against themselves
(TI: “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 38)
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Here we come back to one of the central Nietzschean ideas elaborated in
this thesis: that individuals who achieve the highest degrees of autonomy do so
through the constant struggle to impose some sort of stylistic unity upon the
largest numbers of diverse and conﬂicting drives possible. Moreover, the greater
this struggle is the greater the degree of autonomy that will result from it.
Given the nature of these two positions then, the issue now becomes their
compatibility. On the one hand, Nietzsche recommends that a person should
try and whole-heartedly afﬁrm everything about themselves and their life ex-
actly as it is and has been.3 On the other, he seems to suggest that autonomy
requires treating certain aspects of one’s nature as needing “to be molded, bro-
ken, forged, torn, burnt, seared and puriﬁed” (BGE 225)—an attitude which at
least on the surface seems to entail wanting certain features of one’s character
and life to be different from how they presently are.
There are several ways in which one might deal with this seeming incom-
patibility without attributing outright inconsistency to Nietzsche. One way
would be to simply admit that there is a certain amount of conﬂict between
these two threads of Nietzsche’s thought whilst maintaining that the prescence
of this conﬂict can be adequately explained. Perhaps Nietzsche is operating here
according to the idea that no single ideal will suit all people. These two ideals
would then be seen as catering to different markets, so to speak, and any con-
ﬂict between them would be a function of the differences between the types of
person that they are aimed at. Or else one might argue that, given the difﬁculty
of Nietzsche’s task (i.e. to provide some sort of new ideal for the post-moral
age), he is quite justiﬁed in trying out numerous different and not altogether
compatible ideas. This sort of approach would be true enough to the complex
and unsystematic nature of Nietzsche’s works, but might leave some readers
feeling that justice has not been done to a sort of deep consistency they feel to
be present in Nietzsche’s writings—to the fact that his ideas, despite their unsys-
tematic presentation, are “all related and [refer] to one another” as “a testimonial
to one will, one health, one earth, one sun” (GM P: 2).
3This tension can also be seen in how close this description comes to overlapping with
Nietzsche’s portrayal of “the last human being” who “can no longer have contempt for himself”
(Z: “Zarathustra’s Prologue”, 5).
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Another approach that might be taken, which is in many ways directly op-
posed to the ﬁrst approach mentioned above, would be to claim that we are not
dealing with two different ideals at all here, but rather with the two insepara-
ble halves of a single more complex ideal. The most plausible version of this
strategy, which would be somewhat reminiscent of Nehamas’ argument in Life
as Literature, would be to use the notion of unity as the point that connects
these two strands of Nietzsche’s thought. As was discussed at length during
the course of this thesis, imposing a sort of stylistic unity upon one’s drives
and one’s life is a key condition of becoming autonomous, on Nietzsche’s view.
And, it might plausibly be argued, imposing this sort of stylistic unity is also a
crucial part of Nietzsche’s thinking on life-afﬁrmation, as it is only when every
part of a person’s existence makes an indispensible contribution to the stylistic
unity that is their whole life that they can afﬁrm everything about themselves
and their past down to the smallest detail. Given this link through the notion of
unity, therefore, it would certainly be possible to maintain that autonomy and
life-afﬁrmation go hand in hand for Nietzsche, and that one cannot experience
an increase in one’s degree of either of these two qualities without simultane-
ously experiencing an identical increase in the other.
Seeing Nietzsche’s various pronouncements on autonomy and life-afﬁrma-
tion as being linked in this way is, to my mind, by far the most ambitious of the
strategies one might take in thinking about the relationship between these two
aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy. At the most basic level, the advantages and
disadvantages of this reading are the exact opposite of those discussed in connec-
tion with the ﬁrst approach. On the plus side, it allows us to attribute a high
degree of coherence to the majority of the positive recommendations that Niet-
zsche makes in his writings. On the other hand, however, such a reading seems
to be motivated by the particularly un-Nietzschean assumption that a superior
interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought would be one which succeeded in com-
bining all of his various positive suggestions into one over-arching super-ideal
which should be aspired to by all of Nietzsche’s followers.
Even beyond these basic points, however, the ambitious nature of this ap-
proach leads to some further difﬁcult questions. If the argument I have made
throughout this thesis is anywhere near correct, Nietzsche does not see auton-
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omy as being, or directly implying, any particular attitude towards one’s own
life. Rather, it is something more along the lines of the power of one’s will, mea-
sured by both its relation to other wills and it’s capacity to extend itself through
time. Life-afﬁrmation, by contrast, most certainly is an attitude towards one’s
own life—and a highly positive one at that. If we try to directly equate these
two notions, therefore, the question which immediately arises is: why should
we think that these two things (i.e. the strength of one’s will and one’s degree
of satisfaction with one’s self and one’s life) can never come apart? Why can
someone with a strong will not also be dissatisﬁed with large stretches of their
own personal history? And why can’t someone with a weak will not afﬁrm
their life to a relatively high degree merely through possessing fairly low stan-
dards? Any reading which wants to make such a direct link between autonomy
and life-afﬁrmation will have to ﬁnd some sort of answers to these questions.
Between these two opposed ways of treating the relationship between auton-
omy and afﬁrmation in Nietzsche’s thought, other paths could be found. One
could, for example, see these two ideals as being complementary to each other
in some sense: when faced with those aspects of their life and character that can
be changed, the best reaction a person can have is to impose discipline and form
upon them, and when faced with those elements of their existence which can-
not be altered, it is better to adopt an attitude of unreserved afﬁrmation towards
them. Any inconsistencies between these two threads in Nietzsche’s thought
would then be explained by the fact that they are intended to be directed to-
wards different parts of the person in question’s life—towards the ‘contingent’
aspects on one hand and the ‘necessary’ aspects on the other.
This sort of reading is neat enough, and provides a coherent way of seeing
how these two ideals might ﬁt together in a single individual’s life. Its main
problem, however, is its adequacy to the texts. Whilst it would ﬁt well with
some of the relevant passages (particularly with those that focus on amor fati), it
would be difﬁcult to make it square with some of Nietzsche’s more full-blooded
passages on life-afﬁrmation. In these sorts of passages, Nietzsche claims that
we should afﬁrm every aspect of our existence down to the smallest detail—
hence leaving little room for any sort of important distinction between certain
aspects of one’s life which are necessary and others which are contingent, and
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thereby reintroducing the problem of the consistency between these two lines
of Nietzsche’s thought.
A ﬁnal option worth considering is that these two ideals are compatible but
not co-extensive. If this were the case, it would be possible for an individual
to meet the requirements of both of these ideals to a high standard simulta-
neously,4 but also equally possible for a person to achieve either one of these
ideals independently of the other. This option would have the beneﬁcal feature
of increasing the roster of Nietzcsche’s ideal ﬁgures, as well as allowing for some
interesting differences amongst the reasons why they draw his admiration: some
do so for the strength of will they exercise in overcoming both inner and outer
resistances, and others do so because of their capacity to afﬁrm their lives for
exactly what they are, the good and the bad elements both included. Some rarer
individuals still draw his admiration for their ability to perform both of these
difﬁcult aims at once. For some, however, this sort of solution may still seem
to be too piecemeal. People of this persuasion may point to Nietzsche’s love of
the Homeric Greeks in this context, as he often paints them as people who both
possessed a strong will (prior to the degenaration of their instincts around the
time of Socrates) and managed to afﬁrm life despite its painful and destructive
aspects.5
There is no obvious knock-down argument in favour of any of these posi-
tions. And if we turn to Nietzsche’s works themselves, statements could in-
evitably be found in support of each of them. This is perhaps understandable
given the nature of Nietzsche’s project as he conceives it. Nietzsche is avowedly
not trying to give a systematic and fully consistent presentation of a single ideal
for the future of humanity, but is rather making various attempts to strike out
on the “open sea” (GS 343) that he believes to be opening up due to the downfall
of the Christian-moral worldview. Moreover, given that he believes that very
few people have ever attempted to live according to such ideals before, there is
not exactly a wealth of what we might call empirical evidence for him to work
4With Goethe as an obvious example springing to mind here.
5Soll gives a very interesting treatment of Nietzsche’s shifting conception of the “tragic view
of life” (1988, p.129) that allowed the Greeks to deal with the suffering inherent in life in an
alternative and superior fashion to the “pessimism of weakness” (1988, p.115) that Nietzsche
associates primarily with Schopenhauer.
190CONCLUSION
from. Whatever the relation between these two aspects of Nietzsche’s thought,
however, one thing remains clear: that a large part of Nietzsche’s project was
to promote the existence of the autonomous post-moral man—of the untimely
individual who stands apart from the crowd, is opposed to the spirit of the age,
and is the author of their own values and ultimately of their own self.
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